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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The thesis argues for a ‘pedagogical’ role for courts in the US and EU in 
ameliorating the increasingly transnational regulation of pharmaceutical product safety 
through complementary monitoring of the outputs of regulatory processes. The study is 
divided into two parts.  
First, the thesis explores the regulatory institutional design in the US and EU. The 
parallel development of the FDA and EMA suggests that both markets have achieved 
consolidated domestic/regional regulatory frameworks, which do however show multiple 
weak spots. These vulnerabilities are aggravated by a strong push towards 
transnationalisation of regulatory procedures: domestic systems are now permeated by 
potentially disruptive exogenous elements (e.g. the ratification of transnationally negotiated 
protocols and increasing reliance on foreign clinical trials data). The thesis explores issues 
of effectiveness of safety delivery and legitimacy of rule-making processes to suggest scope 
for improvement in both areas. 
The second part considers the potential contribution of the judiciary, particularly 
national courts in the US and EU, to investigate whether the exercise of complementary 
judicial governance can enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of an otherwise 
essentially closed and self-perpetuating system. A selection of cases grounds the claim that, 
through liability litigation, courts have the capacity to improve the safety levels delivered 
by regulation and thereby to contribute to output-based legitimacy of the institutional 
design. This claim is tested in light of acknowledged strengths and limitations of court 
processes and with regard to differentiating elements at the national level, particularly 
regarding access to justice.  
The concluding argument reassembles the results of the study to recommend the 
existing tool of domestic litigation as a response to certain vulnerabilities in pharmaceutical 
regulation. The ‘hard look’ doctrine described by Sheila Jasanoff grounds the normative 
claim for a ‘pedagogical’ role for courts, enhancing regulation beyond the outcome of 
isolated cases – ad adiuvandum rather than contra.
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“Noi non possiamo essere imparziali. Possiamo essere soltanto intellettualmente onesti: cioè renderci conto 
delle nostre passioni, tenerci in guardia contro di esse e mettere in guardia i nostri lettori contro i pericoli 
della nostra parzialità. L'imparzialità è un sogno, la probità è un dovere.” 
Gaetano Salvemini, Mussolini Diplomatico  
 
 
 
“La recherche en sciences sociales est et sera toujours balbutiante et imparfaite. Elle n’a pas la prétention 
de transformer l’économie, la sociologie et l’histoire en sciences exactes. Mais en établissant patiemment des 
faits et des régularités, et en analysant sereinement les mécanismes économiques, sociaux, politiques, 
susceptibles d’en rendre compte, elle peut faire en sorte que le débat démocratique soit mieux informé et se 
focalise sur les bonnes questions. Elle peut contribuer à redéfinir sans cesse les termes du débat, à 
démasquer les certitudes toutes faites et les impostures, à tout remettre toujours en cause et en question.” 
Thomas Piketty, Le Capital au XXIe Siècle 
 
 
 
“Our society is not committed to preserving life at any cost [...] lives are spent not only when the quid pro 
quo is some great moral principle, but also when it is a matter of convenience.” 
Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The fundamental question inspiring this work is whether the risk regulation regime 
for pharmaceutical products is beset with fundamental problems which, when globally 
considered, include issues of  consumer protection. The reasons for raising this question 
are manifold, but in sum they stem from the observation that the state-based and 
centralised, top-down, law-making/enforcement model of  pharmaceutical safety 
regulation elaborated throughout the 20th century is confronted with disruptive factors 
aggravating its inherent difficulties. At present the pharmaceutical market exhibits 
significant traits of  what can be defined as a closed and self-perpetuating system, pre-eminently 
oriented towards demand for rapid access to markets. This work explores both the nature 
and extent of  ensuing consumer safety issues, and the possibility for courts to provide a 
form of  complementary oversight and perform a ‘pedagogical’ role in the improvement of  
regulatory schemes. 
 A quick snapshot of  the major issues at stake serves to clarify the reasons leading 
to the research question on the state of  pharmaceutical safety. Taking as an analytical 
standpoint recent conclusions of  statecraft to the effect that the function of  the State has 
switched from welfare provision (in the form known as the “nation state”) to maximising 
economic opportunities (in the most recent form of  the “market state”),1 the functioning 
of  and balance between pre-marketing assessment and post-marketing management need 
to be reconsidered in their essence. What will be investigated here is how this market state 
shift is affecting pharmaceutical safety and what potential role exists for courts in 
strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of  risk regulation. 
The first part of  the thesis focuses on the system of  governance for 
pharmaceutical safety that has been constructed in the course of  the 20th century around 
                                              
1 Bobbitt P., The Shield of Achilles – War, Peace and the Course of History, KNOPF, 2002, p. 229, 
explaining that “[s]uch a State depends on the international capital markets and, to a lesser degree, 
on the modern multinational business network to create stability in the world economy, in preference 
to management by national or transnational political bodies […] Whereas the nation-state justified 
itself as an instrument to serve the welfare of the people (the nation), the market-state exists to 
maximize the opportunities enjoyed by all members of society”: and p. 230, expanding on its 
defining characteristics, “…the market state is largely indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that 
matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an impediment to 
economic competition”. 
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national (or regional as in the EU) centralised agencies, with a primary focus on the 
pre-market assessment of  new products, and a subsidiary one (at first, but progressively 
more prominent) on post-marketing surveillance (with the development of  the 
pharmacovigilance system). The limited resources of  these agencies are very much 
concentrated on the domestic markets in which they exercise authority. 
 The thesis provides an overview of  the historical development of  the two 
agencies in charge of  marketing approval procedures for pharmaceutical products in the 
two markets where over 80% of  worldwide products are distributed and consumed: the 
FDA and the EMA. This is a meaningful exercise in order to refine the understanding of, 
on the one hand, how difficult transnational regulatory harmonisation processes are, and, 
on the other, how problematic transnational regulatory practice can be.  The separate 
historical development of  the FDA and the EMA has led to the establishment and 
consolidation of  institutions with substantially different characteristics, despite the fact 
that they are often treated as equivalents in practice. The widespread use of  mutual 
recognition agreements between the US and the EU in pharmaceutical regulatory matters 
calls for an attentive look at the extent of  divergence between two bodies that have been 
exchanging data for at least two decades, and are expected to move towards ever-closer 
cooperation. 
 The analysis of  the development of  both the FDA and the EMA attempts to 
expose three fundamental phases in the evolution of  pharmaceutical regulation. The first 
phase is the acquisition of  ever-greater independence by such agencies and what can be 
referred to as ‘bodies of  expertise’ vis à vis political institutions, both in the policy-making 
and in the decision-taking stages. The second phase, a direct result of  the initial one, 
consists of  the creation and consolidation of  significant asymmetry between the formal 
distribution of  power among political institutions and agencies, and its substantial exercise. 
While formally a great deal of  decision and policy-making power remains within political 
institutions, the actual exercise of  that power is fundamentally outsourced to agencies that 
organise themselves independently. The third phase is the shift to the global arena. Here 
the focus is on the dichotomy between the transnational nature of  the regulatory process 
and the domestic design of  the regulatory frameworks leading to marketing approval. 
 The pressure of  globalised markets has deeply influenced this system of  
governance over the last two decades. The World Health Organisation (WHO), and 
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specifically the International Conference of  Drugs Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA) 
forum, pointed out in the late 1980s the inadequacy of  the monitoring-only role of  the 
WHO in supervising international minimal standards of  drug quality. Taking up the 
ICDRA’s recommendation for a higher level of  harmonisation, in 1990 the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), the Food and Drug Administration of  the United States 
(FDA), and Japan’s Ministry of  Health, together with relevant regional representatives of  
the pharmaceutical industry, created the International Conference on Harmonisation of  
Technical Requirements for Registration of  Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). The 
institution of  the ICH as a transnational regulatory body, where voluntary protocols and 
guidelines are directly negotiated by representatives of  both the major regulatory agencies 
and the regional industry representatives, is tangible proof  of  the switch to a market state 
era. The guidelines produced are explicitly oriented towards a faster, more efficient, and 
less burdensome transnational market approval process, and they are regularly accepted 
and implemented by national agencies.  
 The practice of  pre-market pharmaceutical regulation has accordingly gone 
transnational, although the only ‘hard law’ in place remains national or regional, and 
enforcement is essentially national. This, we submit, poses two sets of  problems: 
(1) The quality/relevance of  the scientific knowledge emerging from the current 
regulatory framework requires a critical analysis. The institutional design with domestic 
agencies as key players is to be questioned on the basis of  empirical data relating to the 
quality, provenance, and compatibility to receiving markets of  scientific data resulting from 
outsourced clinical trials. This is because clinical tests on human subjects constitute the 
paramount and primary source of  the scientific knowledge incorporated in risk assessment 
decisions about the marketing of  new products. The presentation of  said knowledge in 
foreign contexts, and its use in receiving markets, calls for an examination of  its 
robustness. The third phase of  regulatory evolution briefly sketched above involves the 
shift towards the global dimension of  regulatory processes, which is problematised by the 
eminently domestic nature of  current regulatory frameworks that remain fundamentally 
nationally or regionally rooted. The hypothesis is thus the following: strong domestic 
regulations can be vulnerable when permeated by exogenous factors that are not fully 
accounted for. Key questions include whether the absorption of  foreign data still produces 
compliance with the goals of  domestic regulation – that is, substantial and not merely 
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formal regulatory compliance. The thesis questions the effectiveness of  these domestic 
systems with a description of  the phenomenon of  clinical trials outsourcing coupled with 
a series of  critical elements suggestive of  potential structural biases in data quality and 
reliability. The uncertain scenario the study confronts necessarily invites questions as to the 
quality of  pre-market assessments.  
 Among the constitutive elements of  this uncertainty lies the observation that, 
while transnational guidelines are regularly adopted by national regulators, their 
implementation is not entirely consistent. Moreover, if  there is now substantial unanimity 
on procedural issues such as ‘good clinical’ and ‘good manufacturing’ practices, there is 
still a margin of  disagreement on substantial issues such as the definitions of  content and 
conduct of  clinical trials. This means for instance that there is only basic agreement (in the 
form of  minimum standards) on crucial choices regarding selection criteria for clinical trial 
populations, and/or the interpretation criteria, quality monitoring, and desired results of  
said trials. Are such divergences inherently liable to compromise the quality of  scientific 
outcomes? As transnational regulatory practice for marketing approval involves an ever-
increasing number of  bodies across the world, working with incompletely harmonised 
(and nationally interpreted) regulatory rules and standards, there is room to suggest the 
existence of  non-negligible levels of  ambiguity in the quality of  the emerging scientific 
knowledge. This hypothesis questions the very idea of  ‘regulatory compliance’ in terms of  
adherence to the regulatory goals of  a specific domestic legal framework. Procedurally, it is 
hardly debatable that any agency-approved drug complies with the relevant regulation 
(even in case of  outsourcing of  parts of  the procedure to a different country). What is 
questionable is substantial compliance with the standards laid down by the regulator of  the 
receiving market. It is important to underline that the idea of  risk-benefit analysis is a 
grounding feature of  both regulatory and litigation assessments, so that ambiguity of  the 
data analysed may undermine the quality of  the assessment itself. 
(2) The second set of  issues relates to the structure, nature, and impact of  
transnational guidelines, which call into question the legitimacy of  pharmaceutical safety 
regulation and the accountability of  the regulators. If  regulators are shaping their policy 
around transnational guidelines explicitly oriented at expediting market access, there is a 
need to develop new forms of  legitimacy/accountability to compensate for weakened 
traditional ones. Pharmaceutical safety, as the thesis discusses, is characterised by very 
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extensive delegation from the legislative to the executive branch. This poses legitimacy 
problems at a domestic level first, as the margin of  discretion of  executive-based agencies 
in both decision- and policy-making is such that genuine external oversight is limited. The 
evolution of  pharmaceutical regulation throughout the 20th century shows a constant trend 
towards an ever-broader delegation to expert-based committees, operating within the 
framework of  agencies more and more detached from legislators who appear to intervene 
almost exclusively in the wake of  a crisis. The issue has been further complicated in the 
last 25 years by these executive agencies exercising their functions transnationally as 
negotiating actors. The thesis keeps questioning the domestically-shaped institutional 
design, shifting the focus to different and equally crucial aspects of  the regulatory 
intricacies of  pharmaceutical pre-marketing procedures. The magnitude of  the clinical 
trials outsourcing phenomenon analysed in the thesis requires a discussion of  the rules 
governing the use of  foreign data by the FDA and the EMA, examining and questioning 
the provenance, law-making mechanisms, and sources of  legitimacy of  those rules, 
together with the accountability of  the actors involved, in order to grasp the legal means 
by which strong national frameworks are permeated by exogenous elements.  
The perspective remains coherent with the recalled division into three phases of  
regulatory evolution, and focuses specifically on the second and third phases – that is, on 
the one hand the asymmetry between formal distribution and effective exercise of  power, 
and on the other hand, the dichotomy between domestic frameworks and global processes. 
Indeed, when discussing the origin and content of  rules governing the use of  foreign data, 
the effort centres on addressing their critical aspects in light of  the major challenges they 
represent for domestically designed regulatory systems. It is accepted nowadays (especially 
in the European framework) that traditional modes of  legitimation (that is, input-based 
democratic legitimacy) need to be revisited to meet the demands of  multilevel governance 
of  transnational phenomena. The theoretical justifications for the progressive 
abandonment of  democratic legitimacy will be discussed insofar as they apply to the 
pharmaceutical sector. In a nutshell, in the current circumstances characterising the 
pharmaceutical market, legitimacy issues can be tackled in two different ways. One either 
takes a traditional approach, deriving from theories of  democracy and representation, in 
which case the current setup presents major shortcomings. Or one could think of  
different forms of  legitimacy in the form of  either ‘deliberative’ (which maintains the 
 12 
 
focus on the law-making stage) or output-based, rather than more consolidated 
input-based, mechanisms – in which case the question is whether the output of  the 
current regulatory framework can be considered legitimate in terms of  the effective 
delivery of  its proclaimed goals. The latter is the approach with stronger support in the 
literature of  pharmaceutical regulation – a position requiring discussion in light of  the 
uncertainties suggested above regarding data quality and provenance.  
What the thesis ventures upon is therefore an analysis of  the ‘output’ of  the 
system, and more specifically its output in terms of  consumer protection and safety. A 
selection of  case studies is necessary to investigate whether there are deficiencies in pre-
marketing regulation hindering the goal of  product safety, and whether post-marketing 
management and surveillance systems as provided by the current regulatory frameworks 
are sufficient to overcome the suggested issues of  uncertainty in approval procedures and 
‘democratic deficit’. The thesis maintains a complementary perspective that interprets the 
safety outcome as a sum of  the pre-marketing results and the effectiveness of  post-
marketing reactive measures when a medicine causes unexpected adverse reactions 
(ADRs). Specifically the ‘outcome issue’ is broken down into a series of  major sub-aspects: 
first, the structural fitness of  pre-market rules to allow the emergence of  assessment-
relevant knowledge, and conversely the ability of  post-marketing surveillance duties to 
uncover and react to supervening risk discoveries; second, the efficacy and timeliness of  
the system’s ‘reaction time’ when confronted with ADRs; and third, the existence of  safer 
therapeutic alternatives present in the market. Interestingly, the cases show that (as recalled 
above) it is in the presence of  a crisis situation that the national legislator recuperates its 
original function.  The thesis however argues that such national reactions appear to be 
unfit to confront the transnational dimension of  the pharmaceutical market. 
 In sum, the two major sets of  issues identified in (1) and (2) pose the fundamental 
question: to what extent is procedure affecting substance?  
 We have suggested in the opening that, as currently designed, the pharmaceutical 
safety regime with its transnational tournure exhibits traits of  what can be defined as a closed 
and self-perpetuating system, very much oriented towards the trade necessity of  overriding 
obstacles to the free flow of  products, and towards rapid access to markets. After 
analysing the regulatory dimension of  pharmaceutical safety and underlining some of  its 
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critical features, the thesis then turns to the lens of  the judiciary in pharmaceutical safety, 
with a view to developing the premises of  a normative claim for the complementary role 
of  courts. Specifically, the argument posits that courts have the potential to contribute 
substantially in bringing balance to the market orientation of  the pharmaceutical closed and 
self-perpetuating system, by helping to clarify the quality and nature of  scientific data, and by 
breaking the closure of  the regulatory architecture through the introduction of  exogenous 
and bottom-up challenges. The fundamental idea of  the ‘hard look doctrine’, according to 
which courts can have a pedagogical role in the development and refinement of  regulatory 
processes, inspires the second part of  the work dedicated to the judiciary, and forms the 
theoretical basis of  the concluding normative proposition. 
 As the first part of  the thesis begins with an overview of  the institutional design 
of  Western pharmaceutical regulation, the second part opens with a similar descriptive 
account of  EU and US courts’ involvement in the field. The most prominent role of  
courts in pharmaceutical regulation is to adjudicate tort claims in product liability suits. 
The analysis accordingly builds from the starting point of  product liability law, discussing 
the development of  its rules and practice in the selected markets when confronted with 
pharmaceutical cases. The focus is initially on two essential dimensions of  product liability: 
the issues of  foreseeability of  risk (which relates to the notion of  defect and in particular 
the available scientific knowledge to assess a product’s safety) and compliance with 
regulatory requirements.  
Foreseeability, defectiveness, available knowledge, and regulatory compliance are 
structurally linked with the regulatory framework. The preliminary discussion on liability 
rules serves the precise purpose of  creating a link between regulatory mechanisms and 
court litigation by addressing issues that are of  the essence in both sets of  rules: their 
relationship to risk and its assessment. The intent is to set the scene as regards the attitude 
of  liability rules towards risk in pharmaceutical products, because it is within the sphere of  
tort law that the thesis examines to what extent it is possible to rely on courts for the 
purposes of  refining the quality of  risk assessments, legitimising the system, and 
enhancing the delivery of  safety. As the thesis seeks to argue for a pedagogical role of  
courts that goes beyond the traditional ones, classically divided between compensation and 
deterrence, examining the core rules is the necessary preliminary step. The question here is 
whether or not a substantial margin of  manoeuvre exists for courts to intervene and 
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complement the outcome of  regulatory schemes.  
The argument moves forward to an analysis of  the judiciary’s contribution to the 
availability and quality of  scientific data, levels of  participation understood in terms of  
access to justice, and the delivery of  safety.  The first aspect is data quality. Through the 
analysis of  both specific case law and essential product liability constitutive elements, the 
thesis considers the extent to which courts can be called upon to bring added value to the 
regulatory system in terms of  quality and accessibility of  scientific data for risk 
assessments. In other words the question is whether through judicial intervention, 
scientific evidence that gets lost or withheld in the regulatory process can be uncovered 
and integrated in specific risk assessments, or made generally available for more diverse 
purposes. The ability to authoritatively impose full disclosure of  information enables 
courts to overcome an impasse with which regulatory authorities are systematically 
confronted: the necessity of  reliance on partial data (which is systemic to an extent, but 
also very much a product of  transnational regulatory processes and practices alluded to 
above). Beyond its impact on the adjudication of  individual claims, this ability can 
influence the shape of  the regulatory system at large. Through focused interventions 
courts can impact access to information beyond the boundaries of  a single case – and 
arguably all the way to legislative reform.  While the oversight thus provided is occasional 
and necessitates a more diffuse and continuous supplement, the outcome is potentially far 
reaching.  
 Related to the issue of  partial data is the issue of  reliability of  that data. What is 
the level of  awareness within the judiciary as regards the flaws of  the regulatory 
framework? What awareness as to the subtleties of  flaws relating both to an approval 
process grounded on limited data in pre-marketing assessments (a limitation aggravated by 
the increasingly transnational nature of  the data relied upon), and to the intrinsic limits of  
post-marketing measures (which can prove to be slowly reactive rather than effectively 
proactive)? An analysis of  litigation suggests that, whatever the level of  judicial awareness, 
the reality to date has been a generally deferential approach to regulatory findings which 
typically restrains courts from questioning the origin of  emerging safety issues – arguably 
the regulatory architecture itself  – confining the enquiry exclusively to case-specific 
conduct.  
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 As for the courts’ willingness to consider data not disclosed or relied upon in a 
particular regulatory approval process, the analysis digs into the levels of  inclusiveness 
achievable through judicial oversight. The thesis argument suggests that, if  courts are to 
play a proactive and pedagogical role in enhancing regulatory processes, an activist 
approach could and should be promoted on the basis of  the current legal framework, as 
the necessary ingredient to challenge the dichotomy between formal and substantial 
compliance hinted at above. A thorough fact-finding process can pose a legitimate 
challenge to a regulatory assessment on the ground of  failure to achieve desirable safety 
levels as prescribed by law. 
 Beyond the scrutiny of  data quality, the analysis confronts the issue of  access to 
justice in pharmaceutical cases to question the ability of  courts to undertake their 
complementary function – to act as surrogates for participatory democracy as the thesis 
provocatively suggests. This is an essential step in building the general argument which 
suggests a balancing ‘pedagogical’ intervention through ‘judicial governance’ for a 
regulatory system very much designed on market-state premises. Naturally, the question is 
a complex one, and a discussion of  access to justice is fundamental to the assessment of  
whether courts can be effectively reliable agents. 
 To discuss accessibility in a sustainable way, functional to the general scheme of  
the work, the focus is on two separate but mutually influential aspects. First, a complex 
issue linking the themes of  data availability and access to justice is that of  causation. Proof  
of  causation is without question the toughest burden that product liability imposes on 
plaintiffs. A discussion of  the intricacies of  reconstructing the causal links between the use 
of  a pharmaceutical product and allegedly related harms is necessary to show how this 
essential step constitutes a major hurdle in accessing judicial oversight. The dichotomy 
between general and specific causation, particularly complex in pharmaceutical products 
(the effects of  which intrinsically vary from patient to patient), calls for significant judicial 
effort in engaging with a highly technical field.  
Beyond the complexity of  single cases, accessibility requires the thesis to confront 
the long-lasting debate opposing individual and collective redress. Whether or not courts 
can constitute participatory agents depends, at least partially, on this assessment. The 
hypothesis here is that the answer is more to the positive when mechanisms for collective 
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redress are in place, because when individual cases are brought to court the obstacle of  
causation can be simply too burdensome for single parties. While there is arguably 
potential for courts to complement a regulatory system through questioning the fact of  
compliance with substantial legal requirements, this complementarity can be fully 
operational only when the causation obstacle is overcome. As collective mechanisms 
facilitate the successful defeating of  that obstacle, the US seems to remain better equipped 
than the EU in the promotion of  judicial oversight.  
The final aspect of  the role of  the judiciary and litigation in complementing 
regulatory processes touches upon the complex issue of  the adequacy and reliability of  
litigation outcomes in complex fields such as pharmaceutical safety. The classic arguments 
against judicial oversight of  the outputs of  technical regulatory processes are essentially 
two. First, courts are unprepared to tackle difficult scientific issues, and should therefore 
defer to the outcome of  regulatory assessments (if  the possibility of  review is to be 
entertained at all). The second argument is that litigation is an inefficient means of  
regulatory oversight because of  the inherently high transaction costs and prolonged 
timelines involved. Correlated to both, there is a more general argument that product 
liability cases do not provide any measurable social benefit, and that a system based on 
regulatory minimum standards and self-regulatory market incentives is best suited for the 
governance of  product safety at large. 
The thesis confronts these arguments in turn, with no ambition to rebut them in a 
definitive fashion, but rather by suggesting pointers to the adequacy on the one hand and 
fruitfulness on the other of  court cases in the pharmaceutical context. For this purpose, 
the analysis focuses first on how the alleged technical incompetence of  courts can be 
overcome in practice by their ability to make important value-based judgment calls in the 
face of  uncertainty – with impacts and implications possibly reaching beyond the 
boundaries of  the single case at hand. Secondly, the series of  cases considered throughout 
the thesis underpins the claim that fortuity of  risk discovery and delays in swiftly 
addressing safety issues upon their discovery are structural to the regulatory system. 
Experience from these cases points to the existence of  an identifiable and non-negligible 
trend where, in the presence of  emerging safety issues, the regulatory system takes action 
as a consequence of  litigation – either after the case has started or after it has been decided or 
settled. Administrative actions such as suspension of  marketing authorisation or 
 17 
 
re-labelling of  products have often lagged behind private litigation initiatives. The evident 
difficulties for regulators in acting upon emerging safety issues make room for the 
argument that courts can and already are in fact exercising an important surrogate post-
marketing surveillance function. 
This observation will serve as a bridge to the discussion of  the ‘pedagogical role’ 
of  courts that inspires the thesis and its title. The claimed deficiencies of  product liability 
are rebutted with a reflection going beyond an analysis of  cost to the substantive role of  
court decisions.  The dismissive argument falls short of  addressing the genuine 
compensatory function of  product liability cases, but also of  recognising the role of  
courts in complementing regulatory outputs with decisions on issues ranging from 
accessibility of  relevant knowledge to the interpretation of  scientific evidence, not to 
mention the impetus they provide for regulatory reform.  
In sum, the thesis surveys the various threads which lead to a renewed role for 
courts in tackling safety issues at their origin. The concluding argument for courts to 
complement regulatory schemes of  pharmaceutical safety draws together those threads 
and re-systematises them to confront the questions and hypothesis raised throughout this 
introduction and in greater detail in the following chapter I. Can a judicial ‘hard look’ at 
regulatory processes be beneficial from the perspective of  enhancing consumer safety? 
The answer must be yes. Problematic regulatory features exacerbated by the increasing 
transnational development of  standards and procedures call for renewed in-depth 
monitoring from a perspective external to the regulatory system’s mechanisms. A 
‘pedagogical role’, we argue, for courts. 
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CHAPTER I2 
 
FACING DIFFERENT TYPES OF REBUS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
REGULATION 
A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL SAFETY REGIME 
 
 
This opening chapter introduces the fundamental issues characterising the 
pharmaceutical safety regime, which is often referred to subsequently as a ‘system’, and in 
particular a closed and self-perpetuating one.  
Two caveats: first, the term ‘system’ as we use it here refers to the complex of  ‘soft 
rules’, ‘hard’ regulations, and laws that play a role in the governance of  pharmaceutical 
product safety. It is used neither in the technical sense of  a ‘legal system’3 nor in its 
sociological meaning.4 Secondly, when we refer to the system as closed we suggest that it 
attempts to function in a way impermeable to exogenous influences, whereas the idea of  
self-perpetuation refers to the dynamic and resilient nature of  the system, which does not 
remain static in one specific configuration but develops independently over time, adapting 
to evolving socio-institutional scenarios.  
The chapter starts with a somewhat extreme example to illustrate from the very 
beginning what is intended by the phrase closed and self-perpetuating system and to highlight the 
questions the thesis attempts to address. 
                                              
2
 This chapter is loosely based on a previous work: Rizzi M., “Regulating risks in pharmaceutical law: 
the need of an optimal interplay between products safety and products liability”, Opinio Juris in 
Comparatione, Vol. 1/2011, Paper No. 2, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857434. 
3 The concept of a legal system refers to the whole of a legal order (a symbolic-normative phenomenon) 
and legal practices (where the legal order is produced and reproduced: such as law making, 
adjudication and legal scholarship). The literature here would be overwhelming, but the strongest 
definition of a legal system is possibly that provided by Hart H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
4 As elaborated by Luhmann throughout his lifelong work: see for example Luhmann N., Introduction to 
Systems Theory, Wiley, 2012. 
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1.  A tell-tale sign of  a structural problem 
 In the summer of  2009, the WHO officially declared a state of  global 
pandemic5 following the outbreak of  a new strain of  A-N1H1 virus, better known as 
‘swine flu’.6 The outbreak started in Central America, in the state of  Veracruz in Mexico, 
and spread globally. The ensuing increasing anxiety of  the international community led to 
the prompt adoption of  extraordinary measures to avert a potential global health disaster. 
In particular, massive quantities of  A-N1H1 influenza vaccine, subject to ‘fast-track’7 
approval procedures, were swiftly made available by regulatory agencies.  In order to 
ensure the supply of  the vaccine to soothe public opinion, states discharged companies 
from tort liability in case of  damages,8 and assumed full responsibility for the risks created 
by the widespread distribution of  a not-thoroughly-tested vaccine in their communities. 
The following winter (2009-2010), the pandemic gradually started to diminish, and 
by August 2010, the Director-General of  the WHO, Dr Margaret Chan, declared the end 
of  the A-N1H1 pandemic.9 Looking at the numbers, the pandemic could have been much 
worse, or maybe should have been much worse, in light of  the level of  alert and 
subsequent social anxiety. In the space of  one year, the A-N1H1 virus had killed 
approximately 18,000 people globally.10 That is about four per cent of  the 250,000 to 
500,000 annual deaths caused by ‘regular’ influenza.11 Many critical voices raised the 
objection that the WHO had overstated the actual risk and diffused “fear and confusion” 
instead of  “immediate information”.12 However, WHO Director-General Chan had 
                                              
5 See the statement to the press by the WHO Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan, at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/en/index.
html. 
6
 An interesting reconstruction questioning the constitutional implications of the case for EU health 
policy is de Ruijter A., “The Constitutional Implications of European Public Health Policy”, ACELG 
Working Paper Series, 2010/05. 
7 See chapter II on the ‘fast-track’ approval procedures. 
8 The contracts between producers and Member States in the EU for the sale and distribution of A-N1H1 
vaccine are characterised, Europe-wide, by the explicit provision of liability exemption clauses. See 
for example the contract between Novartis and the Italian government, available at 
http://www.altreconomia.it/allegati/contenuti/phpXkxW0S2095.pdf. 
9 See http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/h1n1_vpc_20100810/en/index.html. 
10 By late July 2010, the WHO was still considering the virus a pandemic, on the basis of the same 
statistics: see the relevant documents available at  http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/en/. 
11 WHO fact sheet communication N° 211, April 2009, ibidem. 
12 Lynn J., “WHO to Review its Handling of N1H1 Flu Pandemic”, Reuters, January 10, 2010, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/12/us-flu-who-idUSTRE5BL2ZT20100112; see also the 
New York Times’ ‘Health Guide” on H1N1 Influenza, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/h1n1-swine-influenza/overview.html.  
 21 
 
explicitly underlined that the number of  deaths worldwide was comparatively small, adding 
that “we do not expect to see a sudden and dramatic jump in the number of  severe or fatal 
infections”.13 Questions were thus raised about the necessity of  states investing billions in 
the purchase of  enormous quantities of  a vaccine, the safety and efficacy of  which were 
“far from being certain”.14 Then, quietly and smoothly, this story slowed down and 
disappeared. 
What happened here? The answer raises fundamental questions regarding the 
essence of  the relationship between risk and law, as well as the nature and role of  law in a 
global world. The ‘swine flu’ pandemic is a paradigmatic example of  a panic/non-routine 
situation that challenges an entire system of  laws and regulations, highlighting the 
shortcomings and weaknesses of  the system itself. What is striking about the story of  the 
A-N1H1 vaccine is that the pharmaceutical ‘system’ (the complex interaction of  
international/transnational organisations, regulatory authorities, and pharmaceutical 
industries we referred to as closed) created, reacted to, and then erased a crisis in an entirely 
‘endogenous’ way. Sovereign states and their communities, albeit being primarily affected 
by the results of  the system’s decisions, had little role in the governance of  the issue, 
assuming instead a rather passive stance in accepting the system’s outputs.15 
A caveat is necessary. The A-N1H1 pandemic was, allegedly, an emergency 
situation16 for which special procedures were in place to guarantee a rapid response to 
potentially catastrophic consequences. The focus of  this work is not specifically on 
emergency situations nor is it on the A-N1H1 vaccine. This atypical example is raised as an 
opportunity to illuminate certain features of  the system within which it occurred, or which 
allowed it to occur. Prominent French sociologist Francis Chateauraynaud describes how 
                                              
13 See WHO, “The international response to the influenza pandemic: WHO responds to the critics” at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/briefing_20100610/en/, where it is argued that “[i]n 
every assessment of the pandemic, WHO consistently reminded the public that the overwhelming 
majority of patients experienced mild symptoms and made a rapid and full recovery, even without 
medical treatment”. 
14 As explicitly emerged in an event promoted by the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law in the wake of the ‘swine flu’ crisis, Regulatory Standards & Liability: Developing the 
Appropriate Assessment Model for Medicines, September 2010. 
15 The aforementioned explicit provision of liability exemption clauses in the sale contracts of A-N1H1 
vaccines is a good example, but it is possible more generally to identify a tendency of states to be 
rule-takers with no real power in the rule-making process, as shall be examined in the following 
sections and chapters. 
16 That is, a response to the WHO technically declaring a state of pandemic. How real the emergency and 
how serious the threat is an entirely different story. 
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referring to an extreme situation has a strong pedagogical value for explaining the routine, 
as the extreme exacerbates the problematic issues that are inherent to the society or group 
under scrutiny under ‘normal’ or, shall we say, non-emergency or routine conditions.17 In 
the present case, what emerges from the A-N1H1 story is the appearance of  a self-
perpetuating18 and closed system of  decision-making in the field of  pharmaceutical products 
that operates with substantial independence from state oversight and more generally from 
forms of  democratic control that are traditionally linked to rule-making powers. The 
questions to be addressed are therefore: what does this mean exactly? Why is it so? And 
why is this fundamentally problematic? 
 
2.  A twofold discourse: law and science, law and transnationalisation 
The questions are complex and constitute the ‘causal quest’ of  the thesis. A 
satisfying analysis requires an accurate description, or cartography,19 first of  the institutions 
and actors of  the system and then of  the dynamics within the system. To engage in the 
suggested description it is necessary to consider the significant phenomena that will be 
encountered in this process. We can identify two principal candidates. 
The first is the delegation of  decision-/rule-making power from public 
governments to scientific expert bodies. Because of  the extremely high level of  
technicality characterising increasing numbers of  social sectors, in the second half  of  the 
20th century a trend began towards progressively higher reliance on the assessments of  
bodies and committees with great technical expertise (and thus an aura of  neutrality)20 in 
                                              
17 Chateauraynaud F., Torny D., Les Sombres précurseurs: Une Sociologie pragmatique de l’alerte et du 
risque, Paris, EHESS, 1999; see also Chateauraynaud F. “La Sociologie pragmatique à l'épreuve des 
risques – Exercice de crise sur le dossier nucléaire”, Politix, n°44, 1998, pp. 76-108: the argument 
being that the weaknesses of physiological societal dynamics are better explained by pathological 
outbreaks. 
18 Systems theorists would use the term autopoietic: see the fundamental text by Teubner G. (ed.), 
Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin, 1988; and 
Michailakis D., “Law as an Autopoietic System”, Acta Sociologica 38, 1995. The term is avoided in 
this thesis as this is not a systems theory analysis. 
19 Santos B.S., “Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law”, Journal of Law 
and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1987, pp. 279-302. 
20 See among others Lentsch J., Veingart P. (eds), The Politics of Scientific Advice: Institutional Design 
for Quality Assurance, Cambridge University Press, 2011; Shapin S., The Scientific Life – A Moral 
History of a Late Moral Vocation, The University of Chicago Press, 2008; and Topf R., “Science, 
Public Policy, and the Authoritativeness of the Governmental Process”, in Barker A. and Peters G., 
Expert Advice, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. 
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specific fields. At first this reliance created a complex situation with a progressive 
detachment between scientific sector-specific knowledge on the one hand, and the actual 
wielders of  policy-making power on the other. But the growing gap in the expertise 
required to make learned decisions on technical issues led rapidly to a de facto delegation of  
policy-making power to the expert bodies.  The result was the emergence of  highly 
qualified bodies in specific technical fields, able to understand from a scientific point of  
view the risks and stakes involved in each assessment decision, but also empowered to 
make policy decisions for which they arguably lacked the necessary legitimacy on the one 
hand, and competence on the other.21 The birth and growth of  agencies such as the FDA 
in the US and the EMA in the EU are perfect examples of  such a trend.22 There are 
several risks inherent in the delegation of  decision- and rule-making power to agencies, 
risks that are to a certain extent unavoidable but that call for measures of  oversight from 
the delegator, i.e. the state. For instance, agencies may lack the necessary strength to resist 
lobbying pressures or may adopt biased attitudes, triggering typical situations of  
‘regulatory capture’.23 The delegation process has nonetheless ensued, and is thoroughly 
and clearly explained by Sheila Jasanoff  in a book effectively titled The Fifth Branch.24 
Through a series of  case studies including the most relevant US federal agencies,25 the 
book shows how advisory committees and expert consultative bodies, thanks to effectively 
inescapable reliance on their specific competences, have gained, since the middle of  the 
20th century, increasing shares of  real decision-making power, to the extent that they now 
constitute the ‘fifth branch’ of  the American government. The checks and balances 
                                              
21 Within the florid literature on the legitimacy and competence of independent committees in decision-
making, see among others Blom-Hansen J., The EU Comitology System in Theory and Practice: 
Keeping an Eye on the Commission?, Palgrave, 2011; Dammers W.F, Comitology in the Decision-
Making Process of the European Union, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008; Jorges C., Ladeur K.-H., Vos 
E. (eds), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making: National Traditions and 
European Innovations, Baden-Baden, 1997; and Jasanoff S., The Fifth Branch - science advisers as 
policy makers, Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1994. 
22 See the discussion in chapter II. 
23 On the topic of ‘capture’ see among others Ogus A.I., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, 
Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 57: “the ineffectiveness of regulatory agencies in meeting the public 
interest goals assigned to them could most plausibly be explained by assuming that they had been 
subverted by pressure, influence, and 'bribery' to protect the interests of those who were the subjects 
of the regulation”; see also the more recent Carpenter D., Moss D.A., Preventing Regulatory 
Capture – Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
24 Jasanoff S., The Fifth Branch; see also Jasanoff S., Science at the Bar: law, science and technology in 
America, Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1997. 
25 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee (CASAC). 
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between the sectorial experts who understand the scientific risks, and the policy-makers 
who should manage the needs and fears of  society, are weighted, it appears, in favour of  
the former.26 
The second significant phenomenon characterising the pharmaceutical regulatory 
system is that already referred to as transnationalisation, specifically of  the regulations and 
standards regarding the procedures propaedeutic to the marketing approval of  a new 
product. The globalisation process is profoundly modifying the issues confronting 
lawmakers,27 but conventional legal discourse does not seem able to keep pace with the 
speed of  this transformation. As a matter of  fact, on the one hand states are losing (or 
have already lost) their traditional centrality in the international discourse, as well as their 
role of  necessary and non-fungible rule-makers;28 while on the other hand we are 
witnessing an irresistible and continuous tendency towards fragmentation of  the social 
space in specific sectors, which are gaining independence vis à vis each other, and vis à vis 
the states.29 In other words, the social space to be regulated has crossed the borders of  the 
political space of  the nation state, significantly weakening the capacity of  national law to 
respond to regulatory needs.30 States and their laws are giving way to transnational social 
sectors (or, arguably, ‘systems’ as we have described them), one of  which, we contend, is 
the pharmaceutical market. Within the vast legal scholarship addressing the ‘transnational 
law’ phenomenon, our system of  interest could fit the definition of  what Paul Schiff  
Berman describes as a hybrid legal space:31 a social space in which a plurality of  legal orders 
                                              
26 Jasanoff S., The Fifth Branch, pp. 216-222. 
27 This is not the place for a review of the literature in the field of post-national law; readers are referred 
to the comprehensive summarising efforts of Kaarlo Tuori in “Towards a Theory of Transnational 
Law” (unpublished paper, 26 August 2010); and more recently Maduro M., Tuori K., Sankari S., 
Transnational Law – Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 
2014. 
28 We suggested the existence of this phenomenon above while discussing the delegation of decision-
making powers to independent agencies. So the issue is really two-fold: states lose their rule-making 
powers internally via delegation, and transnationally as they become ‘rule-takers’. The shift from the 
state as a rule-maker to the state as a rule-taker is explained by Cafaggi F., “New Foundations of 
Transnational Private Regulation”, 38 Journal of Law and Society 1, 2011, pp. 20-49.  In that context 
the shift is described in the frame of transnational private regulation (TPR), whereas the context of 
the present study is rather one of transnational regulatory networks (TRN), but conceptually the idea 
translates. 
29 On the validity of Niklas Luhmann's speculative hypothesis that “global law would experience a 
radical fragmentation, not along territorial, but along social sectorial lines” see Teubner G., 
Fisher-Lescano A., “Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law”, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 999. 
30 Tuori K., “Towards a Theory of Transnational Law”, p. 4. 
31 Berman P.S., “Global Legal Pluralism”, 80 California Law Review, 2008, pp. 1155-1237. 
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and systems of  norms coexist and interact. Complementary to this approach is the idea of  
interlegality as developed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Interlegality is characterised by 
“different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in our minds, as much as 
in our actions”, and “porous legality” where “multiple networks of  legal orders” are 
interlinked.32 This idea seems to be perfectly applicable to the pharmaceutical regulatory 
framework, where regional and national public regulations, transnational soft law, 
transnational regulatory networks, national and regional agencies, mechanisms of  
enforcement, and private individual or collective redress mechanisms coexist in the same 
social space, giving birth to a fascinating entanglement. An entanglement that seems yet to 
be fully grasped, given that pharmaceutical regulation is still generally studied and 
understood as a national or regional phenomenon.33  
To use the terminology adopted by Saskia Sassen, what is needed is an analysis that 
sheds light on the complex assemblages34 of  normative levels, from the transnational 
network to the local implementation of  regulatory practices.  This clarification is necessary 
to move forward into the implications of  the relocation of  the state35 from ex-ante rule 
maker to ex-post rule-receiver both at a descriptive level (through the observation of  
current rule-making and enforcement mechanisms where states have relocated the locus 
auctoritatis) and at a normative one (with a discussion of  the actual and potential role of  
national courts in re-creating a form of  state authority through post-marketing scrutiny). 
The transnational space is difficult to define, but confronting this difficulty is 
necessary to avoid ‘tunnel views’ limiting it to the “sphere of  action of  international 
organisations, the extra-territorial intervention of  the states, or the transnational activities 
of  private entities”.36 Avoiding such tunnel views is key to moving beyond the current 
typical focus on national/regional entities, to achieve a realistic understanding of  the 
regulatory mechanisms of  the pharmaceutical market. 
 
                                              
32 Santos B.S., Toward a New Legal Common Sense, 2nd ed., Butterworths, 2002. 
33 As will be discussed in chapters II, III and IV. 
34 Sassen S., Territory Authority and Rights – From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
35 Sassen S., “Immigration Policy in a Global Economy”, 17 SAIS Review 2, 1997, pp. 1-19. 
36 Duval A., “Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law”, 19 European Law Journal 6, 2014, 
p. 823. 
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3.  Transnationalising pharma – is there a ‘risk’ in the understanding of  
risk? 
The study began with an example supporting the claim that the pharmaceutical 
sector functions as a self-perpetuating system of  regulation essentially closed to exogenous 
inputs. The last paragraph raised the issue of  transnationalisation. The question to be 
addressed now is: what is the transnational element in pharmaceutical law? Pharmaceutical 
innovation tends to be handled by a relatively restricted group of  multinational industries,37 
and new products are marketed after they undergo clinical trials in different countries 
obeying different rules and standards – and those new products are frequently the result 
of  combining active ingredients discovered and produced in different places.38  Our initial 
example, the A-N1H1 vaccine, is useful to illustrate the issue. The vaccine is a modified 
version of  another one, originally developed for the prevention of  a previous strain of  
influenza A (H5N1), commonly referred to as ‘bird flu’. When the A-N1H1 virus started 
to spread in the summer of  2009, given the high level of  potential threat to public health, 
the FDA and the EMA approved for fast-track testing39 the use of  an experimental (and 
not yet marketed) treatment developed in South East Asia40 for the prevention of  ‘bird 
flu’. The final product, the A-N1H1 vaccine, was the result of  cooperation between the 
                                              
37 O’Donnell J.T., Drug injury – liability, analysis and prevention, Lawyers & Judges Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2001, p. 121 ff; the total amount of sales has now increased also in export trade. In 
2006 sales were estimated at 29.4 billion Euros, 16.2 billion Euros of which resulted from export 
trade. Worldwide the total amount of sales was 643 billion US dollars in 2006: see Purnhagen K., 
The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law, p. 623; Spitz J., Wickham M., 
“Pharmaceutical High Profits: the Value of R&D, or Oligopolistics Rents?”, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 71, 2012. 
38 This is by now an accepted fact that will be discussed extensively in chapters II and III, see for 
example Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Safe Innovative and Accessible 
Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the Pharmaceutical Sector, Brussels, 10 December 2008; a trend 
confirmed as steadily increasing in the succeeding EMA publication, “Clinical Trials Submitted in 
Marketing Authorization Applications to EMA: Overview of Patients recruitment and the 
Geographical Location of Investigator Sites”, Doc. Ref. EMA/INS/GCP/676319/2012, 11 December 
2013, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/12/WC500016819.pdf.  
39 The so-called ‘mock procedure’, which is an ad hoc speed-approval, aimed at facing serious and 
immediate threats to public health, in which testing is basically spread through a minimal pre-market 
phase and a critical post-marketing phase. In other words, the general public becomes the subject of 
a mass clinical trial. See records of the fast-track emergency approvals, available at 
www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/safetyavailability/vaccinesafety/ucm161448.htm for the FDA 
and www.ema.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Report/2010/01/WC500044933.pdf for the EMA. 
40 Specifically in Thailand, where the experimental vaccine had been approved for phase I clinical trial 
only in 2012: see US Department of Health & Human Services press release of June 7, 2012, 
available at www.phe.gov/Preparedness/news/Pages/International-flu-vaccine-120607.aspx. 
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US and EU pharmaceutical regulatory agencies, based on the provisional results of  a 
procedure conducted in a third country.41 
Again, A-N1H1 was an emergency response. However it exposes an issue that is 
of  crucial importance in understanding the contemporary criticalities of  the 
pharmaceutical market. The market is global, and so are its actors, the innovators and 
producers. Thus the problem is quid? when a product undergoes a procedure that is 
de-localised or multi-localised, but the marketing authorisation procedures are structured 
nationally or regionally. Two competing considerations arise from this question.  On the 
one hand the pharmaceutical industry, together with the EMA and the FDA, has been 
strongly pushing for mechanisms avoiding repetition of  procedural steps in order to 
guarantee “a prompt and efficient availability of  much needed new treatments”.42 On the 
other hand, the necessity of  ensuring high levels of  oversight from a safety and efficacy 
perspective is clear.  Drug testing is intimately linked to conceptions and understandings 
of  key notions, such as the one of  ‘risk’, known to be highly variable across cultures.43 This 
is not a merely abstract point as it has direct consequences on “where and how one draws 
the line between still acceptable, and no longer acceptable exposures”.44 The attitude of  
societies towards manufactured risks,45 for example, impacts directly on the modes of  
conducting clinical trials.46 Further, structures and modes of  interaction between 
                                              
41 A thorough reconstruction of the history of the A-N1H1 vaccine can be found in the very detailed 
analysis of two prominent scholars (a pathologist and a microbiologist), Bologna M., Lepidi A., 
Pandemie: virologia, patologia e prevenzione dell'influenza, Bollati Boringhieri, 2010. 
42 As repeatedly stressed by both the EU Commission and the US FDA in policy documents.  The 
relevant quote is taken from the Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Safe 
Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the Pharmaceutical Sector, Brussels, 
10/12/2008. 
43 There are several studies on how cultural diversity influences risk perception: see for example the 
essential book Hofstede G., Culture's Consequences: comparing values, behaviours, institutions, 
and organizations across nations, 2nd ed., SAGE, 2001.  An analysis of how risk perception is first 
of all an individual, and subsequently a social process can be found in Luhmann N., Risk: A 
Sociological Theory, Walter de Gruyter, 1993. 
44 Beck U., Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity, Sage Publications, 1992, p. 29. 
45 Giddens A., “Risk and Responsibility”, 62 Modern Law Review 1, 1999, p. 4: “Manufactured risk is 
risk created by the very progression of human development, especially by the progression of science 
and technology. Manufactured risk refers to new risk environment for which history provides us 
with very little previous experience.” Manufactured risk is contrasted with external risks, which are 
related “to events that may strike individuals unexpectedly from the outside, but that happen 
regularly enough and often enough” to be broadly predictable. 
46 A classic example of an EU/US clash can be found in the way clinical trials are conducted in Phase III 
of pre-marketing assessments, where the FDA is more stringent in requiring tests against placebo 
whereas the EMA is more inclined towards tests against available alternative treatments. This issue 
is related to different interpretations of the Declaration of Helsinki of 2008 on biomedical research 
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physicians, regulatory agencies, drug companies, and consumers, which are just as variable, 
contribute to create something that has been aptly referred to as a nation’s ‘therapeutic 
culture’.47 The recognition and adoption of  steps in procedures that are multi-locally 
conducted must therefore confront these issues, as they are inherently liable to result in 
differences in the substance and practice of  specific local regulations affecting safety 
assessments. Local regulatory systems (the only real ‘hard law’ in play), with local 
regulatory agencies at their head, cannot be expected to address in a satisfying way the 
issue of  multi-local production and testing of  new products. The safety of  medicine 
consumers needs to be understood rather as a globalised mass phenomenon, and 
addressed accordingly. 
A major initiative in this respect was launched in 1990 by the ICH, which as 
described in the Introduction is a permanent forum representing drug regulatory 
authorities of  the US, EU, and Japan and regional industry representatives. ICH seeks to 
harmonise drug testing through protocols and voluntary agreements48 in order to improve 
the quality of  transnational safety requirements by finding an appropriate balance between 
competing regulatory styles. The thesis will explore the shortcomings of  ICH guidelines in 
addressing substantive issues in chapter III, and question the legitimacy and accountability 
of  ICH as an institution in chapter IV. 
In a snapshot, as regards legitimacy, ICH presents two sets of  issues. First, the 
network is constituted by a limited number of  stakeholders – regulators and industry – 
leaving other essential categories (such as physicians and patients) out of  the picture. 
Secondly, countries such as Brazil, India, and China, originally excluded from the ICH 
forum, are now emerging as major players in the field of  pharmaceuticals, and already host 
                                                                                                                                    
on human subjects: see the discussion in chapter III. 
47 The term is used by Dr. A. Daemrich in Pharmacopolitics – Drug Regulation in the United States and 
Germany, The University of North Carolina Press, 2004, p. 243 ff. 
48 The process of harmonisation undertaken by the ICH will be further described in the following 
chapters II and IV: suffice to say that the procedure requires the adoption of a Concept Paper by the 
Steering Committee. The nature of the guidelines issued through such procedure is controversial, see 
infra, and for a discussion Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law: 
Is an International Approval System Modelled after the European System Worth Considering?”, 63 
Food and Drug Law Journal, 3, 2008, pp. 623-645; and Berman A., “The Role of Domestic 
Administrative Law in the Accountability of IN-LAW: The Case of the ICH” in  Pauwelyn J., Wessel 
R., Wouters J. (eds.), Informal International Lawmaking: Mapping the Action and Testing Concepts 
of Accountability and Effectiveness, Oxford University Press, 2012.  
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significant portions of  the research and testing process for new drugs.49 In order to involve 
emerging markets, ICH members have created an advisory body, the Global Cooperation 
Group, which seeks to promote broader international harmonisation.50 
On the effectiveness side, the concerns are again twofold. On the one hand there is 
the typical problem of  transnational regulatory networks (TRN)51 where participants are 
often tied to their authority (or constituency in the case of  business representatives) of  
origin in a way that generally outweighs their loyalty to global interests.52 On the other 
hand, the presence of  divergent ‘therapeutic cultures’ creates a series of  conflicts based on 
different understandings of  key notions that lie at the very basis of  safety regulation (such 
as, again, the notion of  risk, the aversion to or embracing of  it).53 These observations, as 
they will be developed in the following chapters, suggest that there is room to doubt the 
real strength and autonomy of  a transnational legal culture54 in the field. However, despite 
these briefly sketched concerns, in everyday practice the discovery, testing, and approval of  
a new pharmaceutical is in fact a widespread transnational phenomenon.55 From this 
factual observation we propose two hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis posits the concrete possibility that the increasing number of  
bodies involved across the world in the approval process of  a new product, combined with 
the incomplete international harmonisation of  the relevant regulatory rules and standards, 
generates a non-negligible level of  uncertainty as regards the scientific knowledge 
                                              
49 The data on clinical test outsourcing are discussed in chapter III. 
50 The Global Cooperation Group (GCG) was conceived at first as a subcommittee of the ICH Steering 
Committee in 1999. This was the first response to an increasing interest in ICH Guidelines beyond 
the three original ICH regions. In the early 2000s, “recognising the need to engage actively with 
other harmonisation initiatives, representatives from five Regional Harmonisation Initiatives (RHIs) 
were invited to participate in GCG discussions, namely, APEC, ASEAN, GCC, PANDRH and 
SADC. A further expansion of the GCG was agreed in 2007 and regulators were invited from 
countries where major production and clinical research is done (Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese 
Taipei, India, Republic of Korea, Russia and Singapore)”: see the ICH Organisation as set out at 
http://www.ich.org/about/organisation-of-ich/coopgroup.html. 
51 A critical analysis of transnational regulatory networks can be found in Verdier P.H., “Transnational 
Regulatory Networks and their Limits”, 34 Yale Journal of International Law 113, 2009. 
52 Verdier P.H., “Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits”, p. 162.; contra see Slaughter 
A.M, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 131-162; see also Fenwick M., Van 
Uytsel S., Wrbka S. (eds), Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law, Springer, 
2014. 
53 This will be further discussed in chapter III. 
54 The idea is suggested by Tuori K., “Towards a Theory of Transnational Law”. A transnational legal 
culture emerges in a field where rule-makers cooperate at a supranational level. The idea is that 
through time, they develop a common legal culture autonomous from their original one – they start 
to ‘think’ supranationally and in the interest of the supranational endeavour. 
55 See the in-depth analysis in chapter III. 
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employed in the assessment process. Chapter III will discuss this prospect. 
The second hypothesis is that the current structure of  transnational rule-making is 
struggling (or consciously failing) to achieve its self-attributed mandate of  harmonising 
technical standards. The ICH is however taking strong value-based decisions that surpass 
that mandate, upholding trade considerations as a primary goal, with safety and efficacy as 
subsidiary ones. Chapter IV will explore the cases of  Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and 
Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials (SPCT) guidelines to support this claim. Whereas it 
is represented and perceived as a network of  sectorial experts addressing highly technical 
issues (and producing highly technical outputs – difficult reading for non-experts),56 the 
ICH is really a public-private platform where core choices on levels of  exposure are 
negotiated. This, we posit, is a fundamental regulatory choice57 that should be appreciated 
in its full extent when analysing pharmaceutical regulation – a transnational and no longer 
primarily national/regional phenomenon. 
It now becomes necessary to clarify the consumer safety perspective that informs 
the analysis throughout this study. 
 
4.  The consumer safety perspective – two sides of  a coin 
Consumers are directly affected by the decisions deriving from safety assessments 
made by scientific experts through regulatory procedures.  This study therefore takes the 
perspective of  the level of  safety that is delivered by the system. The increasingly 
globalised nature of  the pharmaceutical market invites critical analysis of  the shape and 
functioning of  the existing national and regional legal frameworks that are meant to ensure 
safety. Until now the chapter’s focus was on the procedures that lead to the marketing of  a 
new product. However, taking the perspective of  consumer safety implies a subsequent 
focus on ‘the other side of  the coin’: the remedies available in case of  damage caused by a 
product. The extent to which consumers are empowered to react to threats or actual 
                                              
56 For a compelling case in favour of technocratic risk regulation and management see Sunstein C., Risk 
and Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
57 On the theory of regulatory choices see Adler M.D., “Regulatory Theory”, in Patterson D. (ed.), A 
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 590-606. 
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damage forms an integral part of  the system meant to ensure their safety.58 
If  consumer safety is a two-sided coin, the two main bodies of  law to be 
considered here are safety regulation and product liability. As for the former, we have 
already suggested, and we shall see below in more detail,59 that the transnationalisation of  
procedures renders national regulatory differences problematic in terms of  consumer 
protection. As for the issue of  remedies for harm, pharmaceutical product liability is a 
composite field, with reactions as dependent upon local history and culture as upon 
divergent understandings of  risk.60  However, unlike regulation, product liability is still 
predominantly nation-based. The thesis therefore attempts to analyse how reactions in that 
field promote the protection of  consumers from potential damage caused by decisions 
that are based on transnational as much as domestic rules – as those reactions have the 
potential, we posit, to unlock the closed regulatory system. 
In this perspective, a particularly interesting issue for this study is the federal 
preemption of  state tort law, a doctrine first articulated in drug litigation in the US in 2006. 
More specifically, in the preamble to its January 2006 prescription drug labelling rule, the 
FDA asserted that “FDA approval of  labelling under the act . . . pre-empts conflicting or 
contrary State law”.61 This approach raised several safety concerns in light of  the inherent 
level of  scientific uncertainty that characterises a new pharmaceutical,62 a fortiori in 
situations in which marketing approval follows a transnational and imperfectly harmonised 
procedure. Preemption of  tort law weakens protection of  consumer safety, which is 
arguably better served by an approach grounded on the theory of  ‘functional 
                                              
58 On the role of tort law in contributing to consumer safety, see generally Viscusi W.K. (ed.), Regulation 
Through Litigation, AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2002; Jasanoff S., Science 
at the Bar; and on the idea of pharmaceutical product safety as a sum of drug regulation and product 
liability see Rizzi M., “Regulating risks in pharmaceutical law”; for recent European trends towards 
a US-shaped adversarial legalism see Kelemen R.D., Eurolegalism, Harvard University Press, 2011. 
59 See chapter II; for detailed examples, an interesting overview of differences between the EMA and the 
FDA can be found in http://biopharminternational.findpharma.com/biopharm/Article/Navigating-
Differences-Between-FDA-and-EMEA-for-Re/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/371018. 
60 For a discussion on the impact of cultural biases on tort law rules, see Van Dam C., “Who is Afraid of 
Cultural Diversity? Cultural Diversity, European Co-operation, and European Tort Law”, 20 King's 
Law Journal 281-308, 2009. 
61 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological 
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30, 2006) (21 C.F.R. Pts. 201, 
314, 601): for a comment see Sharkey C.M., “Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law”, De Paul Law Review, 56, 2007; and the discussion in chapter VI. 
62 On the unavoidable level of scientific uncertainty, and thus on the unavoidable level of risk that is 
inherent in any pharmaceutical product, see in chapter VI the discussion regarding comments j and k 
to the Restatement (Second) on Torts. 
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complementarity’63 of  regulation and liability. This critical issue has been at the centre of  
both a judicial and a doctrinal debate in the US, where tort law has historically played a 
major regulatory role, balancing through litigation the numerous shortcomings of  
regulation.64 Albeit abandoned after only three years,65 the preemption doctrine represents 
a significant attempt to make the closed system fully impermeable to exogenous forms of  
control. Contrary to the US, in the EU product liability is a relatively minor field of  
litigation – although the aggregate figures have been on a slow but steady rise over the past 
twenty-five years. Consumers are generally protected by other private or public legal tools, 
namely insurance or social security systems,66 which significantly reduce incentives to 
litigate in case of  damage.67  The limitations of  these mechanisms in ensuring more than 
simple compensation represent a problematic aspect of  the European scenario.  It is 
arguable that parallel systems of  recovery in case of  damage (coupled with more restrictive 
access to litigation than in the US – where collective redress mechanisms are far more 
developed) create a form of  indirect preemption of  judicial control (locking down, or 
closing, the system again, shielding it from external forms of  oversight). 
 
5.  The structure and methodology for a cartography of  the system – 
Challenges and comparative choices 
Finding a satisfactory methodological approach for this study has been a complex 
task and the final result is open to potential criticism. This section sets out the method as 
originally conceived and the adjustments that were necessary to overcome the obstacles 
encountered along the way. We accept here the idea proposed by Aulis Aarnio that a 
scholarly study of  the law is necessarily aimed at producing knowledge of  legal norms and 
                                              
63 This claim will be further explained in the last section of this chapter. On the doctrine of 
complementarity see Cafaggi F., Institutional Framework of European Private Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 191 ff. The theory of functional complementarity a) on a positive level 
shows the reciprocal influences of the two techniques, and b) on a normative level calls for a high 
degree of coordination. 
64 See for a comprehensive discussion Viscusi W.K., Regulation Through Litigation, and for Europe 
Kelemen R.D., Eurolegalism. 
65 Following the US Supreme Court case decided in March 2009, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 2009. 
66 As thoroughly explained by Reimann M., “Liability for defective products at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century: emergence of a worldwide standard?”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 
2003. 
67 See for example Hodges C., “Current Discussions on Consumer Redress: Collective Redress and 
ADR”, Academy of European Law – Annual Conference on European Consumer Law, 2011. 
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systematising those norms to provide society with an enhanced understanding of  a 
determined (and problematic) legal order.68 Perfect scientific criteria of  controllability are 
hardly applicable to the law69 – the notion of  truth as accepted in natural sciences is of  little 
use in the study of  legal phenomena, where the highest achievement can only be a ‘softer 
version’ of  the truth in the form of  “well-reasoned certainty”.70 It is rather from the 
notion of  coherence that a scholarly legal study draws its strength. It follows that legal 
methodology is by nature “not inductive or deductive but rational discursive. The method is 
legal argumentation, which produces a coherent network of  reasons to produce 
recommendations”.71 The argument here is built by confronting the rules and institutions 
governing pharmaceutical regulation (pre- and post-marketing) with the reality of  the 
phenomenon as observed in practice.  It necessarily follows that the bulk of  the study is 
descriptive. In order to construct the argument, the thesis is divided into two major parts.  
The first and lengthier part looks at the regulatory side of  pharmaceutical safety – its 
institutional design, the substantial and procedural issues it faces in the transnational 
setting, its ability to deliver and ensure safety and efficacy. This will allow us to identify the 
problems in their concrete dimension. The second part digs into the ability of  the judiciary 
to complement and monitor regulatory actions. 
 We have already identified the criticalities arising as a consequence of  the 
transnational dimension coupled with what we call ‘expertise’s capture of  regulatory 
power’. The first step of  the proposed analysis is therefore to produce a descriptive 
account of  the principal institutional agents of  the transnational pharmaceutical scenario: 
the US FDA, the European EMA, and the ICH. The reasons for this choice are simple. 
The US and the EU are the two major pharmaceutical markets, in which roughly 80% of  
the worldwide product is marketed and consumed.72 Given the close cooperation that 
exists between the two as regards marketing approval procedures,73 a reconstruction of  
                                              
68 Aarnio A., Essays on the Doctrinal Study of the Law, Springer, 2011, Chapter IV “Lawyer’s 
Dilemma”. 
69 Ibidem. 
70 Ibidem, p. 28. 
71 Ibidem. 
72 These statistics are widely acknowledged by a number of authors, confirmed by the WHO in “The 
World Medicines Situation 2011 – Pharmaceutical Consumption”, available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s20035en/s20035en.pdf , in 2011, and not subject to 
significant variation since. 
73 There is an intense exchange of data and coordinated testing for marketing approval between the two 
agencies. This close cooperation has been reinforced as of 2009 by the appointment of Dr Janice 
Soreth as the FDA liaison officer to the EMA, and as of 2012 by the appointment of Dr Sabine 
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how these institutions were born, and how they actually work, is essential to understanding 
the complexity of  their relationship. At the time this thesis is being written, the US and the 
EU are in the process of  negotiating an extensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) which will impact sectorial regulatory frameworks, including 
pharmaceuticals.74 Information on the structure and content of  the TTIP is strictly 
confidential and difficult to access.75 However, what emerges to date is that the negotiation 
is moving towards the inclusion of  “application of  good regulatory practices (e.g. 
consultation, transparency, impact assessment, etc.) into a trade agreement, without 
however substantially altering the parties’ respective ways of  making legislation or rules”,76 
enabling substantial margins for regulatory mutual recognition and compatibility 
mechanisms. Because of  the prospective nature of  the TTIP as a “living agreement”, 
obligations can be added without reopening the initial treaty:77 Alberto Alemanno in 
particular has observed that in the hypothetical in which regulators were to find “areas of  
convergence”, they would be able to commit themselves and legally bind their authority of  
origin. This is because agreements of  this sort would be added to the partnership via 
sectoral annexes. In describing the TTIP functioning Alemanno observes that:78 
its cooperation mechanism […] nudges the regulators away from the previously agreed 
regulatory standards […W]hile an agreement reached within a regulatory dialogue […] does not 
formally modify the domestic regulatory requirement […] it implies a departure from it in 
relation to the imported products or services. This may prompt fundamental accountability 
problems as the operation of  TTIP may result in regulatory processes that gradually appear 
detached from the previously agreed policy choice and therefore the policy preferences of  the 
                                                                                                                                    
Haubenreisser as the EMA liaison officer to the FDA. 
74 See EU Commission, “Note for the attention of the Trade Policy Committee - Annex III Initial Position 
Paper on Pharmaceuticals”, 20 June 2013, available at http://www.iatp.org/files/TPC-TTIP-non-
Papers-for-1st-Round-Negotiatons-June20-2013.pdf – policy objectives seem strongly oriented 
towards regulatory simplification and speedier mutual recognition procedures between US and EU. 
75 The confidential nature of the negotiation process is raising a vibrant debate over the lack of 
transparency of the entire venture: see for example the EU Ombudsman press release 17/2014 of 
July 31, 2014, formally asking the Council and the Commission to grant access to TTIP 
documentation, available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/press/release.faces/en/54636/html.bookmark. The debate resulted 
in the Commission’s release, on the 7th January 2015, of the EU negotiating texts for TTIP, available 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230.  
76 Alemanno A., “A Reality Check of TTIP: Beyond the Popular Account”, opinion for Euractiv.com of 
April 2014, available at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-industry/reality-check-ttip-beyond-
popular- account-301443. 
77 Ibidem: see also for a more comprehensive discussion Alemanno A., “The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Parliamentary Regulatory Cooperation”, European Parliament 
Policy Report, Brussels, April 2014, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423562. 
78
 Ibidem. 
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regulated. 
 The thesis shall analyse how close cooperation mechanisms are already in place; 
the impact of  TTIP would, as far as regulation goes, substantially build upon existing 
consolidated practices. This, in turn, calls for a comparative approach. While a thorough 
and exhaustive comparative analysis of  the regulatory architectures of  the US and the EU 
has been recently provided by Alemanno and Richard Parker,79 this thesis attempts a 
slightly different analysis, focusing on general trends in the evolution of  the 
pharmaceutical regulatory architecture of  both markets to suggest common ground.80 
 The analysis of  the EMA and the FDA is meant to shed light on a three-layered 
evolution of  pharmaceutical regulation that is common to the US and the EU albeit within 
different institutional architectures. The first phase is the acquisition of  ever-greater 
independence by such agencies and what can be referred to as ‘bodies of  expertise’ vis à vis 
political institutions, both in the policy-making and in the decision-making stages. The 
second phase, a direct consequence of  the first one, consists of  the creation and 
consolidation of  significant asymmetry between the formal distribution of  power among 
political institutions and agencies, and the substantial exercise of  said power. The third 
phase is the shift to the global arena. Here the focus is on the dichotomy between the 
transnational nature of  the regulatory process and the domestic design of  the regulatory 
frameworks leading to marketing approval. 
The third transnational player taken into account in the descriptive process is the 
ICH, as the guidelines produced within its framework have a decisive impact in 
transnational regulatory practices (paving the way for regulatory cooperation quite similar 
to that suggested above regarding the potential impact of  TTIP). Understanding the extent 
to which the current structure of  this international forum is fit to achieve the goal of  
harmonising regulatory standards is critical to assessing the quality and safety of  a 
                                              
79
 Alemanno A., Parker R., “Towards Effective Regulatory Cooperation under TTIP: A Comparative 
Overview of the EU and US Legislative and Regulatory Systems”, Report to the EU Commission 
(DG Trade), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152466.pdf, 
concluding that despite major institutional differences, regulatory mechanisms share common 
essential goals in the pursuit, for example, of transparency; for a study on comparative 
administrative law see the essential Rose-Ackerman S., Lindseth P.L. (eds), Comparative 
Administrative Law, Edward Elgar, 2011. 
80
 Other fields of risk regulation have ventured into EU-US comparisons to grasp the multi-faceted array 
of options stemming from diverse institutional designs that share similar goals and regulate similar 
products. For instance see the essential contribution by Geraint Howells on tobacco regulation and 
litigation across the Atlantic: Howells G., The Tobacco Challenge, Ashgate, 2011. 
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transnational approval procedure. Chapter II is therefore dedicated to the description of  
the FDA, the EMA, and the ICH. 
 Describing the institutional setting of  the major transnational players is 
propaedeutic to the investigation of  a series of  crucial issues. The thesis questions the 
extent to which regulatory compliance is substantially fulfilled in case of  multi-local 
production/testing. Is the current regulatory system fit to deliver the highest level of  
knowledge relevant to the assessment to be made? Are there institutional and cultural 
differences that structurally hinder the possibility of  achieving harmonisation of  
regulatory standards, which could in turn produce a coherent and commonly understood 
transnational regulatory practice? 
 The substance of  these issues is the core of  the following chapter III, which 
investigates the potential for ‘gaps’ in scientific knowledge multi-locally produced. While 
chapter III was originally meant to contain a series of  in-depth case studies, very limited 
access to essential information necessitated a significant reshaping of  the argument, which 
is now focused on aggregate numbers rather than specific cases.81 This structure is no less 
effective in demonstrating the magnitude of  the transnational regulatory practice in 
pharmaceutical pre-marketing approvals, and in proposing a series of  substantial 
shortcomings. Nonetheless, data accessibility raises more general concerns about the 
transparency and accountability of  the system at large. The pharmaceutical regulatory 
framework of  pre- and post-marketing scrutiny is conceived to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of  marketed products. The fact that crucial information is barely accessible 
questions per se the ability of  the system to deliver the expected result, or to do so in the 
optimal way82 – at the very least, major concerns remain unanswered for lack of  
information.83 
 Chapter IV shifts the focus from substance to procedure, questioning the 
deficiencies (or absence tout court) of  mechanisms of  participatory democracy at the stage 
                                              
81 See section 1 of chapter III on the structural difficulties in accessing data. 
82
 As accurately explained by Steven Shavell, the definition of “optimal” varies considerably depending 
on the perspective one decides to adopt in analysing the system: see Shavell S., “The Optimal 
Structure of Law Enforcement”, 36 Journal of Law and Economics, 1993. The final section of this 
chapter is dedicated to making the study’s perspective explicit, the focus being on consumer safety. 
83
 While the new EU regulation on access to clinical trials will certainly have a positive impact, its design 
seems to miss the centrality of transnational regulatory practices: see the discussion in chapters III 
and IV. 
 37 
 
of  law-making (which at first sight could appear as the natural balance to a system that is 
structurally interest-biased towards the industry, such as the ICH). The chapter will analyse 
the cases of  ICH Guideline E6 on Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and E9 on the Statistical 
Principles for Clinical Trials (SPCT) to propose some conclusions on the model of  
governance and alternative sources of  legitimacy of  pharmaceutical regulation. 
 After examining the regulatory system’s substantial issues and participatory 
shortcomings, chapter V moves to the levels of  safety effectively achieved by the 
regulatory system. The analysis focuses on a series of  case studies to uncover the results 
of  the pre-marketing approval system, and the ability of  post-marketing monitoring 
mechanisms to react promptly to emerging safety issues. In comparison to pre-marketing 
data, post-marketing surveillance data is significantly easier to access, therefore allowing 
for product-specific studies (to maintain coherence with the analysis on chapter III, 
general statistics will also be provided). 
The second part of  the thesis moves from the executive to the lens of  the 
judiciary. As common features are identified in regulatory evolution, and solid regulatory 
cooperation mechanisms are already in place (and possibly on the verge of  being 
significantly strengthened), the thesis maintains the comparative perspective adopted in the 
first part to explore the reactive mechanisms of  the EU and US in the face of  damages 
and regulatory failures.84 Chapter VI attempts a descriptive overview of  the role of  courts 
in pharmaceutical litigation in the selected markets, while the subsequent chapters VII, 
VIII, and IX undertake an analysis somewhat mirroring that proposed for the executive, 
examining the ability of  the judiciary to address substantial issues related to the quality and 
accessibility of  scientific knowledge forming the basis of  risk-benefit assessments, courts’ 
participatory mechanisms, and their overall success in delivering product safety and 
addressing highly complex technical issues. Breaking down the contentious points, the 
analysis should help shed light on the following questions: 
 
                                              
84
 The role of courts is a distinctive feature of the US, where the judiciary has through litigation 
traditionally performed a strong regulatory role. While the EU has traditionally maintained a 
different and less litigious attitude, recent trends suggest a move towards an “adversarial legalism” 
or “Eurolegalism” that is progressively bringing US and EU closer in their attitudes towards judicial 
complementarity of regulatory schemes. See Kelemen R.D., Eurolegalism; and Kelemen R.D., 
“Eurolegalism and Democracy”, Journal of Common Market Studies 50, 2012. 
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1. Can courts play a role in the management of  pharmaceutical products in terms 
of  introducing transparency and coherence as regards the quality, relevance, and nature of  
scientific knowledge? In other words, can courts go beyond pure cost-benefit assessments, 
deferential to regulatory decisions, and enter the realm of  uncertainty with value-based 
judgments? 
2. Can courts act as a democratic agent? Can they act as a proxy for participatory 
democracy which appears to be lacking at a transnational level through accessible national 
enforcement mechanisms? 
3. What are the opportunities for courts to deliver consumer safety (and if  so, to 
go beyond the specific case and influence policy-making, which entails a broad 
understanding of  the concept of  ‘regulatory compliance’)? 
What is essentially asked here is whether courts, and specifically national courts, can 
act as legitimating actors in a regulatory framework that embraces the market state idea: 
can ‘judicial governance’ provide a ‘social balance’ in terms of  guaranteeing diffuse 
bottom-up control of  the regulatory mechanism? If  yes, judicial governance could be seen 
as a legitimating factor of  the market state, embodying, short of  participatory democracy, 
a democratically accessible agent. Courts could be conceived as reviewers of  the regulatory 
process, which entails on the substantive side a review (direct or indirect) of  actual 
standards as implemented, and on the procedural one a proactive role in favouring wider 
participation in harmonising standard-setting initiatives. A strong judiciary could 
strengthen its state’s protection of  the social value of  consumer safety – both in achieving 
the goals of  the regulatory framework where there has been a safety failure (generally 
through compensation in a tort case), and in uncovering structural shortcomings of  the 
regulatory system (for example through tackling the scientific knowledge issue raised 
above). Inevitably the thesis will touch upon the classic arguments against litigation and 
judges, which can be summarised in the question: “wouldn’t this be asking too much from 
the judiciary?” The discussion in chapters VII to IX should provide grounds for rebutting 
this scepticism.  
The concluding chapter X evaluates the results of  both parts of  the thesis, 
executive and judiciary, pointing at positive (although limited) contributions of  litigation 
outcomes, and proposes an enhanced ‘pedagogical role’ for courts. Turning back to the 
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question “are we asking too much from the judiciary?”, the core of  the thesis suggests that 
the question should be reframed in a twofold way: first, are we not asking too much from 
regulation under the current circumstances?; and secondly, are we asking judges the right questions? 
While the law of  torts and the processes of  the courts have been widely accused of  great 
inefficiency and for high transaction costs,85 we take a perspective that departs from the 
analysis of  cost to focus on the substantial issues at stake. Ultimately, if  we accept a 
constructivist approach to law and science, according to which every regulatory assessment 
is fundamentally value-based,86 the question is who is best suited to make those value-based 
judgments? 
 To summarise, the study (through its ‘descriptive bulk’ and the conclusions 
thereof) attempts an answer to the question: can judicial complementary governance 
provide social balance to the current regulatory framework for pharmaceutical product 
safety and its transnational imperatives? 
 
6.  A normative quest 
 Depicting the fundamental breaking points of  pharmaceutical regulation invites 
critical reflection on the normative structure of  the institutional design of  the relevant 
system of  rules. What is the optimal structure of  law enforcement87 in this field? Since the key 
issue in both regulatory and liability assessments related to pharmaceuticals is that of  
relevant scientific knowledge,88 we claim that the legal framework should be shaped in the way 
                                              
85 See for example Polinsky M., Shavell S., “The Uneasy Case for Product Liability”, 123 Harvard Law 
Review 1437, 2010, suggesting that regulation and market forces have such an impact on firms in 
terms of incentives to product safety that product liability does not in fact exert a significant 
additional influence, while imposing additional costs that are ultimately borne by society at large. 
This argument will be touched upon when discussing the adequacy of courts in confronting 
pharmaceutical cases in chapter IX. 
86 The relationship between law and science produces something referred to as ‘regulatory science’ or 
‘trans-science’. See chapter IX, and for a comprehensive discussion of the concept see Shapin S., 
The Scientific Life, and Jasanoff S., Science and Public Reason, Routledge, 2012. 
87 Shavell S., “The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement”. 
88 The concept of relevant scientific knowledge is a rather complicated one. It is used in this context as a 
neutral term to describe the scientific information used in the assessment process. Normatively, we 
accept the definition suggested by Advocate General Tesauro in his Opinion to Case C-300/95 
Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
ECR 1997, I-02649, in which he suggests that the concept should encompass all scientific 
knowledge “including the most advanced level of such knowledge, without any restriction as to the 
industrial sector concerned”. An excellent discussion of the political rather than purely scientific 
nature of the concept can be found in Jasanoff S., “Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant 
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that best promotes the availability of  such knowledge.89 Two major points should be made 
at this stage and subsequently investigated. First, regulation alone struggles to deliver the 
highest level of  said knowledge, given the structural difficulties that we have suggested 
throughout this introduction, which will be developed through the description of  
institutional design confronted with the reality of  regulatory practice. Second, if  flaws in 
regulation hinder the availability of  scientific knowledge that would be relevant to safety 
assessment, the question is quid? when one has to react to damage caused by a product that 
was imperfectly assessed. Is the relevant knowledge for a liability assessment that resulting 
from the regulatory assessment, or is the law of  torts not limited to a retrospective 
investigation, and can it play instead a proactive role in unearthing relevant knowledge lost 
or undermined by the regulatory process?  Such questions become more pressing in light 
of  the transnational dimensions of  the process. 
 The institutional framework governing regulation, confronting the issues raised by 
globalisation, currently reflects the delegation of  states’ regulatory powers to independent 
bodies, the legitimacy of  which lies in their expertise. These bodies then interact at a 
transnational level. The de-nationalisation of  regulatory procedures, combined with the 
progressive delegation of  powers to technical bodies that are out of  the traditional 
democratic circuits, poses both a problem of  legitimacy and one of  effectiveness of  the 
regulations produced. 
 If  we look for example at the ICH, the forum is exclusively conceived for 
regulatory agencies and industry representatives. The issue of  access to information (both 
materially and intellectually) is tangible testimony of  how closed the system is. Now if  states 
progressively relinquish their authority in the field, and evolve (or regress) from a rule- and 
decision-making position to a rule-taking and decision-receiving position, what an individual (the 
consumer, ultimate target of  the system’s decisions) is left with in terms of  engagement 
with the pharmaceutical system is his capacity/ability to react when the outcomes of  the 
system’s decisions affect him. In this sense the law of  torts (and product liability in 
particular) constitutes a natural legal tool, as courts have the potential to implement a form 
                                                                                                                                    
Science”, 17 Social Studies of Science 2, 1997, pp. 195-230. 
89 For an interesting and still compelling discussion of the concept of “relevant knowledge” see 
Mildred M., “The development risk defence”, in Fairgrieve D., Products Liability in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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of  surrogate democratic control90 – although barriers to access in the EU compared to the 
US will require specific discussion. 
 How the regulatory and the litigation systems interact with each other will be 
examined. The hypothesis is that in a situation in which regulation is often the product of  
imperfectly harmonised rules, and non-transparent (if  not potentially interest-biased) 
procedures, the law of  torts can act as a helpful complement to ensure the achievement of  
the consumer protection goal of  regulation. As for legitimacy, if  the process of  
delegation/transnationalisation has reached the point of  no return, the identification of  
forms of  traditional democratic legitimacy appears difficult. One could think of  
mechanisms of  participatory democracy for civil society that could ensure procedural 
transparency in the control of  experts’ technocratic regulation and decision-making.91 
However, this would leave open the question of  how to identify the representatives that 
are supposed to bring legitimacy to the process (a complex issue at all levels, a fortiori when 
the scene is transnational). The law of  torts could be of  great help here as the tool 
allowing the state to relocate its sovereignty through its individuals, empowering them to 
react individually to the decision-making outputs of  a closed system.92 In other words, the 
pharmaceutical system appears to be shaped in such a way that the ultimate regulator has 
to be the individual himself: provided that the state protects its citizenry by giving it the 
means to actively react to processes that are otherwise not permeable. Essential agents of  
this relocated state sovereignty are national courts, whose oversight can potentially 
                                              
90 See the idea of “access justice” developed by Micklitz H.-W., “Social Justice and Access to Justice in 
Private Law”, EUI Working Paper LAW, No. 2011/02: the idea of justice through access 
(Zugangsgerechtigkeit) is based on the premise that it is for the sovereign actor (the EU in the 
paper’s analysis) to grant access to justice to those who are excluded from the market or to those 
who face difficulties in making use of market freedoms.  The idea is developed and adjusted to the 
field of pharmaceutical safety in chapter VIII. 
91 Mechanisms of a Habermasian nature, see the essential Habermas J., Between Facts and Norms:  
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, 1996; and for a recent 
discussion Habermas J., “The crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalisation of 
International Law”, The European Journal of International Law 23, 2012. 
92 It appears indeed that there is here an ‘easy case’ for product liability. On the debate over the utility of 
product liability in the contemporary regulated world see again Polinsky M., Shavell S., “The 
Uneasy Case for Product Liability”, and contra see Goldberg J.C.P., Zipursky B.C., “The Easy Case 
for Product Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell”, 123 Harvard Law 
Review 1919, 2010, explaining how the former position is unsatisfying in terms of tort’s deterrent 
and compensatory functions and victims’ welfare. We will engage in this debate towards the end of 
the thesis, to plead for both an easy case (based on traditional goals of compensation and deterrence 
and the observed incremental impact on regulatory schemes) and a complex case (the pedagogical 
role of courts) for product liability in complementing and legitimating regulation. 
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perform a pedagogical role for regulators.93 
 To summarise, in a context where the state is retreating from its classical top-down 
rule-making power, and is confronted with a transnational closed and self-perpetuating system, it 
may reinstate a form of  bottom-up sovereignty by empowering individuals to exercise 
diffuse control of  the decision-making process through litigious reactions to the decisions 
that affect them. The litigation process has also the potential to uncover relevant 
knowledge lost or undermined in the imperfections of  the regulatory process. 
 The overview provided in this chapter has begun to uncover how pharmaceutical 
safety is characterised by the co-existence of  elements of  a fundamentally different nature, 
contributing to the creation of  a very complex interlegal space.94 Finding a balance among 
competing interests within this space is the delicate and challenging exercise to which this 
study attempts to contribute. 
                                              
93 The pedagogical role of courts vis à vis regulatory bodies is suggested by Jasanoff S., Science at the 
Bar, and will be developed in the concluding chapter X of the thesis. 
94 To use again the conceptual tool crafted by Santos B.S., Toward a New Legal Common Sense. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF WESTERN PHARMACEUTICAL 
REGULATION 
A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES AND A TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY 
NETWORK 
 
  
 This chapter analyses the development of  both the FDA and the EMA in an 
attempt to expose the three fundamental phases in the evolution of  pharmaceutical 
regulation previously described. To complete the analysis of  the institutional design of  
Western pharmaceutical regulation, the analysis includes the phenomenon of  the ICH as a 
transnational sui generis regulatory network, questioning its ability to introduce a reliable 
international regulatory structure, fit to effectively address the challenges created by the 
suggested three phases of  regulatory evolution. 
  
1. National development: the US Food and Drug Administration 
 The history of  the FDA’s regulatory powers begins with the story of  a drug 
disaster, concerning Sulfanilamide, a compound imported to the United States from 
Germany in the early 1930s.95 The original compound was mixed with a solvent, diethylene 
glycol, for the purpose of  preparing the drug in syrup form, without any requirement for 
further tests or review of  scientific literature on solvents. The result was a tragedy, 
resulting in over a hundred deaths in 1937.96 As a reaction, in 1938 Congress approved the 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) expanding FDA’s oversight over the approval of  
                                              
95 The FDA was actually established in 1906 as a branch of the US Department of Agriculture with 
limited powers in reviewing food and drug labels. It was then moved to the Federal Security Agency 
in 1940, then to the Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1953, before settling in the 
Department of Health and Human Services in 1979. 
96 Cavers D.F., “The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and its Substantive 
Provisions”, 6 Law and Contemporary Problems, 1939, pp. 2-42. 
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new drugs, and particularly over the ‘application’ a company was required to file in order 
to market a new product.97 This initiative constitutes a first major preventive shift in the 
regulation of  pharmaceutical marketing authorisation, as well as the first step in a 
progressive detachment between the US government and the FDA: the tests expected for 
the purposes of  evaluating a drug’s safety were not specified in the statute, thus leaving 
considerable margins of  manoeuvre to FDA officials in determining and negotiating 
testing protocols with the industry.98 In this context, although the FDCA did not provide 
for any efficacy mandate, the agency started to resort to risk-benefit assessments, in so far 
as “a safe drug was one whose proposed use would benefit patients more than it harmed 
them”.99 
 A subsequent turning point in US drug regulation happened in the 1960s, 
following another, and most likely the best known, major drug disaster, Thalidomide, which 
led to the birth of  approximately 10,000 children with severe birth defects.100 Although 
only seventeen cases were registered in the US, the seriousness of  reports from Europe, 
and especially Germany, engendered a growing demand in public opinion for consumer 
protection and legislative action.101 As a result, substantial amendments to the FDCA were 
approved, authorising the FDA to set standards for every stage of  a new drug testing. 
Government officials now had to approve a new drug before it could be consumed by 
patients.102 This shift was coupled with a great increase in the use of  advisory committees 
and expert assessments, helping to protect the agency from potential attack on the ground 
that its decisions lacked scientific competence.103 The reliance on scientific testing of  new 
                                              
97 “If the secretary finds ... that the investigations ... which are submitted ... do not include adequate tests 
by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested in the proposed labelling thereof ... he shall, prior 
to the effective date of the application, issue an order refusing to permit the application to become 
effective”: U.S. Congress, “Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act”, 75th Con. 2nd sess. (25 June 
1938), Washington D.C., Government Printing office, 1938. 
98 See Marks H., The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 
1900-1990, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 73-77. 
99 Marks H., The Progress of Experiment, p. 72. 
100 See McFadyen R., “Thalidomide in America: A Brush with Tragedy”, 2 Clio Medica, 1976, 
pp. 79-93; Daemmrich A., “A Tale of Two Experts: Thalidomide and Political Engagement in the 
United States and West Germany”, 15 Social History of Medicine, 2002, pp. 137-158. 
101 McFadyen R., “Thalidomide in America: A Brush with Tragedy”, pp. 79-93. 
102 Which constituted “an important departure from the past”, when FDA officials were simply 
processing applications filed by drug manufacturers: see Daemrich A., Pharmacopolitics – Drug 
Regulation in the United States and Germany, The University of North Carolina Press, 2004, 
p. 30 ff. 
103 “The formidable array of expert advisory committees associated with the agency since the late 1960s 
testifies to its recognition that legitimation from the independent scientific community is 
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drugs appears for the first time in the 1962 statute.104 In order to enforce these provisions, 
the FDA began not only to rely on advice from external scientific committees, but also to 
hire scientific experts as permanent agency officials.105 With these provisions begins the 
first phase of  our threefold regulatory evolution: that is the acquisition by the agency of  
independence from political institutions. With the FDCA allowing for ample margins of  
manoeuvre within a broad legal framework, the decision-making structure became 
arguably closer to policy-making, independent from the political sphere. 
 Around the mid-1970s, a strong anti-regulation movement emerged in response 
to the allegedly excessive precautionary model promoted by the 1962 statute, which was 
considered liable to unreasonably delay the accessibility of  much needed new treatments,106 
a phenomenon known as “drug lag”.107 Having been designed as a response to the 
Thalidomide case, the 1962 statute emphasised pre-market testing as the key feature to 
promote public safety when exposing consumers to a new treatment. However these 
critiques described the very same pre-market scrutiny as negatively impacting public health 
in terms of  public suffering.108 In response to increasing interest-based group pressure, 
representing both the industry and patients and seeking (for different reasons) prompter 
marketing of  innovative pharmaceuticals, in 1988 the agency issued a series of  regulations 
known as the “Treatment Investigational New Drug Regulations” (IND), the aim of  
which was to permit the distribution of  unapproved investigational medicines to a limited 
target patient population suffering life-threatening conditions with the requirement that 
there should be a reasonably solid ground to consider the drug effective without exposing 
                                                                                                                                    
indispensable to the success of its regulatory programs”: Jasanoff S., The Fifth Branch, p. 54. 
104 FDCA, as amended in 1962, §505(d). 
105
 Jasanoff S., The Fifth Branch, p. 78. 
106 Several economic studies stress the decrease in new drugs approved since the adoption of the new 
legislation, raising a threat to innovation, Daemrich mentions for instance Grabowski H., Drug 
Regulation and Innovation: Empirical Evidence and Policy Options, American Enterprise Institute 
Press, 1976; Gabrowski H., Vernon J., Thomas L., “Estimating the Effects of Regulations on 
Innovation: An International Comparative Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, 21 Journal of 
Law and Economics, 1978, pp. 133-163; Peltzman S., Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation: 
The 1962 Amendments, American Enterprise Institute Press, 1974. 
107 The term was first adopted by Wardell W., Regulation and Drug Development, American Enterprise 
Institute Press, 1975. 
108 A study linked several thousand deaths to delays in the approval of treatments such as propanolol and 
practolol: see Wardell W., “Introduction of New Therapeutic Drugs in the United States and Great 
Britain: An International Comparison”, 14 Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 1973, 
pp. 773-790. 
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patients to “significant additional risks”.109 
 For the purposes of  our analysis, it is essential to underline that these regulations, 
having a significant impact on public health in allowing the distribution of  non-
thoroughly-tested pharmaceuticals, were issued by the FDA and not Congress. Thus the 
agency proceeds to acquire regulatory power that goes beyond mere decision-making 
based on given regulations, and gains substantial policy and rule-making control. This 
phenomenon triggers the second phase of  regulatory evolution, which we have described 
as the creation and consolidation of  a significant asymmetry between the formal 
distribution and the actual exercise of  power as between political institutions and 
administrative bodies. This phenomenon has been referred to as “administrative 
experimentalism” by Ladeur,110 with the aim of  rationalising the discussion of  the 
democratic deficit of  bureaucracies. As will be discussed below, this study contests the 
ability of  administrative experimentalism to effectively address the issues raised by the 
transnationalisation of  administrative processes. 
 Following this trend, in the 1990s, pressured by the FDA’s increasingly 
autonomous initiatives, Congress enacted in 1992 the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
(PDUFA) and in 1997 the FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA).111 In adherence to the 
previous IND regulations, the new statutes included measures intended to reduce clinical 
study time, and provided for ‘fast-track’ procedures to quickly process drugs identified by 
the FDA as priorities.112  
 Ever since the adoption of  these statutes, the FDA has been independently and 
regularly updating requirements and standards within the described framework.113 The 
increasing detachment of  the agency from government oversight has been coupled with an 
expanding regulatory and decision-making power, culminating in 2006 with the adoption 
of  the Requirements on Content and Format of  Labelling for Human Prescription Drug 
                                              
109 IND, Federal Register 52 (22 May 1988), 19466. 
110 As discussed extensively in chapter  in chapter IV.  
111 PDUFA and FDAMA 21 U.S.C. § 356; 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. 
112 See Katin K. “The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 and the New Drug Development Process”, 
4 American Journal of Therapeutics, 1997, pp. 167-172; Goldner L., “The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997: Impact on Consumers”, 20 Clinical Therapeutics, 1998, 
pp. 20-25. 
113 In 2007 another piece of legislation was introduced, the FDA Amendment Act (FDAAA), which, 
while acknowledging in form of law the autonomous regulatory initiatives undertaken by the FDA, 
did not introduce any major modification for the approval system: FDAAA, adding a new § 524 to 
the FDCA. 
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and Biological Products,114 in which the FDA sought to exempt its decisions from claims 
in tort law, unilaterally applying the “doctrine of  implied preemption”.115 The system for 
marketing approval in the US had recently been subject to severe criticism in light of  the 
several hundred deaths provoked by the latest major drug disaster, the Vioxx case.116 It has 
been argued that the preemptive shift of  2006 was in fact a reaction of  the agency in an 
authoritative attempt to regain credibility, after the Vioxx case severely questioned its 
ability to ensure drug safety. 
 In light of  this study’s goals, it must be underlined that the system is entirely 
nationally based. That is, the procedures in place for marketing approval are designed to be 
purely national. The existing regulatory framework is designed around the pre-marketing 
phase in a way that raises questions regarding the compatibility of  its results with 
transnational practice. In other words, introducing the third phase of  regulatory evolution, 
the focus moves to the adaptability of  domestically designed (and, mostly, independently 
designed from political institutions) models and the shift towards global regulatory 
processes for marketing approval. 
 The assessment of  a drug’s risk-benefit profile is the result of  a procedure that is 
eminently characterised by a non-negligible degree of  discretion on the part of  the 
regulator. Throughout the pre-market review, the FDA evaluates a pharmaceutical 
product’s known risks and determines whether the product should be approved for 
marketing117 and which warnings should be included in the labelling118 in case of  positive 
evaluation. The process of  assessing risks and benefits is a case-by-case one. The following 
chapters will question the existing institutional setting of  pharmaceutical regulation, 
analysing data that suggest a measure of  caution against a typical legal attitude – mere 
deference to expert assessments – when facing highly technical matters. For now, it is 
                                              
114 Requirements on Content and Format of Labelling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological 
Products, 71 Federal Register, 3922, 3934 (24 January 2006), 21 C.F.R. Pts. 201, 314, 601. 
115 Because of the striking impact that such policy has on litigation, this issue is analysed and critically 
discussed in the second section of this chapter, dedicated to tort law rules. 
116 To which we will come back both in the next section and mostly in the following chapters, as Vioxx is 
one of our case studies. 
117 This decision is reached as a result of a risk-benefit balance, which will be explored in the following 
chapter with the help of selected case studies. 
118 US Department of Health and Human Services, Report to the FDA Commissioner from the Task 
Force on Risk Management: “Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use – Creating a Risk-
Management Framework”, 1999, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/tfrm/riskmanagement.pdf, 
pp. 29-30.   
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worth recalling that a new product can undergo varying degrees of  FDA scrutiny 
depending on originality and other factors. Standard drug approval proceeds in four 
steps:119 
 Phase I seeks pharmacologic effects information and early evidence on 
effectiveness in a relatively restricted amount of  healthy persons. About 20-80 subjects are 
usually involved in one or more of  these trials.120 The applicant typically begins this phase 
by testing several increasing dosages in the volunteers, to verify the safety and tolerability 
of  the product and the pharmacokinetic profile (absorption, distribution, metabolism and 
excretion). 
 Phase II measures several hundred closely monitored sick patients for the 
clinical effectiveness of  the drug. This phase involves patients affected by the conditions 
for which the drug has been studied.121 Efficacy and safety are evaluated by continuing to 
test various dosage of  the compound in patients.122 
 Phase III is characterised by multiple effectiveness and safety tests which 
form the basis for risk assessments and label warnings. It can involve fewer than a hundred 
patients in some cases or many thousands in others, depending on the target population 
and the endpoints being evaluated (on average tests involve 600 – 3000 patients). The drug 
is tested against a placebo. The trials are designed and powered to evaluate selected 
efficacy outcomes, not safety endpoints, although they can generate safety signals to 
pursue.123 
 
                                              
119 FDCA, as revised by the FDAAA, 2007, §505: the basic structure of the clinical trials does not differ 
substantially in its subdivision from that provided for in the EU market, although the details can be 
variable especially depending on the procedure to which a new product is subject (centralised or 
decentralised).  We therefore present it here in its basic features: see Arbour M.E., Sperimentazione 
dei Farmaci, Pisa, 2006, p. 4 ff. 
120 FDA, From Test Tube to Patient: The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and 
Effective, 4th Ed., 2006, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/testtubetopatient/drugreview.html. 
121 CDER, FDA, DHHS, The CDER Handbook, 1998 (as amended in 2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/handbook.pdf. 
122 FDA, From Test Tube to Patient. 
123 It is interesting to observe how the efficacy test is undertaken against a placebo. We will see in the 
following that the EMA runs the same efficacy test against the most advanced drug of the same type 
already marketed. Such a major difference between the practice of the two agencies persists 
notwithstanding the ICH Guidelines on Good Clinical Practice (GCP), which were meant to 
harmonise, among other issues, the practice of clinical trials: see chapter IV. 
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 Phase IV involves delicate duties related to “post-marketing surveillance” 
through the mechanism known as pharmacovigilance. In particular, trials in Phase IV are 
aimed at monitoring safety through continuous scientific and technical data development 
after a new product is authorised for marketing. Phase IV studies can be required by 
regulatory authorities (as per the new legislation discussed in chapter V) but are most often 
undertaken by the marketing authorisation holder for competitive reasons, such as 
identifying new markets for the drug, new uses, or effective combinations with other 
drugs. As discussed in chapter V this type of  safety surveillance is designed to detect rare 
and long-term adverse drug reactions (ADRs) using the target population as a dataset. 
It has been calculated that clinical trials normally take two to ten years to complete 
their full cycle124 depending on a series of  variables.125 An Institute of  Medicine (IOM) 
study126 describes the fundamental regulatory task of  the specialised scientific committee 
of  the FDA, the Centre for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), as being to follow 
experimental new medicines throughout each stage of  the clinical trials, assessing their 
safety and efficacy along the way.127 CDER experts can incentivise applicants to 
autonomously design product-specific strategies for post-marketing safety surveillance, as 
well as studies for the monitoring of  potential development emerging risks, together with 
risk management strategies for the assessment of  known risks. For assessment and further 
data collection purposes, the CDER in the late 2000s developed guidelines for marketing 
authorisation holders to develop Risk Minimisation Action Plans (RiskMAPs), with the 
aim of  including a variety of  “administrative activities to address risks that are known at 
the time of  approval”.128 
 
                                              
124 Chin R., Bairu M., Global Clinical Trials, Elsevier, 2012; PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America), Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, Report given in Washington D.C., 
2006. 
125 Such as the rate of the event of primary interest, the length of patient follow-up, the staging of trials, 
and the difficulty of accruing patients: IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety”, in The 
Future of Drug Safety – Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public, The National Academies 
Press, 2007.  
126
 Ibidem. 
127 In particular, if during the trials the CDER “does not believe, or cannot confirm, that the study can be 
conducted without unreasonable risk to the subject/patient”, the committee can put the trial on hold 
until unsatisfactory elements such as adverse drug reactions (ADRs) are positively addressed: see 
CDER, FDA, DHHS, The CDER Handbook. 
128 See the regulated version of the RiskMAP initiative by the PDUFA, guidelines available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm0
71616.pdf; see also IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety”. 
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 There are several technical conditions limiting the market reach of  newly approved 
products that can be imposed by the agency at the time of  approval.129 Those conditions 
are mostly aimed at balancing the higher risks represented by drugs undergoing special 
procedures.130 However such conditions have been described in a report by the Office of  
the Inspector General (OIG) as “difficult to put in place after the drug has been approved 
for marketing, as efforts to impose such conditions nearly always depend on voluntary 
compliance by the manufacturer rather than on the threat of  withdrawal of  the drug from 
the market as an imminent health hazard”.131 
In 1992 PDUFA introduced additional difficulties for the FDA in exercising its 
authority before approval. A ‘fast-track’ approval process was made available for new 
drugs that “treat ... a serious or life-threatening condition and ... demonstrate the potential 
to address unmet medical needs for such a condition”.132 Aside from fast-track approval, 
under the ‘user fee’ provisions the FDA began charging companies to review applications 
in exchange for tighter adherence to deadlines. The FDA’s previous legal framework 
required application reviews to be done in 180 days; this schedule had proven almost 
impossible in regular practice.133 PDUFA provisions on user fees have enhanced the 
rapidity of  the agency’s decision-making, but the concern here is that the procedural 
rapidity needed to meet PDUFA goals may have made it even more difficult than before 
for CDER experts to investigate efficacy and safety issues thoroughly within the standard 
track.134 
  
                                              
129 For example, distribution “limited to a specific medical specialty, distribution with required periodic 
screening to avoid contraindicated use, and distribution with mandatory enrolment in a registry”: 
DHHS, OIG, FDA's Review Process for New Drugs Applications: A Management Review, OEI-01-
01-00590, 2007, Washington D.C., OIG., reported by IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug 
Safety”. 
130 See infra on the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA). 
131 DHHS, OIG, FDA's Monitoring of Post-marketing Study Commitments, OEI-01-04-00390, 2008, 
Washington D.C., OIG, reported also by IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety”. 
132 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. For drugs that receive fast-track evaluation, the 
FDA may impose safety restrictions on the distribution or use of the drug, see 21 C.F.R. § 314.520; 
and may require post-approval studies, see 21 C.F.R. § 314.510; and “post-approval reporting of 
adverse events is much more closely monitored”, see O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration, 4th 
ed., Thompson, 2014, pp. 13-83. 
133 IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety”. 
134 GAO, Food and Drug Administration: Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval Times, Withdrawals and 
Other Agency Activities, GAO-02-958, 2002; DHHS, OIG, FDA's Monitoring of Post-marketing 
Study Commitments, OEI-01-04-00390, 2008. 
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 The problematic issue the FDA is confronted with can be outlined as follows: the 
task of  protecting consumer safety demands thorough pre-market scrutiny, but the FDA’s 
parallel mandate to incentivise innovation creates a counter pressure. Responding to 
instances of  various constituents seeking faster approval,135 the FDA has established that 
pre-market approval can sometimes be based on “well-designed bench and/or animal 
testing” rather than clinical tests.136 Moreover, according to the same guidelines, the FDA 
considers the extent to which measures such as post-marketing trials can substitute for 
pre-market scrutiny.137  
Now it is worth reporting a synthesised table depicting approval procedures in the 
decade 1995-2005,138 bearing in mind that approximately 50% of  applications undergo a 
user fee provision, and are thus de facto subject to fast-track approval. 
Year Fast-Track Standard Total 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
10 
18 
9 
16 
19 
9 
7 
7 
9 
21 
15 
19 
35 
30 
14 
16 
18 
17 
10 
12 
15 
5 
29 
53 
39 
30 
35 
27 
24 
17 
21 
36 
20 
 
 This brief  overview of  the American pharmaceutical regulatory system provides 
perspective on two sets of  issues.  First, the system reveals itself  to be fundamentally a 
domestic one, as it is conceived and designed as such. Second, certain elements suggest a 
measure of  legitimate criticism as regards the pursuit of  consumer safety. The generous 
                                              
135 As described supra. 
136 FDA, “The Least Burdensome Provisions of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997: Concept and 
Principles; Final Guidance for FDA and Industry”, 2007, available at  
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1332.html. 
137 Ibidem. 
138 Sourced from 2005 CDER Report to the Nation, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/WhatWeDo/UCM078935.pdf. 
Subsequent reports could not be retrieved. 
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input of  third countries’ data into the nationally consolidated FDA procedures has the 
potential to undermine the reliability of  both the standard and (even more so) the 
fast-track approvals.139 Standards have been subject throughout the 20th century to periodic 
review, driven either by precautionary or market-favouring pressures. However the 
situation appears considerably more problematic when confronted with the emerging 
transnationalisation of  procedures, that is, the third phase of  the evolutionary scheme 
proposed in the opening to this chapter: the tension between the domestic nature of  the 
regulations in place, and the global shift of  pre-marketing procedures, where the 
traditional US system of  checks and balances is called into question. 
 
2.  A process of  regional integration: towards the EU European 
Medicines Agency 
 The history of  the creation and consolidation of  the EMA as an independent 
agency is profoundly different from that of  the FDA, succinctly depicted above. While the 
story of  the FDA is a purely national one, the EMA introduces a supra-national element, 
as its origins and development walk alongside the process of  European integration. Thus, 
in historical perspective, it is interesting to look at the process that led to the creation of  
the agency in the 1990s, to draw a parallel with the contemporary American developments 
that we have described.140 
 The EU regulatory system for medicinal products is the oldest, most extensive, 
and most complex of  any vertical product regulatory system, comprising a “very 
substantial body of  Community legislation and case law”.141 It has been amended regularly 
since the first Directive was introduced in 1965 as a response to the Thalidomide tragedy142 
                                              
139 Chapter III will explore the substantial intricacies of relying on foreign data. 
140
 This short reconstruction owes very much to the works of Cuviller, “The Role of the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency in the Harmonisation of Pharmaceutical Regulation”, in Goldberg R., 
Lonbay J. (eds), Pharmaceutical Medicine, Biotechnology and European Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 137, and Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy: Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management in the EU and Co-Operation with the US”, Lecture delivered at the University 
of Pittsburgh, 13 November 2000. 
141 Jacobs F.G., Advocate General, “Foreword”, in Goldberg R., Lonbay J., (eds), Pharmaceutical 
Medicine, Biotechnology and European Law; and Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer 
Product Safety, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 38. 
142 See Teff H., Munro C.R., Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath, Westmead Hants, 1976; Griffin J.P., 
Shah R.R., “The Development of the Control of Human Medicines in Europe from Classical Times 
to the Year 2000”, in Griffin J.P., O'Grady J., The Textbook of Pharmaceutical Medicine, 4th ed., 
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(at which time only few countries already had regulatory systems in place),143 
contemporaneously with the 1962 strengthening of  the FDA’s prerogative in the US. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the EEC began to develop the concept of  pre-marketing 
authorisation of  new pharmaceutical products to ensure a minimum level of  safety before 
distribution. A first step was taken with the approval of  the framework Directive for the 
field in 1965.144 The regulatory architecture it provided survived until 2001,145 providing for 
a first European version of  quality, safety, and efficacy assessment. Subsequently, based on 
that framework, in 1975146 the Council drafted and issued the first legislation providing for 
the essential compulsory criteria of  pharmaceutical scrutiny, based on a scientific 
evaluation grounding the pre-marketing authorisation process. Rules on pharmacological 
and toxicological testing and clinical trials were harmonised, together with the adoption of  
shared basic standards for national assessments by Member State (MS) authorities.147 
 To promote collaboration between MSs and the EU Commission, in 1977 the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP)148 began its mandate. As an 
independent networking scientific committee, its functions were to foster harmonisation 
of  assessment standards and to facilitate cooperation between national agencies and the 
EU Commission. The result of  this initiative was to provide “the first EU-level forum for 
MSs representatives, from which grew networks of  contacts”149 among scientific experts 
                                                                                                                                    
Routledge, 2002; Abraham J., Lewis G., Regulating Medicines in Europe, London, 2000. 
143 The US had introduced the FDCA in 1938, as we have seen in the previous section. 
144 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products, 1965, OJ 
L369/65. 
145 In 2001 a new framework was approved under Council Directive 2001/83/EEC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use, 2001, OJ L311. 
146 Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of the laws of Member States 
relating to analytical, pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect of the 
testing of proprietary medicinal products, 1975, OJ L147/1 and Second Council Directive 
75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products, 1975 OJ L147/13. 
147 The time frame suggests that there was a ten-year gap between the moment the US introduced such 
legislation, and the moment the EU harmonised MS legislation on the topic. Such a gap is 
explainable by the fact that MSs began to legislate on the issue after the Thalidomide tragedy. This 
ten-year gap will however basically remain constant over time, as we shall see. 
148
 Council Directive 78/420/EEC amending Second Directive 75/319/EEC on the approximation of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal 
products, OJ 1978, L 123/26. 
149
 Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy”. 
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coming from their authorities of  origin in the MSs.150 The supervisory responsibility of  the 
MSs was addressed, identifying two key areas: inspections of  testing and production sites, 
and pharmacovigilance duties. With the introduction of  the concept of  “manufacturing 
authorisation” national agencies were vested with the authority to ensure that each 
producer seeking marketing approval nominated a qualified agent responsible for batch 
release, thereby introducing the practice of  ‘self-certification’.151 
Alongside the legislation provided by the Directives, through the CPMP work, 
detailed scientific guidelines on drug testing emerged, contributing to the creation of  a 
body of  supplementary technical ‘soft law’.152 While not legally binding, these guidelines 
were very much an output of  consultation and negotiation between the regulators and the 
regulated.153 This is the beginning of  that mechanism through which the regulators started, 
at a European level, to detach themselves from the traditional law-making power, gaining 
such a margin of  manoeuvre in decision-making that they came closer to policy-making. 
To follow the scheme suggested for this chapter, this is the beginning of  the first phase of  
regulatory evolution. 
 During the 1980s a significant trend started at the European level, combining and 
complementing harmonisation with mechanisms of  mutual recognition of  national rules 
and standards on the premise that they complied with EU legislation minimum 
requirements.154  The reasoning was that even in the presence of  full harmonisation of  the 
rules, final decisions on marketing authorisations would always have to be made on a 
case-by-case risk/benefit assessment by MS authorities.155 As a consequence, in the 
                                              
150
 See also Wahlroos H., “Control of Medicines in the European Union and Drug Information”, in 
Valverde J.L., Weissenberg P., The Challenges of the New EU Pharmaceutical Legislation, 6 
Pharmaceutical Policy and the Law 2005. 
151 On the idea of self-certification see Cafaggi F., “Rethinking Private Regulation in the European 
Regulatory Space”, EUI Working Papers – Law, 13, 2006; Dehousse R., Joerges C., Good 
governance in Europe's Integrated Market, Oxford University Press, 2002; Black J., 
“Constitutionalizing self-regulation”, 59 The Modern Law Review 26, 1996. 
152 As explained by Cuviller A., “The Role of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency in the 
Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulation” and Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer 
Product Safety. 
153 The phenomenon is described by Howells G., Consumer Product Safety, Dartmouth, 1998. 
154
 See Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy”, and Cuviller A., “The Role of the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency in the Harmonisation of Pharmaceutical Regulation”; for an account 
of the ‘trend’ see Rhodes R., Understanding governance: Policy networks, Governance, reflexivity 
and accountability (1997). 
155
  Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy”, and Cuviller, A., “The Role of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency in the Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulation”. 
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absence of  unified decision-making procedures,156 there would always be the potential for 
divergent assessments. To respond to the challenges of  the Commission’s White Paper on 
the completion of  the single market,157 and in response to the intricacies of  conflicting 
regulatory outputs, the decision taken was to temporarily rely on mutual recognition of  MS 
authorities’ decisions. 
 Several initiatives among those suggested by the White Paper were dedicated to the 
pharmaceutical market, with a substantial delegation of  power to the Commission for the 
harmonisation of  pharmaceutical standards, and a higher reliance on comitology,158 thus 
increasing the scientific committee’s power in standard-setting and shaping of  
procedures.159 
 The coordination of  MS decision-taking was reinforced through the introduction 
of  new legislation concerning biotechnology and other high-technology pharmaceutical 
products in 1987.160 MSs took up the duty to process these types of  pharmaceutical 
products in a somewhat collegial manner through the “concertation procedure”.161 
                                              
156
  See Cuviller A., “The Role of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency in the Harmonization of 
Pharmaceutical Regulation”, p. 140, but this topic is addressed by several authors: see among others 
Feldschreiber P., “Marketing Authorisation”, in Feldschreiber P. (ed.), The Law and Regulation of 
Medicines, Oxford University Press, 2008, 103. 
157 Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publication of the European 
Communities, 1985. 
158 See Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy”; Cuviller A., ‘The Role of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency in the Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulation’; and Schaefer G.F., 
“Linking Member State and European Administration – The Role of Committees and Comitology”, 
in Andenas M., Tuerk A., Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, Kluwer, 
2000. 
159 All industrially produced medicines were covered, including vaccines: Council Directive 89/342/EEC 
of 3 May 1989 extending the scope of Directive 65/65/EEC and 75/319/EEC and laying down 
additional provisions for immunological medicinal products consisting of vaccines, toxins or serums 
and allergens, 1989 OJ L142/14. Other measures introduced ranged from the authorisation 
procedures themselves, to issues of transparency in national pricing and promoting the rational use 
of medicines: Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of 
measures regulating prices of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of 
national health insurance systems, 1989, OJ L40/8; Council Directive 92/25/EEC of 31 March 1992 
on the wholesale distribution of medicinal products for human use, 1992, OJ L113/1; Council 
Directive 92/26/EEC of 31 March 1992 concerning the classification for the supply of medicinal 
products for human use, 1992, OJ L113/5; Council Directive 92/27/EEC  of 31 March 1992 on the 
labeling of medicinal products for human use and on package leaflets, 1992 OJ L113/8; and Council 
Directive 92/28/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the advertising of medicinal products for human use, 
1992, OJ L113/13. 
160 Council Directive 87/22/EEC on the approximation of national measures relating to the placing on the 
market of high-technology medicinal products, particularly those derived from biotechnology, 1987, 
OJ L15/38. 
161 Directive 87/22/EC.  It should be noted that “products nationally authorised through the concertation 
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Alongside these provisions, the “rational use package” created a new line of  obligations 
supplementing marketing authorisation, to be coupled with the existing Summary of  
Products Characteristics (SPC) – promoting the “rational use of  medicines” by compiling 
in a standard form all information for consumers and advertisements.162 
 Common ground was being established through the harmonisation and mutual 
recognition of  basic rules. On this basis MSs and the Commission proceeded with the 
natural step forward, entailing a shift “from harmonisation of  rules to harmonisation of  
decision-taking”,163 a crucial step in the mechanism of  detachment of  the system from 
traditional lawmaking power.164 This phenomenon, in our threefold scheme of  
pharmaceutical regulatory evolution, represents the move from phase one to phase two: 
that is from the acquisition of  independence by expert bodies to the consolidation of  a 
significant asymmetry between the formal distribution of  power among the relevant 
actors, and its actual exercise by the prevalent one alone. The key move in this direction 
was the creation of  a properly European marketing authorisation system with Council 
Regulation 2309/93/EEC, reinforced by the establishment of  the EMEA (now EMA)165 as 
an advisory body for the Commission. In agreeing to create the EMA, MSs began to 
partially renounce their sovereignty over the authorisation of  medicines:166 unlike the FDA, 
which is completely centralised, the EMA was defined as a ‘networking’ agency, 
networking with and supervising MS authorities. Alongside the inauguration of  the EMA, 
                                                                                                                                    
procedure were given a ten-year protection against a second applicant. This was particularly 
important at the time given the lack of harmonisation of patent protection across the Community”: 
see Cuviller A., “The Role of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency in the Harmonization of 
Pharmaceutical Regulation”, p. 141. 
162 See Wahlroos H., “Control of Medicines in the European Union and Drug Information”, in The 
Challenges of the New EU Pharmaceutical Legislation, 6 Pharmaceutical Policy and the Law, 2005. 
163
 See also Alder, “Roles and responsibilities of the Regulator”, in Feldschreiber P. (ed.), The Law and 
Regulation of Medicines, 73. 
164 See on the nature of this shift Rhodes R., Understanding governance: Policy networks, Governance, 
reflexivity and accountability; Teubner G., “Breaking Frames: the global interplay of legal and social 
systems”, 45 American Journal of Comparative Law, 1997, p. 149; Dehousse R., Joerges C., Good 
governance in Europe's Integrated Market, Open University Press, 2002; Joerges C., Teubner G., 
Transnational governance, Open University Press, 2004; Scott C., “Regulating constitutions”, in 
Parker C. et al., Regulating law, Open University Press, 2004, 226; Scott J., Trubek D., “Mind the 
Gap: Law and new approaches to governance in the European Union”, 8 European Law Journal, 
2002, 5. 
165
  Council Regulation 2309/93/EEC laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use, and establishing a European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, OJ 1993, L214. 
166
 A phenomenon that is increasing through time given the greater reliance on the centralised 
procedure that the EU pharmaceutical approval system is progressively showing, as suggested 
below. 
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the Regulation introduced the marketing authorisation architecture that is still in place with 
two alternative procedural mechanisms, centralised and decentralised. 
 The centralised procedure was, at its origin, compulsory exclusively for 
pharmaceutical products derived from biotechnology, and left as an option for other 
innovative products.167 Since 2004,168 the scope of  the compulsory application of  the 
centralised procedure has been progressively expanded and specified. In the centralised 
procedure a marketing authorisation application (MAA) must be made directly to the 
EMA for evaluation by the CPMP (renamed CHMP, Committee for Medicinal Products 
for Human Use, since 2001). The actual marketing authorisation is then issued by the 
Commission on the basis of  the EMA’s advice.169 Once granted, a centralised marketing 
authorisation is valid throughout the whole EU. Post-marketing surveillance is now 
disciplined by the recently adopted Directive 2012/26/EU,170 whereby the EMA avails 
itself  of  the network of  national MS authorities to effectively perform pharmacovigilance. 
 The decentralised procedure was (and still is) based on the principle of  mutual 
recognition of  national authorisations between MSs as elaborated in the 1980s. While it 
was originally widely adopted for the majority of  non-biotech new medicines,171 its use for 
innovative products is progressively diminishing. The procedure allows for a national 
marketing authorisation holder to extend the validity of  his authorisation to one or more 
selected MS markets. Under this procedure the EMA functions as an arbitrator in the 
event that a MS refuses to recognise the validity of  an applicant’s authorisation. The main 
committee involved is the Coordination Group for Mutual Recognition and Decentralised 
Procedure – Human (CMDh),172 created in 2005 to mediate disagreements between MSs. 
If  conciliatory attempts fail, the matter is referred to the CHMP for arbitration (the 
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 See Annex to Council Regulation 2309/93/EEC, OJ 1993, L214/1. 
168
 Council Regulation 726/2004/EC laying down Community procedures for the authorization and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency, OJ 2004, L 136/1. 
169
 Note as set out below that the Commission never departs from the EMA’s opinions. 
170
 Directive 2012/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC as regards pharmacovigilance (Text with EEA relevance), OJ 2012 L 299/1.  
171
 Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy”; Cuviller A., “The Role of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency in the Harmonisation of Pharmaceutical Regulation”. 
172
 See EMA, Coordination Group for Mutual Recognition and Decentralised Procedures – Human 
(CMDh), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/ under ‘Committees’. 
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decision is then enforced by the Commission).173 
 The creation of  the EMA prompted the creation of  new advisory committees of  
scientific experts, now directly participating in the preparatory phases of  decision-
making.174  The most significant innovation at the time of  the creation of  the EMA was 
that scientific opinions adopted by advisory committees were now transformed into legally 
binding decisions by the European Commission.175 
 Contrary to that of  the FDA, the history of  the creation of  the EMA is eminently 
supra-national. It is the result of  a remarkable effort of  coordination. It must be recalled 
that at the time the first EU legislation was adopted in the field, almost no MSs had in 
place an autonomous legal framework for the regulation of  medicines. The parallel 
development of  national authorities and EU legislation in the field was a key factor in 
facilitating harmonisation of  both rules and decision-making.176 As we shall stress in the 
following sections, an ever-stronger move towards centralisation of  procedures suggests 
that the EU can be considered as a highly integrated market in the pharmaceutical field, 
and that its legislation is de facto domestic in nature. This is the scenario in which the move 
to the third phase, the dichotomy between domestic regulations and global practice, 
becomes challenging. 
 The regulatory system of  pharmaceutical product safety was extensively revisited 
in 2001, being subject to a substantial codification process, followed by a refinement in 
2004.177 This reform did not however change the peculiar feature of  the EU 
pharmaceutical regulation model, which is the coexistence of  two procedures. This 
situation, it will be recalled, is an inheritance of  the absence of  a central authority until the 
mid-1990s, which necessitated reliance on national authorisations granted by MS 
authorities and on the principle of  mutual recognition among MSs.178 While the 2001 
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  Both mechanisms, centralised and decentralised, are now disciplined by Council Directive 
2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ 2001, 
L311/67. 
174 As provided by Council Regulation 2309/93/EEC of 22 July 1993, OJ L214. 
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 Sauer, “New Drugs in the Global Economy”; Cuviller A., “The Role of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency in the Harmonisation of Pharmaceutical Regulation”. 
176 Feldschreiber P., “The Structure and Function of Medicines Regulation in Europe”, in 
Feldschreiber P., The Law and Regulation of Medicines, 3. 
177 Council Directive 2001/83/EC of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use, OJ L311; Council Directive 2004/27/EC; Council Regulation 726/2004/EC. 
178 The regime was provided by Council Directive 65/65/EEC, and subsequent amendments. This 
situation, as suggested in the text, developed historically: when introduced, Directive 65/65/EEC 
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reform has not modified this coexistence, there is an apparent trend towards greater 
reliance on the centralised procedure,179 reshaping the EU regulatory model in a centralised 
fashion and reinforcing the decision-making power of  the CHMP. Although the 
committee’s function is formally purely advisory, its decisions are in practice always 
conclusive, as there has not been a case where the Commission has departed from the 
committee’s advice180 in the formal decision-making process. The Commission here has 
become a decision-taker181 (a perfect example of  what we refer to as phase two of  the 
regulatory evolution, the asymmetry between form and substance: the formal power to 
adopt legally binding decisions remains within the Commission, but never has the 
Commission rejected the EMA committee’s opinions). 
 Among the factors that demonstrate this trend towards centralisation, we should 
mention on the one hand the greater coherence of  such a model in the context of  a 
European single market, and on the other hand the fact that the operational history of  the 
mutual recognition system has proven itself  to be less than satisfactory,182 as it reveals 
inefficiencies and anomalies in the delivery of  safety. First, the two procedures differ in 
their wordings insofar as they regulate the risk-benefit assessment that leads to marketing 
approval. While the centralised procedure leads to denial of  marketing authorisation when 
                                                                                                                                    
called for the introduction of national authorisation systems, which was arguably all that could be 
contemplated either in practice or politically at the stage, and reforms to the mutual recognition 
procedures have slowly but gradually been introduced since then, for example under Directive 
87/22/EEC, which required that applications for high technology products had to be referred to the 
CPMP for an opinion before a (national) marketing authorisation could be granted. The centralised 
procedure introduced by Regulation 2309/93/EEC was effectively established on a trial basis, 
restricted to certain categories of product which are the subject of expansion, see the following note. 
Whereas some authors suggest that the system is outdated and about to be abandoned altogether, see 
Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 40, others suggest that it is still of 
great importance and should be taken as a model for an international marketing approval procedure, 
see Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of Globalisation in Pharmaceutical Law – Is an International 
Drug Approval System Modeled After the European System Worth Considering?”, Food and Drug 
Law Journal 63, pp. 644-645. 
179 Since the creation of the EMA in the 1990s, the mandatory scope of application of the centralised 
procedure has been regularly expanded: for a comprehensive summary see 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/30996001/EMEA--Marketing-Authorization. 
180 Once again we can observe a progressive detachment of the decision-making power, captured by the 
scientific experts, similarly to what we have observed with the CDER in the FDA’s system. 
181 See Krapohl S., Risk Regulation in the Single Market – The Governance of Pharmaceuticals and 
Foodstuffs in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 83: “Although the expert 
committee was set up as an advisory body for the evaluation of medicinal products, it became a rule-
setting actor on its own during the 1990s”. 
182 The need for a more consistent use of the centralised procedure is stressed by Peter Feldschreiber, 
arguing that the decentralised procedure does not seem to have been achieving its functional scope 
of facilitating pharmaceutical distribution in the EU market but has rather created confusion: see 
Feldschreiber P., “Marketing Authorization”, pp. 103-111. 
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“it appears that the applicant has not properly or sufficiently demonstrated the quality 
safety and efficacy of  the product, or that the particulars and documents are incorrect”,183 
the mutual recognition procedure sanctions denial only where “it is clear that the risk-
benefit balance is not considered to be favourable, that its therapeutic efficiency is 
insufficiently substantiated by the applicant, or that its qualitative and quantitative 
composition is not as declared”.184 More fundamentally, what introduces an element of  
uncertainty in the mutual recognition system is the definition of  risk as provided by 
Directive 2001/83/EC, article 28. According to this provision, risk related to the use of  
medicinal products is defined as “any risk relating to the quality, safety or efficacy of  the 
medicinal product as regards the patients’ health or public health; any risk or undesirable 
effects on the environment”. According to subsequent article 28a, the risk-benefit balance 
consists of  “an evaluation of  the positive therapeutic effects of  the medicinal product in 
relation to the risks as defined in point 28”. A risk is, therefore, “any risk”.185 As a recent 
study conducted among EMA regulators has shown, there is no clear practical 
understanding of  what a risk is under the current regulatory framework for the EU 
pharmaceutical market.186 And here is the major argument contra the decentralised 
procedure. Since conceptions of  risk vary considerably within a single regulatory authority, 
the degree of  variation is consistently increased by involving multiple regulatory 
authorities.   
 The EMA was therefore born as a networking agency, with explicit centralised 
powers only for a limited number of  cases, but partly because of  the operational failure of  
the decentralised model, it has acquired a significantly more centralised position. We argue 
that this creates a strong domestic framework (the EU) which is however vulnerable when 
permeated from the outside, for the very reasons that suggested a shift from decentralised 
to centralised procedures within the EU. 
  
                                              
183 Council Regulation 726/2004/EC, art. 12. 
184 Council Directive 2001/83/EC, art. 26. 
185 The lack of clarity regarding such a key notion as ‘risk’ in the regulatory process that leads to market 
approval suggests that the CHMP's de facto decision-making power is in fact a policy-making 
power, as the regulation’s vagueness leaves room for substantial discretion on the part of the 
decision-makers. 
186 Phillips L.D., “EMA risk-benefit project”, LSE, presented at the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 29 September 2010, pointing out how among EMA regulators 51 different 
definitions of ‘risk’ were collected. 
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3.  Attempts at transnational harmonisation of  regulatory procedures 
 Whereas the European and American regulations for pharmaceutical approval are 
developed within a precise legal framework, at an international level the situation is 
substantially different, very much dependent on negotiating processes rather than clear 
regulations, notwithstanding the ever-increasing transnationalisation of  production and 
testing. We have suggested throughout this chapter that there is a dichotomy between 
domestically designed regulatory frameworks and transnational regulatory processes. We 
will describe the reality of  this phenomenon in the next chapters. Here, in the chapter 
dedicated to the institutional design of  pharmaceutical regulation, we give an account of  
an informal and hybrid body, equally constituted by public regulators and private 
companies, which represents the most advanced attempt to date to overcome the issues 
raised by said dichotomy. 
 Over the past twenty years, regulators and the pharmaceutical industry began to 
find a common interest in attempting to eliminate unnecessary delays in the global 
development and distribution of  new treatments, and more generally in harmonising the 
requirements for drug approval at a transnational level, an initiative consistent with the 
global nature of  the pharmaceutical market. Following the WHO International 
Conference of  Drug Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA),187 held in Paris in 1989, the 
regulatory authorities of  the US, the EU, and Japan founded the permanent International 
Conference on Harmonization of  Technical Requirements for Registration of  
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). Its mission is to “make recommendations towards 
achieving greater harmonization in the interpretation and application of  technical 
guidelines and requirements for pharmaceutical product registration”.188 
 The ICH is organised as a hybrid public/private transnational regulatory network; 
its Steering Committee is the main body, which can issue legally non-binding guidelines for 
its members.189 Decision-making is structured as a negotiation process among the 
                                              
187 The ICDRA provides drug regulatory authorities of WHO Member States with a forum to meet and 
discuss ways to strengthen collaboration: see 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/icdra/en/index.html. 
188
 See ‘ICH vision’, at http://www.ich.org/about/vision.html. For a scholarly overview see Berman A., 
“The Role of Domestic Administrative Law in the Accountability of IN-LAW: The Case of the ICH” 
in  Pauwelyn J., Wessel R., Wouters J. (eds.), Informal International Lawmaking: Mapping the 
Action and Testing Concepts of Accountability and Effectiveness, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
189 As will be discussed in chapter IV, the nature of those guidelines is controversial.  It has been argued 
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members of  the committee, the composition of  which is worth recalling: EMA (together 
with a representative from the Commission), the FDA, Japan Ministry of  Health, 
European Federation of  Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), JPMA 
(Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association), and PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of  America).190 These six founding members are the main actors in the 
negotiation process that leads to the adoption of  harmonised guidelines. The WHO, the 
International Federation of  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), the 
European Federation of  Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), and Health 
Canada (the Canadian regulatory authority for food and drug safety) have permanent seats 
on the committee as non-voting observers. 
 The harmonisation activity of  the ICH can take four different procedural shapes: 
the development of  a new guideline (Formal ICH Procedure), the creation of  questions 
and answers to assist the implementation of  a new guideline (the Q&A Procedure), the 
revision or modification of  existing guidelines (the Revision Procedure), and the addition 
of  standards to existing guidelines and recommendations (the Maintenance Procedure).191 
The output of  ICH work is translated into domestic regulatory frameworks through policy 
documents that escape the normal agency processes of  adoption.192 
 Analysing a decade of  work in the year 2000, the ICH announced that it has been 
“successful in achieving harmonization, initially of  technical guidelines and more recently 
on format and content of  registration applications”.193 Topics discussed by the forum 
range over the entire terrain of  drug testing, from pharmacokinetics to clinical trials. Activity 
in the second decade has been significantly and progressively less frenetic, and only a few 
                                                                                                                                    
that they possess a de facto binding effect, the major example being that the E6 ICH guidelines on 
Good Clinical Practice have been largely copied in the draft of Directive 2001/20/EC on Good 
Clinical Practice, as noted by Krapohl S., Risk Regulation in the Single Market, p. 84, Purnhagen K., 
“The Challenge of Globalisation in Pharmaceutical Law”, p. 638, and Katsikas D, “International 
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceutical 
Products”, in Hale T., Held D. (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance, Polity Press, 2011. 
However, how these guidelines are implemented, not only in the EU but in all ICH constituencies, is 
quite problematic. 
190 These are associations representing R&D pharmaceutical industry, and accordingly companies 
engaged in the development of new drugs; the industry in general is not included. 
191 On the harmonisation procedures see  the ‘ICH structure’ section of the ICH website, www.ich.org; 
for a full and detailed account of the ICH organisation see Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of 
Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law”, pp. 637-640. 
192 The issue is tackled in chapter IV. 
193 International Conference on Harmonization, Steering Committee, “The Future of ICH – Revised 
2000”, Statement on the occasion of the Fifth International Conference on Harmonization, 9 
November 2000, available at http://www.ifpma.org.ichI.html. 
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guidelines and standards are in various stages of  the ICH process at this time.194 Whereas 
consensus was reached quickly in a series of  non-controversial areas,195 others are proving 
much more difficult to harmonise, mainly the specific standards for clinical trials. And on 
this observation it is now necessary to raise some critiques. 
 First, the composition of  the decision-making body raises an immediate problem 
in terms of  legitimacy: the negotiation process excludes representatives of  patients, while 
it provides for a strong inclusion of  representatives of  industry (international and 
regional). As has been fairly observed, “the pharmaceutical industry is involved in the 
harmonization process right from the beginning and is able to influence the ICH directly 
from its heart as a member of  its main working unit”.196 Moreover, we have explored in 
the course of  this section how regulatory authorities are shaped, and how their evolution 
shows a progressive acquisition of  independence by technical experts, coupled with the 
consolidation of  an asymmetry between formal distribution and actual exercise of  power. 
The issue of  legitimacy has been addressed as regards such authorities, in their domestic 
dimension, in such a way that the lack of  democratic legitimacy of  their rule-making 
power is compensated via a “credible commitment”,197 a form of  output-based legitimacy 
that will be thoroughly explored in chapter IV.  
An argument that must be raised here can be drawn from the EMA experience. 
The shift from a decentralised process to an increasingly centralised authority has been 
depicted in the previous section.  The country of  origin, and legal and cultural 
background, of  each MS authority has proven so influential as to pose concrete obstacles 
to an effective and efficient use of  the decentralised procedure. The inability of  the ICH 
to tackle substantial issues in clinical trial requirements, going beyond mere procedural 
standards,198 over a period of  more than twenty years of  activity, is a clear sign of  the same 
issues at a transnational level: participants in a regulatory network are tied to their 
authorities of  origin in a way that poses a structural obstacle to the creation of  common 
                                              
194 As at May 2015, only three are undergoing a process of open consultation: see 
http://www.ich.org/products/open-consultation.html. 
195 Such as basic guidelines on drug quality standards, necessary toxicity tests, and expectations for good 
clinical practice: a full account is available at http://www.ich.org/products/guidelines.html. 
196 Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law”, pp. 638-639. 
197 Majone G., Regulating Europe; Krapohl S., “Credible commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory 
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuffs”, 
European Law Journal 10, 2004. See discussion in chapter IV. 
198 See chapter III. 
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thinking, and consequently common interest.199 
 Aside from the fields where it fails to find a common ground for consensus, when 
it does, the local implementation of  guidelines issued by the ICH displays significant 
variations, calling into question the effectiveness of  their harmonisation potential. For 
example, the Good Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines as outlined by the ICH200 have been 
fully implemented in the EU,201 including the parallel Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) 
guidelines, whereas the two issues are considered separate and independently regulated in 
the US.202 The GCP guidelines, however, were intended to integrate the two aspects, as 
“the authors of  this clinical guideline had an excellent appreciation for the ramifications of  
inadequate manufacturing or packaging on the clinical program”.203 This example is quite 
effective to reinforce the criticisms raised above, as the GCP guidelines are often used in 
the literature as a paradigmatic example of  successful harmonisation from the ICH.204 
 In a global environment in which harmonisation of  regulatory procedure is 
struggling to overcome resistance from competing regulatory styles, a transnational 
regulatory practice via the ICH is undoubtedly well in place.205 That said, the ICH model 
begs serious questions in terms of  the legitimacy of  its procedures and outputs, a 
legitimacy which does not appear to be balanced via a ‘credible commitment’. We have 
analysed the process of  detachment which led, over the past decades, to the acquisition by 
technical experts in the form of  committees and by officials of  national and regional 
                                              
199 In this perspective it is striking to observe that the main obstacle to harmonisation between the EU 
and the US in particular, has been for this whole period, and remains, the placebo versus best 
competitor in the market discrepancy between the standards applied by the two agencies. This shows 
how the very idea of a risk-benefit assessment is intimately linked to attitudes that are, even in a 
globalised world, still eminently local. 
200 ICH, Tripartite Harmonised Guidelines – Guideline for Good Clinical Practice E6 (R1, 10 June 
1996), available at http://www.ich.org/products/guidelines/efficacy/article/efficacy-guidelines.html. 
201 Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ 121/34 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the 
conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use. 
202 See the FDA guide to regulations on GCPs, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm090259.htm; and the separate guide to 
regulations on GMPs, available at  
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/CurrentGoodManufacturingP
racticesCGMPs/ucm110877.htm. 
203 Simmons J., Bernstein D., “Navigating Differences between FDA and EMA for Regulatory 
Compliance During Drug Development”, BioPharm International, September 2006, 2; and see also 
ICH E6 Guidelines, GCP, section 5.14. 
204 Krapohl S., Risk Regulation in the Single Market, p. 84, and Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of 
Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law”, p. 638. 
205 We have briefly analysed in chapter I the transnational approval procedure that led to the marketing of 
the A-N1H1 vaccine; this topic will be thoroughly discussed in chapter III. 
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regulatory authorities of  substantial rule- and decision-making power (what we have 
described as phases one and two of  the regulatory evolution). The lack of  legitimacy of  
those expert bodies can arguably be overcome via different legitimating factors, built 
around the concept of  output-based legitimacy and credible commitment to the mandates 
they serve. However these factors do not seem to apply at a transnational level (the issue 
described in phase three of  the evolution as a dichotomy between domestic regulations 
and global processes). The expanding existence of  a transnational regulatory practice not 
only brings back the issue of  legitimacy, but also raises a pressing concern in terms of  
consumer safety. The shortcomings we have briefly reported generate a level of  
uncertainty that calls for a detailed analysis of  transnational procedures for risk-safety 
assessments.  In the absence of  traditional legitimacy, and in the presence of  substantial 
elements of  uncertainty, there is a need for a form of  control on the outcomes of  
transnational but incompletely harmonised regulatory procedures. 
The next three chapters will ‘question’ the system as described in this chapter.  
Chapter III will propose an analysis depicting the extent of  the transnational phenomenon 
in pharmaceutical regulation; chapter IV describes the rules involved and their source of  
legitimacy; and chapter V attempts to evaluate the results in terms of  safety delivery, that 
is, evaluating the output that supposedly legitimises the system ex post. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
QUESTIONING THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1 
QUALITY, PROVENANCE, AND COMPATIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC DATA 
 
 
 The institutional design described in the previous chapter is now to be questioned 
on the basis of  empirical data. The first stage of  this inquiry involves analysing the quality, 
provenance, and compatibility to receiving markets of  scientific data resulting from 
outsourced clinical trials. This is because clinical tests on human subjects constitute the 
paramount and primary source of  the scientific knowledge incorporated in risk 
assessments for marketing authorisations.  
The first section explores difficulty in accessing data for qualitative research. The 
second moves to a description of  the phenomenon of  clinical trials outsourcing. The third 
section proposes a series of  critical elements suggestive of  potential structural biases in 
data quality and reliability. The concluding remark posits that the uncertain scenario 
resulting from the analysis carried out throughout the chapter raises questions about the 
quality of  pre-market assessments, and thus, a legal question of  substantial regulatory 
compliance with the requirements of  the receiving markets. 
 
1.  Structural difficulties in accessing data: (un)balancing conflicting 
interests 
 The idea of  this chapter was originally quite simple: to evaluate the substance of  
the standards involved in the assessment of  a new product for its marketing authorisation. 
For this purpose, the scheme to be followed would have been one that identifies where 
and when the product was marketed; where and when the product was tested; and whether 
there were significant differences in the regulatory requirements of  the testing countries 
compared to the receiving markets. The goal of  this scheme would have been to assess 
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whether or not there is ambiguity in the scientific data relied upon for marketing 
authorisation, and if  so, whether such ambiguity is a consequence of  unclear or blurred 
regulatory requirements rather than unavoidable scientific uncertainty. 
 The most effective way to put such a test into practice is to select a few products 
and trace back their history from discovery, to testing, to marketing: an exercise that would 
give clear indications and favour firm answers to the proposed questions. However, as 
simple and clear as such a structure would have been, its practical realisation has proven to 
be impossible save at the cost of  gross approximation. The reasons are many-fold and will 
be touched upon in this chapter as well as in the following ones. This section analyses the 
failure of  this experiment and suggests how failing to retrieve conclusive data is not simply 
a serious obstacle to scientific research (not to mention public access to information at 
large) but also, and perhaps more importantly, gives reason for considerable concern about 
the quality and exchangeability of  assessments made within different social and legal 
frameworks. 
 The essential obstacle here was access to data. A crucial piece of  information 
needed to undertake the type of  case study originally conceived is the location of  clinical 
trials, the pivotal ones in particular.206 Such information has been however, as will be 
discussed, extremely difficult if  not impossible to obtain.207 Reports on clinical trials are, in 
most cases, partial and difficult to interpret when it comes to identifying the precise 
location of  the trials. In an attempt at following the original scheme, the study was 
supposed to focus on three products: Rofecoxib (Vioxx), Rosiglitazone (Avandia) and 
Drospirenone (Yasmin and Yasminelle).  The questions proposed were, as indicated above, 
the following: where was the product marketed? Where was the product tested in order to 
obtain marketing authorisation? Were there straight-up contrasts between the regulations 
of  the testing and receiving markets, or ambiguities in the methods of  cross-reference and 
                                              
206 Pivotal clinical trials are to be considered those that form the basis for agencies’ assessments that the 
medicine to be marketed is safe and effective for its intended use. 
207 For literature on the difficulty of accessing critical data see among others Rennie D., “When Evidence 
Isn't: Trials, Drug Companies and the FDA”, 15 J.L. & Pol'y 991, 2007; Gøtzsche P.C., Jorgensen 
A.W., “Opening up Data at the European Medicines Agency”, British Medical Journal 342, 2011, 
d2686; on the recent developments that will improve the accessibility of data in the EU see Bonini S. 
et al., “Transparency and the European Medicines Agency – Sharing of Clinical Trial Data”, New 
England Journal of Medicine 371, 2014; Strom B.L. at al., “Data Sharing, Year 1 – Access to Data 
from Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials”, New England Journal of Medicine 371, 2014; for a US 
development see Zarin D., Tse T., “The Proposed Rule for U.S. Clinical Trial Registration and 
Results Submission”, New England Journal of Medicine 372, 2015.  
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interpretation of  foreign data? And what margin of  appreciation was given to the data 
receiver in order to fit the foreign data into the receiving regulatory framework? The key 
aim was to explore the basic issue raised in the Introduction to this work: whether or not 
transnational testing is fit to comply in substance with the safety requirements of  the 
receiving markets, in other words, fit to ensure real regulatory compliance.208 
 The reasons for choosing the aforementioned products were simple: all have been 
distributed in the markets this work focuses on, all have been tested transnationally,209 and 
all caused severe unexpected harm to patients once on the market.210 Further, since one of  
our selected markets of  investigation is the EU, another criterion was to pick products 
covering both the centralised and the decentralised procedure.211 Interviews with medical 
assessors of  the EMA and former FDA officials confirmed that those products are all 
good representatives of  the development of  regulatory safety issues and well worth 
investigating.212 
 The research was carried out in the following way. The first sources consulted were 
public records and databases, namely the online databases of  the relevant agencies. At a 
second stage, said agencies were directly contacted for specific information missing from 
the public record. Subsequently the sponsors, that is the involved pharmaceutical 
industries, were approached, and finally NGOs active in the field. The results were 
distinctly underwhelming. 
 It has not been difficult to figure out where the products were marketed, as that 
information is easily retrievable from agency and industry records.213 The problematic part 
begins once the research moves on to the second step, that is, where the products have 
been tested. While there are significant indications in the scientific debate that all three 
                                              
208 We will discuss in the next chapters IV and V how if an issue exists on the effectiveness side, that is in 
terms of output, then from a legitimacy angle output-based legitimacy is necessarily weakened. 
209 Further details will be provided in the following section of this chapter. 
210 The issue is developed in chapter V, which discusses the safety outcome of the regulatory procedures. 
211 Rosiglitazione was approved via the centralised procedure, while Rofecoxib and Drospirenone 
underwent the decentralised one, with respectively the UK and the Netherlands as reference MSs. 
212 Personal interviews with Dr. Peter Feldschreiber, senior medical assessor of MHRA and EMA 
consultant, and Dr. Jur Strobos, senior medical assessor of the FDA. 
213 For the US see the products approval chart available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm (type 
the name of the product in the ‘search drugs’ area); for the EU, Public Assessment Records are 
available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/ (type the name of the product in the ‘search for medicines’ 
area). 
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have undergone tests in third countries,214 access to the details of  the clinical trial sites is 
simply not to be found. 
 First, as recalled, the investigation covered the public records. Starting with 
Rosiglitazone (brand name Avandia), here are the results.215 As regards the US, the clinical 
trials register216 lists a grand total of  40 trials, 35 of  which completed (only 5 showing 
results), 2 active, 1 recruiting, 1 terminated, 1 unknown.217 None of  the listed trials 
however precedes the date of  approval for the US market of  Avandia, which was 
May 1999.218 As for the EU, the authorisation came a year later, in July 2000. However, the 
EMA’s Public Assessment Reports (PAR) are completely silent as regards the location of  
trials.219 The European clinical trials register220 lists only 59 trials, all subsequent to the date 
of  approval and conducted within the EU and EEA.221 Information on pivotal trials for 
marketing authorisation is accordingly not accessible through public records. The story of  
Rofecoxib (brand name Vioxx) and Drospirenone (brand names Yasmin and Yasminelle) is 
essentially similar: the only difference being that, in the EU, since these two products were 
approved under the decentralised procedure, the difficulty in accessing the relevant data 
for the research arose when searching the British222 and Dutch223 agencies’ public records. 
 The next step consisted of  a direct request to the agencies to access data on 
clinical trials location. The results of  this search were more interesting. While none of  the 
correspondence with US public officials examining the request can be quoted, the essential 
contents of  the exchanges can be reported.224 The FDA, through the CDER Division of  
Drug Information, suggested that such data, for all three products, should be requested 
                                              
214 This will be further discussed in section 2, but see specifically Schipper I., Weyzig F., “Ethics for 
Drug Testing in Low and Middle Income Countries: Considerations for European Market 
Authorization”, SOMO, February 2008; Chin, R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials – Effective 
Implementation and Management, Elsevier Academic Press, 2011. 
215 As at May 2015. 
216 Available at http://clinicaltrials.gov/, self-described as the official “registry and results database of 
publicly and privately supported clinical studies of human participants conducted around the world”. 
217 See US clinical trials register, ibidem (type ‘Rosiglitazone’ in the ‘search for studies’ area). 
218 See FDA Letter of Approval ND 21-071, available in the drugs database at www.fda.gov (type 
‘Avandia’ in the ‘search drugs’ area). 
219 See EMA European Public Assessment Record on Avandia, reference EMA/230001/2010, available at 
www.ema.europa.eu. 
220 Official EU clinical trials register of the EMA, available at https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu/. 
221 See ibidem. 
222 Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), see http://www.mhra.gov.uk/. 
223 Dutch Medicines Evaluation Board (CGB-MEB), see http://www.cbg-meb.nl/. 
224 It is worth noting that the correspondence is personal and unofficial, and the agency remained silent 
when asked (several times) for an official statement on the matter. 
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directly from the sponsors, as it is considered Confidential Commercial Information and 
therefore belongs to the sponsors under the American Freedom of  Information Act.225 
The agency itself  reviews the data but does not retain records of  it. As for the EU, the 
discourse is similar but complicated by the centralised versus decentralised procedure 
factor. In the case of  Avandia, approved through the centralised procedure, an 
information request was sent to the EMA. The response was more elaborate than that 
received from the FDA, but inconclusive for the identification of  decisive trial locations 
outside of  the US and EU zone: it only included “a list of  clinical trials, which may be 
considered pivotal with regard to the initial marketing authorisation of  Avandia”,226 the 
location of  all of  which is either in the US or in the EU.227 Whether or not such a list is 
exhaustive of  the trials upon which the risk assessment for the EU marketing 
authorisation was based is hard to tell as no further information was provided, but there 
are ample independent indications that suggest Avandia was indeed tested in third 
countries.228 Multiple personal communications with EMA officials, which again are not to 
be quoted, confirm that significant portions of  clinical trials, especially in Phase III,229 were 
outsourced to countries other than EU Member States or the US, but that those locations 
and sites are covered by stringent confidentiality agreements.230 As for Vioxx, since it was 
first authorised in the UK, the request was sent to the British MHRA. The exact reply 
cannot again be quoted, on the explicit request of  the respondent, but in essence it reveals 
that the agency has very little information on the countries and sites in which the clinical 
studies were conducted, and only very limited records of  a single study conducted in 
“South America”, with no further specification. This is because the MHRA shreds on a 
regular basis trial records after 15 years, thus losing critical information and data.231 
                                              
225 See US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. 552, Exemption 4 “Confidential Business 
Information”. 
226 EMA/188255/2012 – 20 March 2012 – Human Medicines Development and Evaluation, response to 
request for information on clinical trials RFI-2012 No 01-309. 
227 Ibidem. 
228 See Ridley D.B., Grabowski H.G., Moe J.L., “Developing Drugs for Developing Countries”, Health 
Affairs 25, no.2, 2006, pp. 313-22; Dickersin K., Rennie D., “Registering clinical trials”, Journal of 
the American Medical Association 290, 2003, p. 516; Koski G., Nightingale S.L., “Research 
Involving Human Subjects in Developing Countries”, New England Journal of Medicine 345, 2001, 
pp. 136-38. 
229 Phase III is characterised by multiple effectiveness and safety tests which form the basis for risk 
assessments and label warnings. An average of 1,000 to 3,000 patients are exposed to the 
experimental treatment in this phase, which is essential for the safety and efficacy final assessment. 
230 Personal communications with EMA contract agent and CHMP official, December 2011–March 2012. 
Unfortunately no further details can be shared. 
231 MHRA shreds clinical trials data upon which it takes the decision to authorise a product for marketing 
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Moreover, personal communications with one MHRA senior official confirmed that Vioxx 
approval was supported by scientific evidence of  third country provenance.232 Yasmin and 
Yasminelle were first approved by the Dutch agency. Here the response to the access to 
information request was a straight negative, as the location of  trials is “classified 
information” in order to preserve the “privacy of  participants”.233 
 The third step consisted of  contacting the sponsors directly. The only sponsor to 
reply, after repeated information requests, was GlaxoSmithKline, sponsor of  Avandia. The 
information provided was irrelevant to the location of  trials, and limited to data available 
on both US and EU clinical trials registers and general (public) prescribing information for 
Avandia.234 Neither Merck (for Vioxx) nor Bayer (for Yasmin and Yasminelle) responded at 
all. 
 Finally, when asked about clinical trial locations, NGOs active in the field of  
pharmaceutical product safety simply referred to the public records.235 The Cochrane 
Collaboration236 made reference to its database, however no further data than those 
available from agency websites could be found. 
 The issue of  access to clinical trials data is old and has been substantially explored 
especially in scientific literature.237 The problem being that, given the proprietary nature of  
                                                                                                                                    
15 years after the product enters the market. See Gøtzsche P.C., Jorgensen A.W., “Opening Up Data 
at the European Medicines Agency”: “Under MHRA record management policy, all application files 
and data for licences are held for 15 years. After this period, files are destroyed unless there is a 
legal, regulatory, or business need to keep them, or unless they are considered to be of lasting 
historic interest.” 
232 Personal communication with MHRA senior medical assessor, September 2010–March 2011.  
Unfortunately no further details can be shared. 
233 Personal communication with Ben Klijn, Communications Department – Dutch Medicines Evaluation 
Board, 8 February 2012. Attempts were also made with the French and Italian agencies; both 
responses referred the requester to the Reference Member State (RMS) authorities. The Swedish and 
Danish agencies did not refer to the RMS authorities but denied to release the information as it 
constitutes “trade secrets”. 
234 Personal Communication with Christine Henning Pharm. D. – Senior Medical Information Scientist – 
GlaxoSmithKline, 1 February 2012, Ref. 11491752. 
235 Several NGOs were contacted, including three very prominent ones in the field of pharmaceutical 
monitoring: Health Action International (www.haiweb.org/), the independent review Prescire 
(http://english.prescrire.org/), and SOMO, the Center for Research on Multinational Corporations 
(http://somo.nl/), in several personal email communications.  Each response referred to public 
records. 
236 See the database at http://summaries.cochrane.org. 
237 Within such literature, among the most recent examples see: Mathieu S. et al., “Comparison of 
Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized Control Trials”, 302 JAMA 9, 2009, 
pp. 977-984; Wieseler B. et al., “Still Waiting for Functional EU Clinical Trials Register”, 342 BMJ, 
2011, d3834; Prayle A.P. et al., “Compliance with Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trials Results on 
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such data when arising from privately sponsored trials, regulators are either not in 
possession of  the relevant documentation or confront significant obstacles when they elect 
to publish it. Three very recent cases from the General Court of  the European Union 
(GC) give an uncontroversial aperçu of  how the balancing of  competing interests is 
interpreted when it comes to publication of  trials data. In these cases, a third party was 
seeking access to documentation that formed part of  a marketing authorisation submitted 
to the EMA by private sponsors, regarding the trial testing of  three drugs, claiming a right 
to access to documents pursuant to Regulation 1049/2001.238 The EMA, in Decision 
EMA/24685/2013 of  13 January 2013, granted access to such documents and as a result 
was sued by the sponsors. With its Orders of  the Court T-44/13, T-73/13 and T-29/13,239 
the GC ordered immediate suspension of  the EMA’s decision based on the fact that the 
relevant data had not yet been made available to the public, de facto sanctioning, on the one 
hand, a wide discretionary power of  the industry in controlling the publication of  data, 
and on the other hand, at a more general level, a strong tendency to uphold commercial 
confidentiality or individual privacy over transparency and access to information. 
 The situation is certainly evolving in a positive direction after the adoption of  a 
new EU regulation on clinical trials that tackles the issue of  access.240 The regulation 
introduces a Portal for EU clinical trials where publication is compulsory,241 but only, 
according to article 1, for clinical trials conducted “in the Union”. The new legislation 
therefore appears to leave the issue of  publication of  trials conducted in third countries 
untouched, except where special reporting duties are provided for.242 As pointed out in 
                                                                                                                                    
ClinicaTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Study”, 344 BMJ, 2012, d7373; Chan A.-W., “Out of Sight but 
not Out of Mind: How to Search for Unpublished Clinical Trial Evidence”, 344 BMJ, 2013, d8013. 
A more journalistic but comprehensive and well documented overview of the issue can be found in 
Goldacre B., Bad Pharma, Fourth Estate, London, 2013, Chapter I “Missing Data”. 
238 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31/05/2001 
pp 0043-0048. 
239 Case T-44/13 Order of the President of the General Court, 29 April 2013, Abbvie v EMA, OJ C 189, 
29.06.2013, p. 24–25; Case T73/13 Order of the President of the General Court, 25 April 2013, 
InterMune v EMA, OJ C 189, 29.06.2013, p. 25–25; Case T-29/13 Appeal of EMA against decision 
in Case F-29/13 Drakeford v EMA, OJ C 202, 30.06.2014, p. 27 – see chapter VII for a discussion of 
the cases and their appeal. 
240 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ L 158, 
27.05.2014, pp. 1–76; see the discussion in Bonini S. et al., “Transparency and the European 
Medicines Agency – Sharing of Clinical Trial Data”; and Strom B.L. at al., “Data Sharing, Year 1 – 
Access to Data from Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials”.  
241
 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014, arts. 80-82. 
242
 See ibidem, arts. 42 and 53. 
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scientific literature,243 the wording of  the new requirements remains uncertain as regards 
the extent of  the Confidential Business Information (CBI) exemption, and only a close 
monitoring of  actual enforcement practice will clarify if  and to what extent such 
provisions are effective.244 And a major limitation of  the new legislation is its 
non-applicability to already marketed products, which suggests that the real impact of  the 
new regulation will be perceivable as for marketed drugs only in some ten to fifteen years 
from now. 
 Clinical trials location thus remains a closely protected trade secret, of  which 
agencies are either not in possession or not at liberty to disclose publicly. From a legal 
perspective, we contend that if  data are insufficient to follow the testing of  a product into 
the details of  the location of  pivotal clinical trials (which is necessary information to 
evaluate the compatibility of  data in testing and receiving markets), this uncertainty alone 
is sufficient to question substantial compliance with the safety requirements of  the 
receiving market. The following sections set out the reasons for this claim. 
 
2.  Outsourcing of  clinical trials to third countries – a widespread 
phenomenon 
 If  a close study on specific cases is not possible given the confidential nature of  
the data that would be required, the second-best option is analysis from a macro-level 
perspective. The globalisation of  clinical trials is a major subject for scientists and 
sociologists.245 While specific cases are difficult to penetrate, scientists, epidemiologists and 
agency civil servants are more at liberty to discuss the phenomenon at large, that is, 
without entering into the details regarding single products (or only partially doing so). This 
is evident in the abundant literature on the topic of  clinical trial outsourcing, in the form 
of  studies commissioned by agencies themselves, and more prominently, discussions in 
                                              
243 Toussaint B., “EU Clinical Trials Regulation”, 381 the Lancet 9879, 2013, pp. 1719-1720; 
Gøtzche PC., “Deficiencies in Proposed New EU Regulation of Clinical Trials”, 345 British Medical 
Journal, 2012, e8522. 
244 See also Rizzi M., “Simple Safe and Transparent? - Preliminary Reflections on the Adoption of a New 
EU Regulation on Clinical Trials”, European Journal of Risk Regulation 4, 2013, p. 534 ff. 
245 The major sources for this section and the following one will be the leading medical journals the 
Lancet, the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), and the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA); the work of Drs Richard Chin and Menghis Bairu, leading US clinical trials 
experts; and the work of Peter Feldschreiber, senior medical assessor at MHRA and consultant for 
the EMA. 
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top medical journals such as the New England Journal of  Medicine (NEJM), the Journal of  the 
American Medical Association (JAMA), the British Medical Journal (BMJ), and the Lancet. Based 
on both such scientific literature and personal (often anonymous) interviews, sociologists 
have been trying to work on the subject as well, tackling it from various perspectives, 
mainly the selection criteria for patients in clinical trials or how, through the outsourcing 
of  clinical trials to middle- and low-income countries, said trials become integral to public 
health and quality of  healthcare in developing contexts.246 These sources are of  paramount 
importance for the present study, together with the work of  NGOs.247  Their analysis is 
generally not comprehensive for single products, but by tackling in depth specific steps or 
issues in the life-cycle of  a medicine, they contribute significantly to the better definition 
of  a bigger picture.  
We contend that legal scholarship has by contrast been neglecting this aspect of  
pharmaceutical safety regulation,248 and we posit that reinstating a comprehensive legal 
discourse is essential to the better fulfilment of  public and individual health protection 
goals. 
 The conclusion of  the previous section, having described the impossibility of  
in-depth qualitative analysis on a case-by-case basis as regards testing locations, is that the 
widespread outsourcing of  clinical trials for marketing authorization is a source of  
uncertainty sufficient per se to question compliance with the receiving markets’ 
requirements. The first element to take into account in support of  such a claim is the 
extent of  the outsourcing phenomenon. 
 It is difficult to trace a linear picture of  the growth of  the phenomenon through 
time. Reports tend to be a little erratic and often only cover specific periods or provide 
partial coverage:249 the numbers that are available constitute a ‘guesstimate’, often 
                                              
246 The phenomenon is well explored in Petryna A., When Experiments Travel – Clinical Trials and the 
Global Search for Human Subjects, Princeton University Press, 2009. 
247 Again, the most significant share will come from the work of Health Action International 
(www.haiweb.org/), the independent review Prescire (http://english.prescrire.org/), and SOMO, the 
Center for Research on Multinational Corporations (http://somo.nl/). 
248 As chapter II attempts to illustrate, the legal discourse is still very much linked to a national or 
regional perspective, and does not seem to fully appreciate the consequences of outsourcing for 
regulatory compliance on the one hand, and on the other hand the issue of legitimacy regarding the 
procedures allowing such outsourcing (explored in the following chapter IV). 
249 The issue is explored by prominent anthropologist Adriana Petryna in several contributions, including 
Petryna A., “Clinical Trials Offshored: On Private Sector and Public Health”, BioSocieties 2, 2007, 
p. 21, noting that an estimated 50,000 clinical trials are active around the world, but that these 
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conservative.250 In this light it has, significantly, been argued that ambiguities in numerical 
estimates are by themselves proof  of  a “global field of  experimental activities whose true 
scope is largely unknown”.251 Ten years ago, senior medical assessors suggested that 
“major barriers to a comprehensive repository of  clinical trials” included “industry 
resistance [and specifically resistance to allowing full disclosure of  the entirety of  clinical 
studies conducted per product], the lack of  a funding appropriate for a serious and 
sustained effort, lack of  a mechanism for enforcement of  policies, and lack of  awareness 
of  the importance of  the problem”.252 The observations made in the opening of  this 
chapter, together with several testimonies from the scientific environment, suggest that 
progress is still needed on the topic. Indeed, there is evidence that only an average of  one 
in 37 trial studies reported to the FDA for new drug applications gets published.253 No 
such data is available for the EMA – although for EU-based trials, the new Regulation 
should end the struggle. 
 Despite the unrefined contours of  the issue, it is worth taking a close look at the 
available figures on the globalisation of  clinical testing, as these are significant 
notwithstanding their incompleteness. The section proceeds with a review of  the US and 
EU numbers. 
 
The EU figures suggest the following. A report published by the EMA in 2013 
provides interesting overviews of  the distribution and number of  patients, investigator 
sites and pivotal clinical trials included in Marketing Authorisation Applications (MAA) 
                                                                                                                                    
estimates “differ dramatically” depending on the sources. 
250 For instance, the number of 50,000 active clinical trials, suggested supra, is the result of a study by 
the Thomson CenterWatch in Boston, a non-profit survey center. According to Petryna, ibidem, 
“50,000 is a ‘guesstimate’ – ‘very conservative’ – in large part because of the drug reviewers’ lack of 
knowledge of the number of experiments informing a new drug application”. 
251 Petryna A., When Experiments Travel, pp. 89-98. 
252 Dickersin, K., Rennie, D., “Registering clinical trials”, p. 518. 
253 See Wilson J.B., Gomez-Panzani E., “United States Regulations”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global 
Clinical Trials. It is also worth recalling that registered trials constitute only a fraction (estimated 
roughly around 50%) of the overall amount of trials. This study only focuses on registered trials as 
these are the ones upon which marketing authorisation is granted. However, the absence of a clear 
registry of all clinical trials undertaken by sponsors is a significant public health issue worth 
investigating. See also MacLean C.H., Morton S.C., Offman J.J. et al., “How Useful are 
Unpublished data from the FDA in Meta-Analysis”, 56 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 2003, pp. 
44-51. A strong case for data publication has been made recently by Zarin D., Tse T., “The Proposed 
Rule for U.S. Clinical Trial Registration and Results Submission”. An analysis of the virtues of 
patient-level data accessibility can be found in Nisen P., Rockhold F., “Access to Patient-Level Data 
from GlaxoSmithKline Clinical Trials”, New England Journal of Medicine 369, 2013. 
 77 
 
submitted to the EMA during a period spanning January 2005 to December 2011.254 The 
data presented shows that 62% of  the overall patient population in pivotal clinical trials 
submitted to the EMA during the relevant period were from non-EU countries, 
comprising 37.3% from the ROW region (Rest of  the World, comprising Africa, Middle 
East/Asia/Pacific, Australia/New Zealand, Central/South America, CIS, Eastern Europe 
non-EU), and 31.5% from North America (US and Canada).255 The number of  patients 
recruited in the EEA is substantially decreasing, and the major contributors are Finland, 
Germany and Poland.256 By contrast, the number of  patients recruited in the ROW area, 
primarily middle- and low-income countries, is proportionally growing. China, Costa Rica, 
Philippines, Japan, Brazil, Russia, Thailand, and South Africa had a range of  120 to over 
200 patients recruited per pivotal clinical trial per country in MAAs submitted to the EMA 
in the relevant period.257 The overall trend as regards clinical trial site increases in ROW 
countries (and especially developing countries) is substantially proportionate to that of  
patients.258 A further element of  interest is the number of  patients per site as registered in 
submitted clinical trials reports to the EMA for MAA. The average for the ROW area is 
significantly higher than in other regions. The EU/EEA/EFTA registers 13 patients per 
site,259 North America 10, while the ROW averages 17 (the peak being Africa with 23, 
followed by Central/South America with 20).260 These rates are particularly significant, as 
the following sections will uncover, because of  the structural difficulties in quality control 
by investigators in developing country sites. 
 As for the US, the numbers have been growing rapidly as well, but the calculation 
is conducted in a slightly different way. A report from the Office of  the Inspector General 
(OIG) of  the Department of  Health and Human Services (DHHS) shows that as of  2008, 
                                              
254 The data is extremely partial as, first, not all products for the considered period are included, and 
secondly, most trials are excluded as not published and/or not registered. See the full report, EMA, 
Clinical Trials Submitted in Marketing Authorization Applications to EMA: Overview of Patients 
recruitment and the Geographical Location of Investigator Site, Doc. Ref. 
EMA/INS/GCP/676319/2012, 11 December 2013, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/12/WC500016819.pdf. 
255 See EMA, ibidem, p. 9, Table 2. 
256 See EMA, ibidem, p. 22, Figure 12. 
257 See EMA, ibidem, p. 23, Figure 13. 
258 See the study carried out by the EMA member of the Working Group on Third Country Clinical 
Trials, Altavilla A., “Ethical Standards for Clinical Trials Conducted in Third Countries: The New 
Strategy of the European Medicines Agency”, European Journal of Health Law 18, 2011, pp. 65-67. 
259 The number is inflated by the higher average number of patients per site in the new European 
countries (19 per site) compared to older western European countries. 
260 EMA, Clinical Trials Submitted in Marketing Authorization Applications to EMA, p. 21, Figure 11. 
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80% of  marketing applications for new medicines (NDA) approved by the FDA contained 
data on clinical trials conducted outside the US.261 According to that report, more than 
50% of  both patients and trial sites involved in these applications had non-US 
provenance.262 These numbers are extrapolated taking into account only the applications 
with sufficient information to determine whether the data were non-US. Again, in light of  
the recalled issues of  accessibility and ownership of  data on trial locations, these numbers 
are to be considered partial and conservative.263 Of  the more than 57% of  patients in 
NDAs who were from non-US sites, a significant portion came from the EU/EEA/EFTA 
zone (with 14%), whereas the ROW region accounted for over 29%.264 The numbers are 
collated from 121 applications approved by the end of  fiscal year 2008, and cover patients 
enrolled in trials conducted over the previous 10 years, that is since 1998.265 A different 
study reports that, as at the end of  2007, over one third of  the overall trials submitted for 
NDAs that year (157 of  509) had been conducted solely outside the US, and that a 
majority of  investigation sites (13,521 of  24,206) were outside the US, most of  them 
located in ROW regions.266 
 Taking the figures of  North America and EU/EEA/EFTA zones together, there 
appears to be a growing trend since 1998 of  both patients and clinical trial sites external to 
these areas and mostly from the ROW region. Precise statements of  the number of  trials 
and patients per trial over the last 15 years would be little more than ‘guesstimates’ (as 
recalled, only a fraction of  registered clinical trials are published, and only about half  the 
overall trials are registered). There is however one figure that is uncontroversial and 
significant. If  we look at the number of  non-US/non-EU clinical investigators, the 
percentage of  these investigators identifiable in MAA and NDA applications in the 
relevant period grows from 15% in 1998 to 31% in 2008.267 
                                              
261 See Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials”, 
DHHS - OIG, 2010, p. 10. 
262 See ibidem. 
263 See the discussion supra in section 1 and the Thomson CenterWatch Survey as reported in Petryna A., 
“Clinical Trials Off-shored”, p. 21. 
264 See Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials”, 
p. 12, Graph 1; and Chin R., “Background”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials, 
pp. 4-6. 
265 See Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials”, 
p. 14, Graph 3. 
266 See the explanation of these numbers in Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific Implications of the 
Globalization of Clinical Research”, NEJM 360, 8, 2009, pp. 816-823. 
267 The result is extrapolated from the data on clinical investigators in the OIG study of D.R. Levinson, 
 79 
 
 Even if  the general observations above are grounded on partial and, time-wise, 
somewhat erratic numbers, there is consensus among both the scientific community and 
the regulators (two figures often problematically overlapping, as suggested in chapters I 
and II) that the phenomenon of  off-shoring of  clinical trials to third countries for 
developing/testing medicines for which an NDA or an MAA is submitted in the US or the 
EU market is a consolidated and growing reality.268 The reasons for this shift are numerous 
and shall be summarised below. 
 The first reason is savings in cost and time. This aspect can be broken down into 
three elements. The primary element is the actual cost-saving that off-shoring trials to 
ROW regions implies. India and South Africa are growing clinical trial hubs for this 
reason, especially for Phases II and III of  clinical studies.269 In a 2008 interview with the 
Harvard Business Review, an anonymous executive board member of  a prime American 
pharmaceutical company stated that “a first-rate academic medical centre in India charges 
approximately $1,500 to $2,000 per case report. That is less than one tenth the cost at a 
second-tier centre in the United States”.270 More generally, studies show that in the US and 
the EU the cost of  clinical trials is rapidly increasing, by 20% per year, thus rendering off-
shoring highly profitable, allowing savings ranging from 50% up to, as reported, 90%.271 
This enormous cost reduction depends on several elements, especially the lower wages of  
doctors, nurses, and coordinating investigators, and lower maintenance costs of  sites in 
middle- and low-income countries.272 Secondly, recruitment of  patients tends to be much 
                                                                                                                                    
and the EMA report on off-shored clinical trials. 
268 See Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials”; 
EMA report on clinical trials; Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific Implications”; Chin R., Bairu 
M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials; Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials Playbook, Elsevier 
Academic Press, 2012; Altavilla A., “Ethical Standards for Clinical Trials”; Petryna A., When 
Experiments Travel; Schipper I., Weyzig F., “Ethics for Drug Testing in Low and Middle Income 
Countries”; Feldschreiber P., The Law and Regulation of Medicines; Rowland C., “Clinical Trials 
Seen Shifting Overseas”, International Journal of Health Services 34, 3, 2003; Yee A., “Regulation 
Failing to Keep up with India's Trials Boom”, the Lancet 379, 9814, 2012. 
269 Garnier J.P., “Rebuilding the R&D Engine in Big Pharma”, Harvard Business Review 86, 2008, pp. 
68-76; Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific Implications”, p. 816. 
270 Garnier J.P., “Rebuilding the R&D Engine in Big Pharma”, p. 70. 
271 Wei D., “The How-To of Global Clinical Trials Forecasting, Budgeting and Project Management”, in 
Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials Playbook, p. 57. The cost saving rate is substantially 
undisputed and has been confirmed by personal interviews with Merck, Pfizer, Novartis, and 
GlaxoSmithKline executives. 
272 WHO, “Making the most of Existing Health Workers”, in Working together for Health: the World 
Health Report, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2006; and Glickman et al., “Ethical and 
Scientific Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Research”. 
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faster in developing countries. Recruitment can be increased by 100%, up to even 500%.273 
Data from the US and the EU suggest that as many as 80% of  clinical trials fail to secure 
enrolment on time, and that this recruitment problem is costly and time-consuming for 
pharmaceutical companies.274 In this sense, the much higher numbers of  potential trial 
participants and the reduced research costs in, for example, China, India, and South Africa 
offer considerable opportunities to accelerate recruitment.275 Furthermore, standard testing 
requires patients to be treatment-naïve.276  For many products representing large market 
shares in Western countries (such as anti-arthritis or anti-diabetes medications – the  
recalled Vioxx and Avandia),  off-shoring is paramount,277 as virtually no recruitable local 
patient is treatment-naïve, and none is likely to consent to be treated experimentally given 
the abundance of  valid therapeutic alternatives already on the market.278 Finally, the third 
strong driver for globalisation of  clinical trials is the highly bureaucratic and costly 
regulatory environment of  Western countries. The complexity of  regulatory requirements 
and the significant burdens on clinical investigators to ensure compliance and adequate 
documentation, while conducting regular training, are strong incentives to move testing 
sites to countries with younger and more flexible bureaucracies and regulations, where less 
stringent regulations and/or weaker enforcement can result in faster approval of  research 
protocols.279 
 We note at this point that the widespread adoption of  the ICH Good Clinical 
                                              
273 Chin R., “Global Clinical Trials, Study, Design and Planning”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global 
Clinical Trials Playbook, p. 11; and Petryna A., When Experiments Travel, chapter I.  
274 Altavilla A., “Ethical Standards for Clinical Trials”, p. 67; Annas G.J., “Globalized Clinical Trials and 
Informed Consent”, New England Journal of Medicine 360, 2009; and SOMO, “Briefing Paper: 
Examples of Unethical Trials”, February 2008, available at http://www.somo.nl. 
275 Rowland C., “Clinical Trials Seen Shifting Overseas”, p. 555; Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific 
Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Research”, p. 818. 
276 That is, not previously exposed to therapeutic equivalents; the issue will be further developed in the 
forthcoming sections. 
277 For this reason, despite the lack of data in public records, it comes as no surprise that EMA and 
MHRA officials confirmed that both drugs have undergone trials in third countries. The issue of 
patient naïvety and its link to widespread testing of typical Western diseases in developing countries 
(in which such products are of very limited use, if any) will be touched upon in the following 
section. 
278 The issue will be further discussed in section 3 infra. Here we refer to the rich work of Petryna A., 
When Experiments Travel, with particular attention to the interviews in chapters 1 and 2; see also 
Rowland C., “Clinical Trials Seen Shifting Overseas”, p. 555. 
279 The literature is consistent on the point. We refer to the cited studies in The Lancet, NEJM, JAMA, 
BMJ, and the literature referenced in this section. The point will be further discussed in section 3 and 
in the next chapter. The relaxation of standards involves mostly the substantive oversight of trial 
conduct rather than the black letter regulations, which albeit divergent in their wording, are generally 
informed by the ICH Guidelines. 
 81 
 
Practice (GCP) Guidelines can be seen as both an endorsement of  and an independent 
contributor to the globalisation of  clinical trials.  This will be discussed in the following 
chapter IV, dedicated to the origin and contents of  the rules governing transnational trials. 
 Consensus as to the existence and magnitude of  the clinical trial off-shoring 
phenomenon is now essentially unanimous, as much in the scientific community as in the 
minds of  the regulatory agencies. What is lacking and, we contend, needed, is a proper 
analysis of  its legal implications. This section laid down the first reason for the necessity 
of  legal reflection upon the uncertainty resulting from the globalisation of  clinical trials: 
the magnitude of  the phenomenon. The next section analyses the contentious issues 
arising in this globalising drive, demonstrating why out-sourcing, while clearly 
advantageous in economic terms, comes at a cost on the safety and data quality side. 
 
3.  Structural biases in data quality and reliability 
 If  the out-sourcing of  clinical trials is a widespread and now generally accepted 
phenomenon, so are the ensuing difficulties. Once again, it is with a certain surprise that 
one can observe how the topic has received relatively scarce attention in the legal sphere, 
while persistently raised by both academic and practicing scientists. Even what little legal 
research there is on the topic seems to not fully appreciate the true nature of  the problem, 
which is substantial rather than merely procedural.280 
 There is room to argue that the data quality of  trial reports off-shored to third 
countries may be less than optimal, for various reasons. Major concerns comprise 
(1) structural deficiencies in data control quality, (2) divergences in therapeutic culture, 
(3) ethical misconduct with scientific implications, and (4) issues related to patient 
recruitment, treatment-naïvety, and genetic aspects of  treatments’ success or failure. 
(1) The first element to consider is the fact that controlling data flowing from 
foreign environments is an extremely complex task, requiring resources and infrastructures 
                                              
280 An example of procedure-focused legal literature on drug safety is Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of 
Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law: Is an International Approval System Modelled after the 
European System Worth Considering?”, 63 Food and Drug Law Journal, 3, 2008, proposing an 
international approval system based on the ICH role, without really addressing the substantive issues 
raised by transnational development and testing. We will discuss those substantive issues now, and 
the procedural side in depth in chapter IV. 
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that are difficult to sustain. Regulatory bodies, according to prominent scientific 
literature281 (and in line with the tendency to approach pharmaceutical regulation as a 
national or regional phenomenon), are very much inwards oriented as they are structured 
to supervise clinical trial data and pharmaceutical safety in general “in their domestic 
markets”282 (a design that follows the model adopted and developed in Western markets, as 
explored in chapter II while discussing the EMA and the FDA). The competent agencies 
tend therefore to be insufficiently informed on critical elements of  clinical research carried 
out outside their jurisdiction, including the state of  the sites, the identity and level of  the 
investigators, the identity and exact background of  the trial patients, and therefore the 
resulting quality of  the trial data.283 The monitoring of  clinical trial sites and conduct in 
third countries is a crucial task for data-receiving agencies, especially the FDA and the 
EMA for NDAs and MAAs, but one that proves to be arduous if  not impossible 
altogether. It is worth again looking at the numbers retrievable from the FDA and EMA 
public records. According to the relevant US regulation on the acceptance of  foreign data 
in an NDA,284 site inspection is a key element for the FDA to gain confidence about, or 
have the ability to validate, the reality and quality of  trial data.285 The FDA should be using 
onsite inspections to ensure that clinical investigators, sponsors, and institutional review 
boards (IRBs) comply with FDA regulations on good clinical practice while developing 
and testing investigative drugs. However, although the FDA has unfettered authority to 
conduct site inspections,286 it is not required to do so. The recalled OIG study report 
                                              
281 See EMA report on foreign clinical trials; Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor 
and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials”; Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific Implications of the 
Globalization of Clinical Research”; Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials; Chin R., Bairu 
M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials Playbook; Altavilla A., “Ethical Standards for Clinical Trials”; 
Petryna A., When Experiments Travel; Schipper I., Weyzig F., “Ethics for Drug Testing in Low and 
Middle Income Countries”; Feldschreiber P., The Law and Regulation of Medicines; Rowland C., 
“Clinical Trials Seen Shifting Overseas”; Yee A., “Regulation Failing to Keep up with India’s Trials 
Boom”. 
282
 As suggested in Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of Clinical 
Research”, p. 818. 
283 See Little R.J. et al., “The Prevention and Treatment of Missing Data in Clinical Trials”, NEJM 367, 
14, 2012, p. 1355; Agrawal V., “International Clinical Trials”, Bioethics & the Law, 2012 p. 7; 
Rowland C., “Clinical Trials Seen Shifting Overseas”; we also refer to the experience reported in 
section 1 of this chapter when discussing unavailability of data for qualitative research, whereby it 
was often the case that the agency was not in possession of the relevant data. 
284 21 CFR 314.106: the regulation will be further analysed in chapter IV. 
285 This requirement is not exclusive to foreign data, but also applies to US-based trials. Inspection is an 
essential, although not compulsory, monitoring function for data quality surveillance: CFR 314.100 
and following. 
286 21 CFR 314.120(c)(1). 
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demonstrates that the FDA inspects very few sites either domestically or internationally.287 
The FDA itself  only inspects 1.2% of  domestic (US) trial sites, and in the period between 
1998 and 2008, it is reported to have actually inspected less than 1% of  non-US sites.288 
The EMA report shows slightly different figures, but still extremely low when it comes to 
the ROW region. The countries with the highest number of  inspections are the US 
(21.9%) followed by Canada (5.7%), India (3.9%), Russia (3.5%), China (1.8%), Philippines 
(1.8%), South-Africa (1.3%), and Thailand (1.3%), the percentages expressing the rate of  
inspected trials per total number of  registered trials per region.289 It should be of  great 
concern that MAAs and NDAs are generally fleshed with data produced at non-inspected 
sites. Reliance on local authorities’ oversight and enforcement of  international standards, 
the major argument for the ‘non-invasive’ attitude of  Western agencies, should be carefully 
weighted, as studies also demonstrate a substantial failure to monitor on the side of  IRBs. 
While data on ROW regions are extremely difficult to retrieve, one study showed that 
about 56% of  670 researchers surveyed from ROW regions confirmed that the research 
they undertook was actually revised by the competent IRB or the local health ministry.290 It 
is also worth recalling at this point that, as suggested above, the ROW regions have the 
highest rate of  patients per site. There seems to be here a form of  asymmetry between the 
formal powers attributed to the regulators, and the practical ability of  said regulators to 
effectively exercise such powers. 
(2) The second element to consider is very much tied to the first, and relates to 
what we have described as ‘therapeutic culture’.291 This concept is used to synthetically 
describe the multilateral relationship between patients, doctors, medicine producers and 
providers, and the monitoring authorities. Such relationship can vary considerably from 
country to country, and finds reflection in regulatory requirements. Mostly, as regards 
                                              
287 Domestically, inspections are not so much necessary for the control of regular clinical practice, but 
called for in cases of malpractice or regulatory infringement. The absence of clear registers on the 
totality of clinical trials taking place at a given time is also a factor. 
288 While it is difficult to break down the number between regions, the variation is between 0.5% and 
1.4%, see Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical 
Trials”, p. 5. 
289 EMA report on foreign clinical trials, p. 27. 
290 Hyder A.A., et al., “Ethical Review of Research: a Perspective from Developing Country 
Researchers”, Journal of Medical Ethics 30, 2004, pp. 68-72; the equivalent numbers in the US and 
EU areas are close to 100%. 
291 See the brief presentation of the concept offered in chapter I: the idea is taken from Daemrich A., 
Pharmacopolitics – Drug Regulation in the United States and Germany, The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004, pp. 243-48. 
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clinical testing practices, the differences are measurable in terms of  greater or lesser risk 
aversion for developed countries,292 and greater or lesser involvement of  the patient in 
therapeutic decisions when it comes to developing countries.293 To give a practical example 
of  both scenarios, let us consider the WHO Declaration of  Helsinki of  2008 on ethical 
guidelines for research involving human subjects.294 The Declaration sets the desirable 
standard that every patient enrolled in a clinical trial should be guaranteed access to the 
best recognised treatment identified for the health condition at stake. While the EMA has 
developed guidelines for the application of  this criterion, the FDA, in complete disregard 
of  the Declaration, requires in the overwhelming majority of  trial studies the traditional 
test against placebo.295 This situation is possibly in the process of  changing, as the US 
Supreme Court recently ruled that the ethical guidelines of  the Helsinki Declaration are 
rapidly attaining the status of  international human rights law.296 But until recently, when 
questioned on the subject, FDA officials respond that the placebo versus best proven 
therapy issue is “a mere ethical concern, and not a regulatory one”.297 The contrast with 
the responses of  EMA officials to the same question is sharp, as they appear strict in 
elevating the rule to a “stringent requirement for the validity of  a study trial”.298 Where 
there is a risk to the patient’s health, the therapeutic culture of  the EU takes what can be 
considered as a conservative or ‘patient comes first’ approach, whereas the US sticks to the 
placebo rule, considering it the only valid option for proper test results. This is not without 
consequences, as the two tests are not only liable to present diverging results, but, as senior 
medical assessors from both the EMA and the FDA agree, “they simply constitute 
                                              
292 Ibidem: in this analysis, Daemrich refers to the work of Hofstede G., Culture's Consequences: 
Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations across Nations, Sage, 2001, and in 
particular to the use of indices to measure several cultural variables, including for the purposes of 
this study “uncertainty avoidance” and “individualism/collectivism”. 
293 Ibidem: the relevant index is in this case the “power distance”, measuring the ability of a society to 
handle inequalities, specifically here inequalities in education and overall access to information for 
informed consent. This will be further discussed below. 
294 WHO, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 
Declaration of Helsinki, 2008, CIOMS, Ethical Guidelines n.10. 
295 Bairu M., “Bioethical Consideration in Global Clinical Trials”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global 
Clinical Trials, pp. 21-29. See FDA regulations 21 CFR 314.126. 
296 Pfizer Inc. v. Rabi Abdullahi et al., US Supreme Court 130 S. Ct. 534, 2010. 
297 Personal interview with former FDA senior medical assessor Dr. Jur Strobos, 12 March 2012. 
298 Personal interview with senior medical assessor at the MHRA and EMA consultant Dr. Peter 
Feldschreiber, 27 February 2011. It has to be noted though, that as strong as such a statement is in 
principle, given the limited inspection and monitoring activity of the EMA in off-shore trials, the 
effects are hardly measurable. 
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different types of  tests, and mixing the two is scientifically questionable to say the least”.299 
 On the other hand, when it comes to developing countries, the most contentious 
issue is informed consent.300 This topic is as much an issue of  therapeutic culture as it is 
one of  ethical misconduct, and necessitates a separate discussion. 
(3) Ethical concerns as regards out-sourced clinical trials are many-fold. To link 
the discussion with the previous paragraph, the first element to be discussed is informed 
consent. Lack of  voluntary and adequately informed consent to clinical trials in developing 
countries is unfortunately extremely common.301 The aforementioned lack of  IRB 
supervision opens the door to trials of  experimental medicines the safety of  which, for 
testing in humans, has not yet been established. A study on clinical trials conducted in 
China in 2004 demonstrates that 90% of  published clinical trials were not corroborated by 
ethical review of  the relevant protocols, and only 18% reported an adequate discussion on 
informed consent with participants.302 A 2008 SOMO study reports similar data, not on a 
country but on a product basis, demonstrating the lack of  voluntary informed consent of  
patients involved in clinical trials conducted in several ROW countries.303 Finally, the recent 
US Supreme Court judgment in Pfizer,304 adverted to above, was a response to a 
ground-breaking lawsuit based on ethical misconduct in Nigeria, where an experimental 
drug for meningitis was given to child patients without informing the patients and their 
families of  the existence of  an alternative and proven treatment.305 It is interesting to note 
that the defence in that case argued that no international norm existed requiring physicians 
to obtain informed consent for the use of  experimental drugs.306 
                                              
299 The quote is from the interview with MHRA Dr. Feldschreiber, however the FDA’s Dr. Strobos agreed 
on the substance: “scientifically these are hardly comparable methods”. 
300 Daemrich A., Pharmacopolitics, referring to Hofstede G., Culture's Consequences, in pointing out 
how this issue falls within the scope of both “power distance” and “individualism/collectivism”.  
301 Altavilla A., “Ethical Standards for Clinical Trials”, p. 69; Bairu M., “Bioethical Consideration in 
Global Clinical Trials”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials, pp. 21-29. 
302 Zhang D. et al., “An assessment of the Quality of Randomized Controlled Trials Conducted in China”, 
Trials, 9, 2008, p. 22. 
303 Schipper I., Weyzig F., “Ethics for Drug Testing in Low and Middle Income Countries”, pp. 27-64, 
reporting the lack of informed consent and ethical reviews on trials for Abilify, Olmeted, and 
Seroquel. 
304 Pfizer Inc. v. Rabi Abdullahi et al., US Supreme Court 130 S. Ct. 534, 2010. 
305 The experimental drug was the antibiotic Trovan (later pulled out of the market): patients and their 
families were not informed of the possibility of treatment via Rocephin, a low-dosage 
FDA-approved antibiotic. 
306 A technically true statement, which may account for the Supreme Court’s attempt to elevate the 
Declaration of Helsinki to the status of international human rights law. 
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 A different type of  problem is represented by discrepancies between desired 
results and the actual effects of  trials on local public healthcare. According to the Helsinki 
Declaration, clinical trials should be tailored to the health conditions and needs of  the 
local populations.307 However, studies have reported that the overwhelming majority of  
medicines tested in developing countries target diseases that are typical of  Western 
developed countries,308 and rarely address local health issues.309 A further and related 
concern is that of  double standards. In export-oriented countries, such as India, studies 
have demonstrated that export products are subject to greater regulatory oversight than 
those destined for local use, thus neglecting if  not aggravating local medical needs.310 One 
of  the very few ‘third-world diseases’ for which in-depth research has been financed and 
treatments successfully developed is HIV, which has a very specific history of  its own, and 
which has been affecting Western countries deeply for over two decades.311 
(4) A further reason to question the quality of  the data arising from off-shore 
clinical trials concerns patient recruitment criteria and, on a related note, the genetic 
diversity of  patient populations in diverse regions of  the world. The problem can be 
summarised as follows. Testing protocols for new medicines require the patient population 
of  the trial to be treatment-naïve.312 This implies that patients involved in clinical trials 
must not have been exposed to therapeutic equivalents before undergoing the trial.313 Such 
                                              
307
 WHO, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 
Declaration of Helsinki, 2008, CIOMS. 
308 Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Trials”, reporting 
the overview of “Global Pharmaceutical Sales by Region” carried out by Health IMS, 2009. 
309 Treatment of local diseases is extremely difficult to incentivise. While about 80% of pharmaceutical 
consumption takes place in the EU and the US, profitability is linked to sales in such markets. 
Diseases such as tuberculosis, which seriously affect several ROW countries, only get covered 
insofar as public incentives are in place. 
310 Berman A., “The Role of Domestic Administrative Law in the Accountability of IN-LAW: The Case 
of ICH”, in Pauwelyn J., Wessel R.A., Wouters J. (eds.), Informal International Lawmaking, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 468-499. 
311 The history of HIV has produced an immense body of literature, an account of which is beyond the 
scope of this work. It is however worth recalling that this is an example of public expenditure for 
medical research with the aim of overcoming the lack of profitability of private R&D for HIV 
treatments. The incredible advances that have been made in the field are largely attributable to the 
PEPFAR/Emergency Plan, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, created by US President 
George W. Bush to fight the global AIDS/HIV pandemic.  That plan committed $15 billion over the 
period 2003-2008. 
312 ICH Guideline E10, Choice of Control Group and Related Issues in Clinical Trials, adopted by EMA 
CPMP, July 2000, issued as CPMP/ICH/364/96, and FDA regulation published in the Federal 
Register, 14 May 2001, Vol. 66, No. 93, pp. 24390-24391. 
313 A fact per se scientifically contentious, as study results on a naïve patient are likely to differ from 
those on a patient previously exposed to alternative treatments (and the target population is often 
composed of the latter kind of patients): see Bairu M., “Bioethical Consideration in Global Clinical 
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a requirement is at odds with the widely accepted phenomenon that a vast majority of  
clinical tests are conducted for widespread ‘developed-country diseases’, for which 
alternatives may have been on the market for decades.314 This has two related 
consequences. First, the pool of  potential trial participants is extremely limited in 
developed countries, and secondly, the number is even more dramatically reduced by the 
existence of  proven and marketed alternatives.315 This is per se problematic: because of  the 
requirement of  naïvety, no trial is conducted in comparison with existing treatments on the 
target population’s market. For common diseases such as arthritis (the condition Vioxx was 
designed to treat), there is simply no evidence of  comparative trials among the numerous 
marketed medicines available.316 The need to recruit treatment-naïve patients is a strong 
driver of  globalisation, as recalled earlier: the inevitable ensuing issue is that the trial 
population differs substantially from the target population. Geographically distinct groups 
are characterised by differences in genetic profiles that, as studies have demonstrated, 
affect the safety and effectiveness of  medicines.317 The consequent question is whether the 
‘social ecology’ and genetics of  a study population are transferable to the target population 
for marketing and consumption of  a particular medicine (where effective alternative 
therapies are usually already available).318 The scientific community is fiercely divided on 
the topic. Clearly, scarce access to clinical data, described in section 1 of  this chapter, does 
not help the quest for a conclusive answer, leaving uncertainty as the winner of  the 
contest. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Trials”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials, pp. 21-29; Cohen-Kohler J.C., 
Esmail L.C., “Scientific Misconduct, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Tragedy of Institutions”, 
Medicine and Law 26, 2007, pp. 431-446. 
314 The issue is thoroughly examined by Petryna A., When Experiments Travel, in chapter 1, where she 
crafts the effective term “treatment saturation”. 
315 Petryna A., ibidem, p. 124. 
316 This conclusion is the result of cross-referencing available clinical trial registers for NDAs and MAAs 
in the US and the EU. Due to the partiality of such data, the question was raised directly with EMA 
and FDA medical assessors. Confirmation came from both agencies. 
317 Glickman reports that “a study of 42 genetic variants associated with pharmacologic response in drug 
studies showed that more than two thirds had significant differences in frequency between persons 
of African ancestry and those of European ancestry”: Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific 
Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Trials”, p. 819. See also Goldstein D.B., Tate S.K., 
Sisodya S.M., “Pharmacogenetics Goes Genomic”, Nature Reviews Genetics 5, 2004, p. 76. 
318 Altavilla A., “Ethical Standards for Clinical Trials”, p. 69; Glickman et al., “Ethical and Scientific 
Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Trials”, p. 819. 
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4.  Is uncertainty the conclusion? 
 Drafting this chapter has been a challenging exercise. The practical impossibility of  
carrying out qualitative case studies represented, and in a way still represents, a serious 
obstacle to the achievement of  this chapter’s goal: the grounded analysis of  the 
provenance, quality, and compatibility of  scientific data from off-shore sources. Facing 
such difficulties, the structure has been reshaped, following what we have defined as a 
‘second-best’ option. This scheme has a number of  shortcomings in terms of  consistency 
and solidity of  the data. First, the picture shifts from specific to general, and second, even 
in the general analysis the sources and data are rather fragmented, making it hard to reach 
positive conclusions. It has however been possible to raise several concrete issues within 
the sections of  this chapter, and it is now time to draw the threads together. 
 The first point is the existing consensus within prominent scientific literature as to 
serious problems regarding the general reliability of  data from developing countries. We 
have broken down the issue into four sub-aspects: (1) structural deficiencies in data 
control quality, (2) divergences in therapeutic culture, (3) ethical misconduct with scientific 
implications, and (4) issues related to patient recruitment, treatment-naïvety, and genetic 
aspects of  treatments’ success or failure. Of  these aspects, numbers (1), (3), and (4) (as 
regards treatment-naïvety issues) are basically non-contentious. The scientific community 
and regulators from both the EMA and the FDA concur in identifying structural 
deficiencies in data quality due to lack of  monitoring, inexperience of  local investigators, 
relaxed regulatory requirements in terms of  compliance with basic ethical standards, and 
fundamental uncertainties regarding the exact nature of  trials at off-shore sites. The idea 
of  diverging ‘therapeutic culture’ sustains this idea via a different perspective. There is not 
simply a lack of  monitoring or inexperience.  In the framework of  regulations unavoidably 
designed in a fashion that leaves an ample margin of  appreciation for the investigator to 
evaluate the data, different cultural imprintings as to how therapy is conducted exert 
significant influence on the gathering and interpretation of  said data. To what extent this 
factor is taken into account when data are shipped to a different cultural environment (or 
to use the terminology of  this study, the receiving market) is difficult to measure, but the 
issue is real.319 Also real is the problematic use of  treatment-naïve patients, for the array of  
                                              
319 In a personal interview, a senior medical assessor of the EMA, when queried on the subject, 
responded: “Yes, this is an issue that we have troubles measuring, and procedural requirements can 
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reasons suggested above, ranging from the uselessness of  most experimental treatments to 
the trial population, to differences in both therapeutic experience and genetic patterns 
between trial and target populations. It has also been shown that off-shoring of  clinical 
trials is an increasingly widespread phenomenon, with an exponential growth rate over the 
last two decades which is unlikely to stop, thus rendering issues of  data quality more and 
more salient. 
 It is in this context that we need to consider the impossibility of  undertaking a full, 
in-depth, product-specific analysis. We closed the first section of  this chapter with a claim 
that such impossibility could per se indicate issues with substantial regulatory compliance. 
In light of  the analysis carried out in the subsequent sections, we suggest that since 
consensus on the phenomenon of  out-sourcing trials is essentially complete, and 
consensus on the ambiguity of  the quality of  the resulting scientific data is, if  not 
complete, sufficiently broad to seriously question said quality, a concrete legal issue ensues 
regarding substantial compliance with requirements of  safety and efficacy in the receiving 
markets. The uncertainty surrounding the life cycle of  specific products (and especially, as 
suggested here, the location of  testing sites), if  frustrating in terms of  reaching certain 
research conclusions, leaves the door wide open to such a claim. Whereas a measure of  
scientific uncertainty is unavoidable as regards the safety and efficacy of  any new 
treatment, here the situation seems to be more complex. The complicating factors 
impacting the quality of  the assessment exhibit traits that arise from the regulatory process 
(or rather its limitations) rather than the products themselves. This poses a legal problem 
(a form of  legal uncertainty), and should be addressed accordingly. Chapter VII will 
provide an analysis mirroring the one offered in this chapter, through the lens of  the 
judiciary, in an attempt to explore the potential for courts to improve scientific data quality 
through discovery and disclosure mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                    
only do so much to overcome it. We work on the assumption that when GCP guidelines are in place 
the data is robust, but we have scarce information on how the implementation is carried out.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
QUESTIONING THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2 
ORIGIN AND CONTENT OF THE RULES: (NON-?)INCLUSIVENESS OF 
PROCEDURES 
 
 
 This chapter takes over the questioning of  the institutional design and shifts the 
focus to a different and equally crucial aspect of  the regulatory intricacies of  
pharmaceutical pre-marketing procedures. Issues previously raised in terms of  
effectiveness will now be investigated in light of  their impact on the accountability and 
legitimacy of  the legal frameworks in which they materialise. First the analysis describes 
the legal basis on which pre-marketing assessments in the US and EU domestic 
frameworks are permeated by exogenous elements. Secondly, the discussion will shift to 
the theoretical justifications for the progressive abandonment of  traditional democratic 
legitimacy in the rule-making mechanisms for the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
1.  The regulatory requirements for accepting foreign clinical data in 
EU/US markets 
 Chapter III illustrated how, for a now considerable period of  time, the FDA and 
the EMA have accepted data resulting from clinical studies conducted in third countries in 
support of  safety and efficacy claims in NDAs and MAAs.320 This section reviews the 
relevant FDA and EMA regulations for foreign data acceptance with a view to accounting 
for the rules governing this phenomenon. 
 Under section 21 CFR 312.120(c)(1), the FDA used to accept foreign clinical trial 
data with the stringent requirement that the trial conformed with the option providing 
                                              
320 See sections 2 and 3 of chapter III, and also infra. 
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“greater protection of  the human subjects”,321 as between the ethical principles and related 
recommendations as provided by the Helsinki Declaration,322 or the “laws and regulations 
of  the country in which the research was conducted”.323 This alternative choice suggested 
a conception of  the Helsinki provisions as minimum standards to be met or surpassed by 
national regulatory requirements. 
 However, in April 2008, the FDA published a regulatory change, removing the 
requirement for clinical trials conducted in non-US countries to comply with the Helsinki 
Declaration324 in its original version of  1989. This change provides, under 21 CFR 312, 
that the FDA will accept foreign clinical trials conducted in accordance with the Good 
Clinical Practice (GCP) regulations325 as developed through ICH procedure, namely 
Guideline E6.326 
 This raised significant alarm as regards a series of  essential Helsinki Declaration 
requirements, in particular those regarding the safeguarding of  vulnerable subjects as 
regards the potential dangers of  the use of  placebo (in terms of  lost opportunities to 
undergo an existing treatment).327 Concerns raised by the abandonment of  the Helsinki 
                                              
321 Wilson J.B, Gomez-Panzani E., “United States Regulations”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global 
Clinical Trials – Effective Implementation and Management, Elsevier Academic Press, 2011, p. 43. 
322 In its version of 1989, WHO, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, Declaration of Helsinki, 1989, CIOMS. It is worth noting that at the time, the 
debate over placebo versus proven alternative therapy was not as developed as it became in the 
following decade. That delay is reflected in the contents of the 1989 version of the declaration. 
323
 Wilson J.B, Gomez-Panzani E., “United States Regulations”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global 
Clinical Trials, p. 45. 
324 Ibidem, p. 43; see the decision at Federal Register. 2008 Apr 28; 73(82): 22800–22816. 
325 The amended version of 21 CFR 312.120 as revised in October 27, 2008 provides that foreign data 
can be accepted when: “(i) The study was conducted in accordance with good clinical practice 
(GCP). For the purposes of this section, GCP is defined as a standard for the design, conduct, 
performance, monitoring, auditing, recording, analysis, and reporting of clinical trials in a way that 
provides assurance that the data and reported results are credible and accurate and that the rights, 
safety, and well-being of trial subjects are protected. GCP includes review and approval (or 
provision of a favourable opinion) by an independent ethics committee (IEC) before initiating a 
study, continuing review of an ongoing study by an IEC, and obtaining and documenting the freely 
given informed consent of the subject (or a subject's legally authorized representative, if the subject 
is unable to provide informed consent) before initiating a study. GCP does not require informed 
consent in life-threatening situations when the IEC reviewing the study finds, before initiation of the 
study, that informed consent is not feasible and either that the conditions present are consistent with 
those described in 50.23 or 50.24(a) of this chapter, or that the measures described in the study 
protocol or elsewhere will protect the rights, safety, and well-being of subjects; and (ii) FDA is able 
to validate the data from the study through an onsite inspection if the agency deems it necessary.” 
326 ICH, Tripartite Harmonised Guidelines – Guideline for Good Clinical Practice E6 (R1, 10 June 
1996), available at http://www.ich.org/products/guidelines/efficacy/article/efficacy-guidelines.html. 
327 With the caveat mentioned above, on the subsequent development of the placebo versus most 
advanced treatment alternative debate. See Wilson J.B, Gomez-Panzani E., “United States 
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Declaration were addressed by the FDA’s inclusion in the GCP requirements of  “review 
and approval (or provision of  a favourable opinion) by an independent ethics committee 
(IEC) before initiating a study, continuing review of  an ongoing study by an IEC, and 
obtaining and documenting the freely given informed consent of  the subject”.328 It is 
noteworthy that the text of  the US provision explicitly refers to “standard[s] for the design, 
conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing, recording, analysis, and reporting of  clinical trials” 
(emphasis added), which are strong procedural requirements in accordance with ICH 
Guideline E6. Despite its ostensibly substantive content, this set of  rules falls short of  
effectively addressing the critical issues previously identified (such as for example the issue 
of  patient-naïvety, or the inability to solve the placebo versus best available alternative as a 
regulatory or ethical question). This is a significant aperçu of  the phenomenon described in 
this work as a dichotomy between national frameworks and transnational practices. The 
strong internal regulatory regime in place in the US (see supra chapter II) is open to 
exogenous elements (foreign data) which are assessed on the basis of  standards strongly 
designed from a procedural perspective but rather generic on substance, and principally 
through the possibility for the FDA to conduct onsite inspections (in practice a very 
limited activity, see again supra chapter III). 
 We have posited that the out-sourcing phenomenon for clinical trials is 
characterising modern practice in the EU as much as in the US. The EMA, up until 2014, 
required that clinical trials included in MAAs be conducted in accordance both with 
GCP,329 and with the ethical standards of  Directive 2001/20/EC.330 The EU Directive has 
been implemented in all 28 Member States, and three EEA countries (Norway, Iceland and 
Lichtenstein) comply with the relevant requirements as well.331 EU Directive 2001/20/EC 
used to apply to all clinical trials on investigative medicinal products, from Phase II to 
Phase IV (pharmacovigilance). A follow-up was achieved with Directive 2005/28/EC, 
approved in April 2005, incorporating the Good Manufacturing Practice rules into the 
                                                                                                                                    
Regulations”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials. 
 328 21 CFR 312.120 (i). 
329 See Directive 2001/83/EC, Annex I, as amended by Directive 2003/63/EC. 
330 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 4 April 2001, On the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating 
to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products 
for human use. 
331 Wilson J.B., “European Union Regulations”, in Chin R., Bairu M. (eds.), Global Clinical Trials, p. 55. 
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overall GCP scheme.332 The EU regulations did not differentiate at a legislative level 
between the requirements for clinical trials conducted within the EU territory and those 
carried out in third countries.333 Again, however, the major tool for quality monitoring is 
provided by the power of  inspection of  clinical trials sites.334 
As mentioned in chapter III, a significant reform of  EU pharmaceutical regulation 
was recently approved, with the adoption of  a new Regulation on clinical trials. With its 
current proposal, the Commission seeks to modernise the legal framework of  clinical trials 
by addressing a series of  shortcomings ascribed to the regime governed by Directive 
2001/20/EC. The proposal seems to go in the direction of  abolishing differentiations in 
practice between trials held in the Union and in third countries (that is, towards the 
elimination of  a ‘special’ status for the latter).335 For the purpose of  this chapter, it is worth 
noting the provisions of  chapter 8 of  the Regulation,336 on the conduct of  trials. The 
intended effect of  the articles contained in this chapter is to draw together the rules 
introduced by Directive 2005/28/EC, laying down principles and guidelines on good 
clinical practice, and the Commission guidance documents on the topic. Rather than 
detailing principles and guidelines for actual trial conduct, however, the proposal 
cross-refers explicitly to ICH Guidelines on the matter (specifically ICH Guideline E6), 
and in substance focuses on a series of  provisions on monitoring of  trial sites, adequacy 
of  trial population, and duties (articles 47–59), de facto acknowledging an established trend 
that favours policy documents vis à vis hard law instruments in governing such highly 
technical (and therefore constantly evolving) issues. The key factor, for all intents and 
purposes, remains the inspection mechanism, with all the limits underlined supra. 
 The basic set of  rules justifying and allowing the reported significant use of  
                                              
332 Commission Directive 2005/28/EC of 8 April 2005, laying down principles and detailed guidelines 
for good clinical practice as regards investigational medicinal products for human use, as well as the 
requirements for authorization of the manufacturing or importation of such products. 
333 In the wording of both Directives 2001/20 and 2005/28, the requirements for the validity of trials 
submitted for MAAs apply indistinctly to data from MSs and third countries. Unlike the US 
provisions, the EU does not specify distinct requirements for acceptance of foreign data. 
334 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on clinical trials for 
medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20, OJ L 158, 2014, art 78; 
Directive 2005/28/EC, arts. 21-30. 
335
 Ibidem, Recital 65: “The Commission should be able to control whether Member States correctly 
supervise compliance with this Regulation. Moreover, the Commission should be able to control 
whether regulatory systems of third countries ensure compliance with the specific provisions of this 
Regulation and Directive 2001/83/EC concerning clinical trials conducted in third countries.” 
336 Ibidem, chapter 8 on the conduct of a clinical trial, supervision by the sponsor, training and 
experience, and auxiliary medicinal products. 
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foreign data in both the US and EU markets is therefore grounded in the aforementioned 
ICH Guideline E6 on GCP (discussed in detail in the next section).  The basis for foreign 
trial acceptance is thus quite similar, with both sets of  rules largely comprising ‘soft’ 
procedural requirements developed transnationally at ICH level (and subsequently 
transposed into domestic governance through soft instruments such as policy documents 
– see the next section). 
 Such an approach is, as suggested, intrinsically procedural, falling short of  properly 
addressing the series of  substantial concerns that were raised in the previous chapter.337 
Moreover, the only real option for the FDA and the EMA to supervise the fulfilment of  
GCP requirements would be to enforce their monitoring and inspection powers.  As 
already suggested, such enforcement activity has proved very limited in practice and can 
only provide extremely narrow coverage of  the overall transnational clinical testing 
scenario.338 
 It is worth briefly recalling the findings of  recent studies on the use of  foreign data 
by the EMA and the FDA. According to the aforementioned OIG report: 339 
 80% of  approved NDAs in 2008 contained data from foreign 
clinical trials. A majority of  both trial population and trial sites were located 
in non-US countries. 
 The FDA reported inspections in just under 1% of  sites 
located outside the US. 
 The report concludes that challenges to conducting 
inspections in third countries sites and limited availability of  resulting data 
(similar to the ones this research has encountered) “inhibit the FDA’s ability 
to monitor foreign clinical trials”. 
The report conducted on the issue of  foreign clinical trials submitted to the EMA in 
MAAs suggested similar difficulties in managing the flow of  foreign data, and serious 
                                              
337 In particular, monitoring of data quality, the implementation of procedures conflicting with diverse 
therapeutic cultures, and patient-naïvety issues. 
338 See section 3 of chapter III on inspections and related challenges. 
339 See Levinson D.R., “Challenges to the FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials”, 
DHHS - OIG, 2010, and section 2 of chapter III. 
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limitations upon the agency’s ability to conduct inspections.340 In an attempt to overcome 
such structural obstacles, and in order to foster closer cooperation on the off-shoring of  
clinical trials, the EMA and the FDA have launched a joint initiative to collaborate on GCP 
for international inspections. The initiative identifies a series of  key objectives:341 
 To conduct periodic information exchanges on GCP-related 
information in order to streamline sharing of  GCP inspection planning information, 
and to communicate effectively and in a timely manner on inspection outcomes. 
 To conduct collaborative GCP inspections by sharing information, 
experience and inspection procedures, cooperating in the conduct of  inspections and 
sharing best-practice knowledge. 
 To share information on interpretation of  GCP, by keeping each 
regulatory agency informed of  GCP-related legislation, regulatory guidance and 
related documents, and to identify and act together to benefit the clinical research 
process. 
 The initiative is the first official document recognising the necessity of  cooperation 
not only in the rule-making side of  pharmaceutical safety, but also, and essentially, in the 
conduct of  the trials. The attempt to overcome disparities in GCP interpretation is a key 
and welcome element of  this policy document. However, its ability to practically impact 
the state of  affairs in the US and the EU is intimately linked to its enforceability, on the 
one hand, and its financing on the other.   The original idea was to have an 18-month pilot 
period, starting in September 2009. As of  today,342 the initiative has produced limited 
results, the main one being a further confirmation of  the difficulties encountered by the 
agencies in performing statistically significant inspections.343 
 
                                              
340 See EMA, Clinical Trials Submitted in Marketing Authorization Applications to EMA: Overview of 
Patients recruitment and the Geographical Location of Investigator Site, Doc. Ref. 
EMA/INS/GCP/154352/2010, 5 November 2010, and EMA/INS/GCP/676319/2012, 11 December 
2013; see also section 2 of chapter III.  
341 See “EMA-FDA GCP Initiative -Terms of engagement and procedures for participating authorities”, 
EMA Doc.Ref. EMEA/INS/GCP/538414/2008 FDA Mod. of 20 August 2009. 
342 March 2015.  In the fall of 2013, a new joint initiative was launched based on the claimed positive 
outcomes of the 2009 experience. There is an expectation that this report will provide statistically 
more relevant data on inspections in third countries.  
343
 See EMA and FDA, ‘Report on the Pilot EMA-FDA GCP Initiative’, Doc. Ref. 
EXT/INS/GCP/56289/2011, at 13, Table 1. 
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2.  The GCP and SPCT Guidelines – Essential examples of  
harmonisation through ICH 
 The previous section has shown that the essential element of  foreign clinical trial 
acceptance in both the EU and the US is the fulfilment of  the requirements laid down in 
ICH Guideline E6 on Good Clinical Practice (GCP). In the words of  the ICH Steering 
Committee:344 
The tripartite harmonised ICH Guideline was finalised under Step 4 in May 1996. 
This Good Clinical Practices document describes the responsibilities and expectations of  all 
participants in the conduct of  clinical trials, including investigators, monitors, sponsors and 
IRBs. GCPs cover aspects of  monitoring, reporting and archiving of  clinical trials and 
incorporating addenda on the Essential Documents and on the Investigator’s Brochure 
which had been agreed earlier through the ICH process. 
 A second essential tool in the transnational regulatory process leading to marketing 
approval of  new products is found in ICH Guideline E9 on Statistical Principles on 
Clinical Trials (SPCT). As acknowledged by the document itself:345 
The focus of  this guidance is on statistical principles. It does not address the use of  
specific statistical procedures or methods. Specific procedural steps to ensure that principles 
are implemented properly are the responsibility of  the sponsor. Integration of  data across 
clinical trials is discussed, but is not a primary focus of  this guidance. 
 In describing such responsibility, the documents set a series of  procedural 
standards ranging from the institution of  a review ethics committee to the obligations of  
investigators towards the patients, the method of  double-blind randomisation,346 and stress 
the obligations of  sponsors in trial management. These are very complex documents, 
technically and procedurally specific, that however provide no firm guidance on the 
interpretation of  data and risk-benefit parameters.347 On the substance of  data 
                                              
344 ICH, Tripartite Harmonised Guidelines – Guideline for Good Clinical Practice E6 (R1, 10 June 
1996), available at http://www.ich.org/products/guidelines/efficacy/article/efficacy-guidelines.html.  
345
 ICH, Tripartite Harmonised Guidelines – Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials E9 (1998), 
available at 
http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E9/Step4/E9_Gui
deline.pdf, p. 2. 
346 The double-blind randomised test requires patients to be equally randomly distributed between those 
receiving the experimental treatment and those receiving placebo. Investigators shall be equally 
distributed in the same fashion. Both groups ignore who is receiving what. 
347 The guidelines are deferential to the autonomy of investigators in these matters.  It is interesting to 
note how in other fields, the idea of risk assessment is narrowly defined instead of broadly 
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interpretation, the terrain where experience, funding and therapeutic cultures play crucial 
roles,348 investigators enjoy a very wide margin of  appreciation. 
It is interesting for the purposes of  our study to focus on the mechanisms of  
production of  guidelines such as ICH E6 (GCP) and E9 (SPCT), for a further discussion 
on the (non-?)inclusiveness of  their adoption procedures. Arguably, over and beyond 
simple sets of  minimum technical standards, these rules represent the expression of  a 
mercantile attitude, where rapid access to market and free flow of  products are the 
fundamental policy choices. The complicating factors previously described make room for 
the hypothesis that these choices are transnationally more achievable than the parallel 
commitments to health protection349 – although to what extent exactly we cannot say, due 
to the impossibility of  conducting in-depth case studies. Nevertheless the observations 
made in chapter II suggest that the hypothesis should not be dismissed hastily. For 
instance the discussed criteria for selection of  trial populations, frequent disregard for local 
health concerns, and divergences between trial and target populations are contentious 
issues both from a scientific and policy perspective.350 Moreover, the analysis in this 
chapter suggests that an argument can be made pertaining to the mechanisms of  drafting 
and adoption of  ICH documents, to the effect that rule-making mechanisms suffer from a 
lack of  transparency and openness that moves the debate beyond the substance of  the 
rules and embraces their legitimacy and the accountability of  the leading agents. The key 
question being, “who makes the fundamental value choices?” 
 We have already outlined the structure of  the ICH, which consists basically of  
representatives of  the EU, Japan, and US regulatory authorities and regional 
representatives of  the pharmaceutical industry,351 and which focuses on the harmonisation 
                                                                                                                                    
suggested, such as in the case of nuclear and radioactive materials, where the risk/benefit assessment 
is stroked down through a precise equation: see Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM laying down 
basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, 
OJ 2014, L13/1, and EU Commission Final Report “Assessment of the Consequences of the 
Presence of Toxic Elements in some Common Radioactive Waste Streams”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/studies/doc/other/eur18211.pdf, p. 137 ff.  
348 We refer back to the analysis in section 3 of chapter III. 
349 See the ‘ICH Vision’ section on the ICH website, www.ich.org. 
350 See section 3 of chapter III. 
351 The EMA (together with a representative from the Commission), the FDA, Japan Ministry of Health, 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), JPMA (Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association), and PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America).  See Arnold R. B., Annex 1 Co-Sponsors of the Conference, in D’Arcy 
P.F., Harron D.W.G. (eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Harmonization 
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of  technical requirements for drug approval. This section describes its actual 
functioning.352 It will be recalled that in addition to the six original members, four 
‘observers’ participate in the ICH.353 The role of  this group of  non-voting members is to 
foster communication between countries that are not organised through the ICH and 
those that are. The observers are the World Health Organisation (WHO – which plays a 
strong role in connecting ICH and non-ICH countries for the purpose of  ensuring 
comparable minimum standards, circulating ICH Guideline drafts around non-ICH – 
especially developing – countries for comment and criticism), the International Federation 
of  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), and Health Canada (the 
Canadian regulatory authority for food and drug safety). 
 In the early stages of  its existence, the ICH emphasised the need for cooperation 
between the major players in the pharmaceutical market.  It was intended to serve as a 
platform for experts in the pharmaceutical industry from the three key regions – the US, 
the EU, and Japan – to discuss technical and scientific aspects of  pharmaceutical 
authorisation requirements, with the principal goal of  lessening the number of  trials 
required to be carried out for research and development of  new treatments. This was 
sought to be achieved through harmonisation of  the interpretation and design of  technical 
guidelines for the pharmaceutical authorisation process, including marketing approval 
reviews. The decision-making process for the adoption of  technical guidelines is, 
accordingly, based on negotiation among the members from the regulatory bodies and the 
pharmaceutical industry.   
 As previously stated, the main ICH decision-making body is the Steering 
Committee (SC), which can unanimously issue guidelines for its members.354  The SC is 
supported by ICH Coordinators and the ICH Secretariat.  As the main working unit of  the 
ICH, the SC not only determines procedures and policies for the ICH and selects topics 
for harmonisation, but also monitors the progress of  all harmonisation activities. The SC 
                                                                                                                                    
Brussels 1991 xxi, xxi-xxiii.  
352 The reconstruction that follows is based on the data retrievable from the ICH website, www.ich.org, 
but is also based on (and owes much to) the work of Berman A., “Informal International Law 
Making in Medical Products Regulation”, in Informal International Law Making – Case Studies, 
TOAEP, 2012 and Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law: Is an 
International Approval System Modeled after the European System Worth Considering?”, 63 Food 
and Drug Law Journal, 3, 2008, pp. 623-645. 
353 Follow the ‘Organisation of ICH’ hyperlink from the ‘About ICH’ section on the ICH website. 
354 Follow the ‘Organisation of ICH’ hyperlink from the ‘About ICH’ section on the ICH website. 
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consists of  fifteen members (representing the six voting members plus the observers 
described above).355 The pharmaceutical industry is thus represented not only regionally 
but also through its international representative body, IFPMA. The influence of  the 
pharmaceutical industry is extraordinary if  we take a closer look at the organisation of  the 
ICH Secretariat. The purpose of  the Secretariat is, generally speaking, administrative 
support for the SC with research and documentation.356 Additionally it coordinates 
working and discussion group meetings. This body operates directly from the IFPMA 
office in Geneva. 
Generally, harmonisation activities of  the ICH fall into four categories, each of  
which has a different procedure. The procedures consist of  the development of  a new 
guideline (Formal ICH Procedure), the creation of  questions and answers to assist the 
implementation of  a new guideline (the Q&A Procedure), the revision or modification of  
existing guidelines (the Revision Procedure), and the addition of  standards to existing 
guidelines and recommendations (the Maintenance Procedure).357 
 In developing harmonised guidelines (the Formal ICH Procedure), the ICH 
follows a five-step consultative mechanism.358 The process is triggered by one of  the 
members or non-voting observers, which presents a ‘Concept Paper’ on the issue at stake 
to the SC.359 Once the SC has endorsed the Concept Paper, an Expert Working Group 
(EWG) drafts a preliminary guideline based on the Concept Paper’s desired goals. After 
the preliminary guideline has been approved by the SC, it undergoes regulatory 
consultation processes in the three regions (US, EU, Japan). The key actors at this stage 
become the regional agencies responsible for the consultation process. In particular, the 
FDA carries out the notice and comment procedure set out in the FDA’s Good Guidance 
Practice.360 The EMA follows its Procedure for Guidelines and provides for a public 
                                              
355 Follow the ‘Organisation of ICH’ and then the ‘Steering Committee’ hyperlink from the ‘About ICH’ 
section on the ICH website. 
356 Follow the ‘Organisation of ICH’ hyperlink from the ‘About ICH’ section on the ICH website. 
357 For a full description follow the ‘Process for Harmonisation’ hyperlink from the ‘About ICH’ section 
on the ICH website. 
358 All decisions, both in the Steering Committee and in the subordinate working groups, are taken by 
way of consensus.  
359 See the full description of the process by following the ‘Process of Harmonisation’ and then the 
‘Formal Procedure’ hyperlinks from the ‘About ICH’ section on the ICH website. 
360 21 CFR 10.115: a detailed overview of the domestic consultation procedure in the US is available in 
Berman A., “The Role of Domestic Administrative Law in the Accountability of IN-LAW: The Case 
of ICH”, in Pauwelyn J., Wessel R.A., Wouters J. (eds.), Informal International Lawmaking, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 468-499. 
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consultation mechanism.361 Comments can however also be submitted directly to the ICH, 
and the WHO circulates the draft guidelines among its members for comments and 
observations. Commenting is therefore open to anyone from any country interested in 
taking part in the discussion. The results of  the consultations are sent back to the ICH 
EWG, which elaborates, on the basis of  the received comments and observations, an 
amended draft guideline to be adopted by the SC as a harmonised ICH Guideline. The 
Guideline is subsequently adopted domestically by each member. 
 While the commenting procedure is conceived as open and inclusive, the 
deliberative mechanisms are exclusive and scarcely transparent, as the proceedings of  the 
SC and the negotiation processes are not published. While there is some access to the 
preliminary stages of  consensus-building, actual decision-making is left to the internal 
mechanisms, and the lack of  access to the SC’s internal proceedings does not allow for a 
full appreciation or evaluation of  the fate of  regional consulting results. 
 The final stage of  the five-step Formal ICH Procedure, implementation, is in the 
hands of  the regional agencies, which adopt the ICH Guidelines for the conduct of  
internal marketing approval procedures (within the legal framework governing the margins 
of  autonomy of  agencies for their rule-making activity, but outside the rule-making 
mechanisms domestically in place).362 While ICH Guidelines are accepted as generally 
legally non-binding, it is arguable that they can be considered de facto binding363 – despite 
their origin in open negotiations with industry – due to the nature and extent of  their use 
at a domestic level.364 The de facto binding role of  ICH Guidelines is strikingly suggested by 
the heavy reliance on these Guidelines by national lawmakers designing domestic and 
regional legislation.  The ICH E6 Guideline on GCP, discussed above, has been essentially 
                                              
361 EMA, “Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related Documents within the Pharmaceutical 
Legislative Framework”, 2009, Doc. Ref. EMEA/P/24143/2004 Rev. 1, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/10/WC500004
011.pdf. 
362 In the example of GCP, the Guideline was adopted by the FDA and published in the Federal Register, 
9 May 1997, Vol. 62, No. 90, p. 25691-25709; and by the EMA in July 1996, issued as 
CPMP/ICH/135/95/Step 5, and subsequently translated into Directive 2005/28/EC as a consolidated 
administrative practice. Whereas in both cases the preliminary guideline underwent the comment 
consultation procedures, the final outcome is the result of a further negotiation which is not 
accounted for as the proceedings are exclusive and not accessible. 
363 See Purnhagen K., “Competition of Agencies in European Pharmaceutical Law – Does It Exist, Is It 
Desirable and How to Handle It?”, European Journal of Risk Regulation, 1, 2010, pp. 227-238 
364 See Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law”, and Krapohl S., Risk 
Regulation in the Single Market, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 86 ff. 
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fully adopted in both the European Directive 2001/20/EC on Good Clinical Practice and 
the amended US 21 CFR 312.  As described in section 1, that Guideline now constitutes 
the legal basis for acceptance of  foreign data in the major pharmaceutical markets.  The 
majority of  ICH Guidelines do not end up being adopted as formal acts of  law: they 
instead remain in the domestic legal framework as policy documents (for example, 
administrative updates of  the existing regulatory system) or instruments of  ‘governance’ 
(which are not strictly speaking legal).365  But when agencies, for example, interpret 
national pharmaceutical law, they consult ICH Guidelines and interpret the respective 
national rules and procedures in their light. The domestic impact of  such guidelines, in 
light of  the analysis proposed in chapter III, can therefore be dramatic. 
 ICH is therefore, in summary, a trilateral technical forum between the regulatory 
authorities and pharmaceutical companies of  the EU, US, and Japan. The industry and 
regulators have found their interests converging over the last two decades, with a mutual 
desire to reduce the use of  “human, animal and material resources” as they work to 
“eliminate unnecessary delay in the global development and registration of  new drugs”.366 
The opportunity to cut costs and draw from large pools of  potential patients is a potent 
driver for globalising pre-marketing procedures, as previously discussed. Criticisms have 
long being levied against the FDA for taking too long to review and approve drugs, and 
despite its shorter period of  activity, similar complaints have been raised regarding the 
EMA.367 The opportunity to concretise market pressures into a set of  regulatory guidelines 
represents the way for Western agencies to lessen their burden, and for the industry to 
substantially cut costs and delays in new products approvals.368 The answer to the question 
                                              
365 We will discuss this phenomenon infra but for a general discussion see Berman A., “Informal 
International Law Making in Medical Products Regulation”; and on the questionable legitimacy of 
these practices Ehnert T., “The Legitimacy of New Risk Governance – A Critical View in Light of 
the EU’s Approach to Nanotechnologies in Food”, European Law Journal, doi: 10.1111/eulj.12082 
(April 16, 2014). The author relies on traditional concepts of legitimacy as elaborated by Habermas 
and Scharpff to demonstrate the lack thereof in European risk governance. 
366 Purnhagen K., “The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law”, quoting Hoff S., “The 
Regulatory Environment for the New Millennium”, Drug Information Journal, 34, 2000, pp. 659-72. 
367 Andersson F., “The Drug Lag Issue: The Debate Seen from an International Perspective”, 
International Journal of Health Services, 22, 1998, pp. 53-72. 
368 A goal clearly stated by the ICH itself: “Regulatory harmonisation offers many direct benefits to both 
regulatory authorities and the pharmaceutical industry with beneficial impact for the protection of 
public health. Key benefits include: preventing duplication of clinical trials in humans and 
minimising the use of animal testing without compromising safety and effectiveness; streamlining 
the regulatory assessment process for new drug applications; and reducing the development times 
and resources for drug development”: follow the ‘Vision’ hyperlink from the ‘About ICH’ section on 
the ICH website. 
 103 
 
on who makes the fundamental choices finds its answer in the hardly measurable 
negotiation process within the ICH Steering Committee, whose members act within broad 
legislative frameworks leaving them ample margins of  manoeuvre – originally conceived 
for domestic mechanisms and therefore scarcely equipped for transnational permeations. 
 
3.  An experimentalist new mode of  governance domestically, a 
non-inclusive model transnationally 
Describing which type of  governance model (among those suggested and analysed 
in a quite florid literature369) is in place in the pharmaceutical system is a rather difficult 
endeavour. This section proposes an interpretation that expands on a claim raised at the 
beginning of  this study and restated in the previous chapter: that pharmaceutical 
regulation is mostly understood as a domestic phenomenon, to the extent that it is also 
generally studied as such. The international dimension somehow escapes the legal 
scholarship debate and yet undermines, at least partially, the conclusions reached in the 
analysis of  domestic governance. When pharmaceutical regulation is studied as an 
international phenomenon, the analysis often limits itself  to the observation of  
international soft law-making mechanisms without clearly linking those mechanisms to 
their domestic impacts.370 What is missing, then, is a study of  the implications of  
transnational regulation for domestic systems of  governance. 
Chapter II described how advisory committees have over time gained power, going 
far beyond consultancy and becoming real policy-makers. We have referred to this 
phenomenon as a ‘capture’ of  regulatory power. This process has been described in many 
and different ways. One of  the most comprehensive accounts of  the evolution of  
administrative law has been provided by Karl-Heinz Ladeur, who depicts thoroughly how 
                                              
369 A complete account of the debate over transnational models of governance goes far beyond the scope 
of this work. For an overview see Maduro M., Tuori K., Sankari S., Transnational Law – Rethinking 
European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 2014; Kingsbury B., Krisch N., 
Stewart R. (special eds.), “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol. 68 n° 3 & 4, 2005; Sabel C.F., Zeitlin J., “Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU”, 14 European Law Journal 3, 2008; Joerges 
C., Dehousse R. (eds.), Good Governance in an Integrated Market, Oxford University Press, 2002; 
Scott J., Trubek D.M., “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European 
Union”, 8 European Law Journal 1, 2002; Walker N., de Burca G., “Reconceiving Law and New 
Governance”, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 519, 2007. 
370 See for example for the international level the literature cited in this chapter by Purnhagen and 
Berman, and for the domestic level see in Europe Feldschreiber and Howells. 
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this process of  power attraction by administrators is an inherent trait of  administrative law 
since its very origins. In this interpretation, such a process (which leads to the 
phenomenon of  autopoiesis of  norms by administrative authorities)371 is natural and may 
find its balance in terms of  legitimacy through experience, insofar as administrative law is 
much more the result of  administrative experimentation (and subsequent judicialisation) 
than the output of  a legislative mechanism. To consider administrative law as a 
self-generating endeavour, only at a subsequent stage stabilised by courts or the legislators, 
allows for an interpretation that focuses on the societal dynamics that lead the 
evolutionary process of  norm self-generation.372 In this regard, societal dynamics are 
described as moving from the ‘society of  individuals’ intimately linked with a form of  
administrative law based upon individual decisions, a stage that coincides in the language 
of  statecraft with the age of  the ‘state-nation’.373  The following stage runs in parallel with 
the move to the ‘nation state’, and as such is defined as the ‘society of  organisations’, 
where individual decisions give way to more collective concerns such as planning laws and 
forms of  welfare state. Subsequently, as the state has moved to its most recent evolution, 
referred to as the ‘market state’, societal dynamics have evolved to the current ‘network 
society’, which requires new administrative forms and procedures for decision-making.374 
The core idea of  Ladeur’s theory is that:375 
the globalization process does not invade a stable domestic administrative […] legal 
system from outside, but that it is also a consequence of  an evolutionary process that 
disrupts the legal system from within. 
 According to this idea, the move from domestic to transnational is a natural 
process which is consistent with national experiences, as it is considered to be a 
consequence of  the societal dynamics that led to the kind of  global networking of  which 
the ICH is a perfect example. To an extent, the evolution in three phases of  
pharmaceutical regulation which we are describing in these chapters is compatible with this 
evolutionary theory of  administrative law. However, we contend that a general objection 
                                              
371 See Ladeur K.-H, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General 
Administrative Law”, Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, Research Paper n°16/2011. 
372 Ibidem, p. 5 ff. 
373 We use here the evolution of statecraft as described extensively by Bobbitt: see Bobbitt P., The Shield 
of Achilles, Anchor Books, 2003, Book I Parts II & III; see reference made in the Introduction. 
374 Ladeur K.-H, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General 
Administrative Law”, p. 24 ff. 
375 Ibidem, p. 6. 
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can be raised to this idea of  the evolution of  administrative law, specifically focusing on 
our field of  interest. If  it is true that regulators and regulated have always discussed the 
terms of  the rules (and they have, within a given legislative framework, as described in 
chapter II), the international dimension here introduces a rather new and different 
phenomenon. The regulators and the industry are participating as peers in the elaboration 
of  ICH Guidelines – guidelines that contribute themselves to the shaping and 
implementation of  national or regional norms (for instance in the case of  GCP). Such a 
situation is hardly comparable to general administrative law as traditionally conceived in 
Western democratic nation states.376 To exclusively describe the contemporary state of  
administrative law as reflecting the natural course of  societal dynamics runs the risk, from 
a legal standpoint, of  underestimating the profoundly different context in which the 
‘networks’ are operating (uncharted transnational territories)377 as opposed to the 
‘organisations’ (previously operating in national or regional constitutionally and legally 
defined domains). 
 A different line of  thinking, in the attempt to create a theoretical justification for 
the escape of  regulatory mechanisms from traditional modes of  democratic legitimation, 
has elaborated the idea of  “experimentalist new governance”.378 The basic premise of  this 
theory grounds the legitimacy of  regulatory models in an alternative way to traditional 
representative democratic circuits, through the concept of  ‘deliberation’. A deliberative 
process is a ‘soft process’, including all the major stakeholders of  a given field, in which 
governance is achieved in functional rather than traditional structural or institutional terms.379 
Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin observe that such a soft consultative process can only 
                                              
376 For a complete account of traditional Western concepts of administrative regulation see above all 
Ogus A., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Hart Publishing, 2004; and in comparative 
perspective see Rose-Ackerman S., Lindseth P.L. (eds), Comparative Administrative Law, Edward 
Elgar, 2011. 
377 Consider the example of the ICH: no administrative agency in the US, nor in the EU, would ever be 
constructed in a way that a) involves only one-sided stakeholders together with the regulators; and 
b) lacks clear procedural rules on transparency, participation and access to documents. But its 
informal nature, and the context in which it operates (the uncharted transnational territories), allow 
for greater flexibility. Arguably, the ICH exists because at a transnational level negotiations can 
happen in a much less scrutinised fashion. 
378 See the essential contribution of Sabel C.F., Zeitlin J., “Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU”, 14 European Law Journal 3, 2008, 
pp. 271-327; see also the recent interesting contribution by De Burca G., Keohane R.O., Sabel C., 
“Global Experimentalist Governance”, British Journal of Political Science 44, 2014, pp. 477-486. 
379 Ibidem, p. 274. 
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legitimise itself  by adherence to “standards of  some alternative deliberative democracy”.380 
Typically, the deliberative democratic process is described as informal, as the socialisation 
of  stakeholders involved in the decision process (something referred to as “epistemic 
communities” – for instance the comitology mechanisms of  the EU) does not necessarily 
descend directly from legislative acts.381 It is also considered (in its European variety) to be 
‘multi-level’, as it involves actors ranging from national administrations to supra-national 
bodies without establishing a hierarchy between them, blurring the distinction between 
centralised and decentralised decision-making and instead favouring networks of  diverse 
decision-makers.382 Moreover, to overcome the most immediate criticism identifiable in the 
departure from representative democracy’s classic forms of  accountability and legitimacy, 
the deliberative process is essentially inspired by principles of  transparency, access, and 
participation.383 
 It has been argued that pharmaceutical regulation falls within the scope of  
‘experimentalist new governance’ because the agencies involved (we consider here the 
FDA and the EMA) are built in a way that includes all stakeholders involved in the 
pharmaceutical market. Both agencies recognise a central role for scientific committees, 
and these committees are assisted by various actors, such as representatives of  patients, 
physicians, and the government.384 Decisions within the agency bodies are taken by way of  
consensus through deliberation as much as possible, with voting being the last resort 
option. 
 As intriguing as this suggestion may be, we posit that it falls short of  addressing 
properly the issue of  transparency, which per se undermines the conclusion. We have 
                                              
380 Ibidem, p. 273 – recognising that even strong advocates of the model struggle to reach a positive 
conclusion. 
381 As observed among others by Neyer J., “Explaining the Unexpected: Efficiency and Effectiveness in 
European Decision-Making”, 11 Journal of European Public Policy 19, 2011. 
382 See Sabel C.F., Zeitlin J., “Learning from Difference”, p. 273; and the essential contributions cited in 
the piece by Egeberg M. (ed.), Multilevel Union Administration: The Transformation of Executive 
Politics in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, and Hofmann H.C.H., Türk A.H. (eds.), EU 
Administrative Governance, Edward Elgar, 2006. 
383 A recent, interesting, and comprehensive discussion can be found in Ehnert T., “The Legitimacy of 
New Risk Governance”. 
384 We refer by way of example to the Management Board of the EMA, which originally comprised two 
representatives of the Commission, two members of the European Parliament, and one 
representative per MS.  With the essential reforms brought by Directive 2001/83 and Regulation 
726/04 the Board was extended to comprise members from interest groups including patients and 
physicians. In the US, the Advisory Committees of the FDA similarly include physicians, 
consumers, and insurance companies. 
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discussed the issue of  access to clinical trials data. If  it is true that ex ante rule-making 
transparency mechanisms, on the one hand, and on the other hand ex post access to 
processed data are very different things, nonetheless it seems hardly conceivable that an 
‘alternative deliberative democracy’ can be founded on restricted access to essential 
information, protected under trade considerations. The reason for this claim is that the 
functional legitimacy of  deliberative democracy mechanisms is grounded on fundamental 
principles of  transparency, participation, and access. If  the final output of  the process, that 
is the regulated product, cannot be evaluated in full (as is the case when the clinical trial 
history of  a medicine cannot be traced by reason of  non-accessibility of  data), the 
transparent mechanism of  rule-adoption is rendered void by the impossibility of  
evaluating its effectiveness in achieving the purported goals.385 
 If  the potential for domestic regulatory mechanisms to fall within the scope of  an 
experimentalist mode of  governance can in theory be argued, such hypothesis does not 
fully confront the transnational dimension and its implications. The descriptions of  the 
ICH mechanisms, and of  the substantial impact of  its guidelines, strongly point to the 
necessity of  moving the reflection to a transnational level. At that transnational level, the 
rule-making mechanism is structurally non-inclusive, and modelled around goals set by a 
restricted number of  stakeholders. We have argued that the basic value-choice is 
trade-oriented, and that no real counterpart is involved in the negotiation process. The 
fundamental Guidelines on GCP are a good example of  a procedural regulation, leaving a 
wide margin of  appreciation in the substance of  the standards, which has been adopted 
‘blindly’ by agencies supposed to ensure deliberative processes.386 The mechanisms of  
production and adoption of  ICH Guidelines do not appear to be conceived to balance the 
disproportionate margin of  discretion the new-governance agents benefit from vis à vis 
traditional rule-makers in representative democratic circuits. The scenario as described 
throughout this chapter suggests rather that there is (in the field of  pharmaceutical 
regulation) a tendency to ‘hollow out’ procedural standards when the scene is set at the 
transnational ICH level.387 Strong domestic procedural mechanisms, accepted as legitimate 
                                              
385 See the discussion of the idea of credible commitment in section 4 of this chapter. 
386 There is no real access to information about what participation has been guaranteed in the adoption 
process of the GCP Guidelines, either by the FDA or the EMA – the internal ICH documents are not 
accessible, only the final Guidelines are. What is striking, on the other hand, is the ultimate literal 
transplant of said Guidelines into legislation. 
387 The issue is well raised in Mendes J., “EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes: Hollowing Out 
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and effective in principle, may appear thus to be circumvented. 
 The above discussion on the model of  governance in place for the regulation of  
pharmaceutical products suggests uneasy answers. While designed and described as an 
example of  ‘new governance’ domestically, as a transnational phenomenon it appears to 
resemble more a reversed version of  the transnational private law (TPR) theory elaborated 
by Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen in “Rough Consensus and Running Code”.388 
While the theory proposes an understanding of  bottom-up societal regulation of  TPR, the 
pharmaceutical system seems to be organised in a top-down fashion, whereby the 
consensus and the running code are reached and infused in the regulatory mechanisms by 
selected stakeholders and interests, with what we have referred to in the opening chapter 
of  the thesis as the idea of  a closed and self-perpetuating system. This re-opens the question of  
the source of  legitimacy for the pharmaceutical regulatory system, and presents a rather 
difficult case for any attempt to ground such legitimacy at the ex ante rule-making stage. 
 
4.  The source of  legitimacy – a credible commitment in the absence of  
participatory mechanisms? 
 If  legitimacy is hard, if  not impossible altogether, to achieve at the rule-making 
stage, different mechanisms must be conceived. The attempt is to legitimise ex post the 
regulatory framework by evaluating its success in achieving its goals: a form of  
output-based legitimacy used to circumvent and overcome the absence of  the more 
traditional input-based one.389 Chapter III raised several issues in terms of  transparency 
and access to clinical trials data. We have already argued that if  essential data are 
non-accessible, the evaluation of  output is a complex (if  not forlorn) task. The new EU 
                                                                                                                                    
Procedural Standards?”, 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, 2012, pp. 988-1022; 
seethe more recent discussion on internationalised rule-making mechanisms Mendes J., “Rule of law 
and participation: a normative analysis of internationalised rulemaking as composite procedures?”, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 12, 2014, pp. 370-401. 
388 Calliess G.-P, Zumbansen P., Rough Consensus and Running Code – A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law, Hart Publishing, 2010.  The theory is based on the idea that a Rough Consensus among 
stakeholders in a given field becomes a Running Code through a pilot phase in which the content of 
the consensus acts as a proposed standard, followed by a recognition phase in which the standard 
becomes recommended, and eventually a binding phase where the standard is adopted. The process, 
being inclusive and non-hierarchical, is eminently bottom-up. 
389 See again the discussion in Ehnert T., “The Legitimacy of New Risk Governance”; the classic 
arguments in Scharpf F. W, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, Oxford University 
Press, 1999; see also the interesting Bartl M., Legitimacy and European Private Law, EUI Thesis, 
2012.  
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Clinical Trials Regulation referred to in the previous chapter might make a difference in 
the future (for new MAAs),390 but for the time being, access to data for currently marketed 
medicines remains largely restricted. 
 It is possible however to look at the final safety outcome (that is, the safety or 
actual harms attributed to products marketed under a certain regulatory framework). It is 
then possible to a certain extent to evaluate and legitimise a certain regulatory framework 
by reference to that outcome. An essential contribution to this line of  thinking comes 
from the theory of  “credible commitment” as elaborated by Giandomenico Majone and 
developed by Sebastian Krapohl.391 The idea is that either through delegation or through 
legislation, regulators gain substantial policy-making power, which they exercise 
independently, within a general legal framework setting the goals of  the regulatory system 
to which they commit themselves.392 Because the decision-making of  such regulatory 
regimes cannot be legitimised by input from democratically elected bodies, it must 
legitimise itself  through the efficiency and efficacy of  its policy outputs.393 A common 
culture and a common interest arise among regulators to efficiently pursue the scope of  
their activity, thus triggering a positive effect on the quality of  the output. However, such a 
theory is again designed for domestic and/or regional scenarios, and pharmaceutical 
regulation is instead a transnational one. 
 To the extent that the effectiveness of  outputs necessitates a common interest and 
culture, the description of  the ICH previously suggested raises some concerns. It must be 
recalled that the ICH is, partially, a transnational regulatory network (TRN),394 and partially 
a hybrid body involving regulators and industry as peers. Participation is restricted to 
national regulators appointed by their respective authority of  origin, coupled with 
representatives of  the pharmaceutical industry. As regards the national regulators it has 
been argued that “[f]ar from being removed from domestic politics, regulators are tied to 
them by multiple channels [linked to domestic interests] that generally outweigh their 
                                              
390 See the discussion of the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing 
Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ L 158, 27.05.2014, pp. 1–76. 
391 Krapohl S., Risk Regulation in the Single Market; Majone G., Regulating Europe, Routledge, 1996. 
392 Krapohl S., Risk Regulation in the Single Market, pp. 43-50. 
393 Majone G., Regulating Europe, pp. 284-301. 
394 A critical analysis of transnational regulatory networks can be found in Verdier P.H., “Transnational 
Regulatory Networks and their Limits”, 34 Yale Journal of International Law 113, 2009. 
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loyalty to global interests”.395 Such ties create a series of  conflicts of  interest between 
constituents, and thus an obstacle to the creation of  a common interest, which 
undermines the quality of  the result.  Issued harmonising guidelines may accordingly pose 
risks of  a race-to-the-bottom in standards adoption, or simply avoid critical topics. The 
specificity and complexity of  this field is also fostered by the presence of  divergent 
‘therapeutic cultures’. These create a series of  frictions based on different understandings 
of  key notions that lie at the very basis of  safety regulation (such as, again, the notion of  
risk, aversion to or embracing of  it).396 Not only conflicts among different national 
interests and divergent therapeutic cultures have to be considered. The ICH scheme 
includes (together with the regulators, in equal numbers and with equal powers) the strong 
presence of  the industry, which brings a clear-cut trade drive into the equation that can 
hardly be accounted for. Under the given circumstances, it appears difficult to apply the 
criterion of  ‘credible commitment’, which could operate as a substitute for democratic and 
deliberative legitimacy, to the ICH. Nor does it appear reasonable to expect the creation of  
a “transnational legal culture”397 in the field, as fundamental divergences over the 
substance of  the issues to be regulated persist.398  
 When it comes to pharmaceutical regulation, the generally accepted policy 
objectives are twofold: access to medicines and protection of  health and safety.399 
Evaluating the output of  the regulatory system as legitimate entails an analysis of  both 
elements. While elements of  the first aspect have been discussed in both chapter III and in 
the previous sections of  this chapter (to the extent that the transnationalisation of  
procedures and rule-making mechanisms facilitates its achievement), the analysis of  health 
and safety outcomes will be the object of  the following chapter V. 
                                              
395 Verdier P.H., “Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits”, p.162; contra see Slaughter A.M, 
A New World Order, Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 131-162; see also the recent Fenwick M., 
Van Uytsel S., Wrbka S. (eds), Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law, 
Springer, 2014. 
396 See section 3 of chapter III. 
397 The idea is suggested by Tuori K., “Towards a Theory of Transnational Law” (unpublished paper, 
26 August 2010); see also the discussions in Maduro M., Tuori K., Shankari S., Transnational Law – 
Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
398 We refer again to the analysis proposed in chapter III, and to sections 1 and 2 of this chapter. 
399 The objectives are stated as for the EU in Directive 2001/83/EC, and as for the US in 21 CFR 312 ff. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
QUESTIONING THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 3 
EVALUATING THE SAFETY OUTCOME 
 
 
The conclusions of  chapters III and IV call for an evaluation of  the safety 
outcomes provided by the pharmaceutical regulatory system as currently designed. What 
follows is a selection of  case studies aimed at determining whether there are deficiencies in 
pre-marketing regulation hindering the goal of  product safety, and whether the 
post-marketing management and surveillance systems as provided by the current 
regulatory framework are sufficient to overcome the issues of  substantive uncertainty and 
procedural ‘democratic deficit’. Developing the issues discussed in chapters III and IV, the 
analysis of  the safety outcome attempts an evaluation of  the efficacy of  the system and, 
therefore, of  its output-based legitimacy.  
 
1.  Vioxx and Celebrex - Randomised risk discovery 
The first element to consider is the effectiveness of  the pre- and post-marketing 
regulatory schemes in identifying risks related to medicinal products. To what extent are 
regulatory schemes effective in capturing risks to consumer health? To fully understand the 
centrality of  the issue this section will analyse a well-known case of  regulatory failure: 
Rofecoxib, commercially distributed by its manufacturer Merck as Vioxx.400 This case is of  
marked interest as it reveals in a relatively straightforward way a series of  weak spots in the 
regulatory mechanisms leading to marketing approval and providing for post-marketing 
surveillance. It is worth noting that as a result of  the Vioxx crisis, both the US (in 2007 
                                              
400
 A very detailed historical account is provided by FDA, “Sequence of Events with Vioxx Since 
Opening of IND”, available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-
4090B1_04_E-FDA-TAB-C.htm; the account has been further developed by Gilhooley M., 
“Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing”, Seton Hall Law Review 
37, 2007, pp. 945-954. 
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and 2012)401 and shortly thereafter the EU (in 2010 and 2012)402 have reacted with the 
adoption of  revised procedural requirements both pre- and post-marketing. It has been 
argued (and the final section of  this chapter will expand on this claim) that the new 
provisions, while correctly identifying the issues to redress, fall short of  effectively 
addressing the structural causes of  the crisis.403 Other subsequent cases such as Rosiglitazone 
(commercial name Avandia, analysed in section II of  this chapter) or Benfluorex 
(commercialised under various denominations, the most controversial one being Mediator 
in France),404 support the concern that regulatory mechanisms are, on their own, 
insufficient to optimally405 confront the emergence of  risks to consumer health. 
The history of  Vioxx can be recounted as of  its first marketing approval in the US, 
on the 20th of  May 1999406 (approval in the EU followed shortly through a mutual 
recognition procedure, the UK being the Reference Member State).407 Vioxx was approved 
by the FDA to treat severe and chronic pain in patients suffering arthritis. The key feature 
offered by Vioxx and other drugs of  the same category, known as COX-2 inhibitors (such 
as Celecoxib marketed as Celebrex by Merck’s competitor Pfizer), was a significant 
gastrointestinal advantage as compared to other arthritis pain relievers already in the 
market.408 A first element to note (one which is of  relevance to the development of  this 
historical reconstruction) is that despite its clear intent to provide a comparative advantage, 
Vioxx was never tested against its pre-existing competitors for marketing approval, but 
                                              
401
 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 110 Stat. 823. 
402
 Regulation (EU) 1235/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending, as regards 
pharmacovigilance of medicinal products for human use, Regulation (EC) 726/2004, and Directive 
2012/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 amending Directive 
2001/83/EC as regards pharmacovigilance (text with EEA relevance), OJ 2012 L 299/1. 
403
 The principal reason being a significant lack of funding which makes comprehensive post-marketing 
surveillance no more feasible than before, see infra section 3. 
404
 Mediator, commercialised by Servier, was prescribed to patients with type-2 diabetes to reduce insulin 
resistance (a so called ‘adjuvant antidiabetic’). It is an old medicine first marketed in 1976 that 
remained on the market until the EMA in 2009 recommended its withdrawal due to related risks of 
cardiovascular events – see EMA, Benfluorex art. 107 referral, Annex II, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Referrals_document/Benfluorex_107/WC
500109589.pdf.  
405
 See chapter I on the idea of the ‘optimal’ enforcement of the law in the field. 
406
 FDA letter of approval NDA 21-042 of May 20
th
 1999, retrievable from the Vioxx ‘Drug Approval 
Package’, at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2002/21-042s007_Vioxx.cfm.  
407
 Vioxx was approved in the UK in June 1999, as confirmed in private correspondence with the 
Medical Writer of the FOI team, Licensing Division of the MHRA. 
408
 Although such significant advantage was only proved later on by the VIGOR study as discussed infra, 
and therefore the comparative advantage was initially only theoretical – which questions the 
appropriateness of the marketing authorisation, see Gilhooley M., “Vioxx’s History”, pp. 945-947. 
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only against placebo.409 While cardiovascular risks were considered “theoretically” 
possible,410 this possibility was not reflected in the data submitted to the agency for 
approval, as the evidentiary basis was not considered sufficient.411 The FDA (and 
subsequently the UK MHRA) was satisfied with the safety database for Vioxx, which was 
considered robust and as fulfilling regulatory requirements for approval.412 The absence 
(real or purported – the impossibility of  fully accessing the clinical trial history of  the drug 
makes it difficult to say with certainty) of  “evidentiary concerns” about cardiovascular 
ADRs prompted an approval without any reference to such potential risks in the 
labelling.413  
Interestingly, the existence of  severe cardiovascular risks, which triggered the 
subsequent unfolding of  events (worldwide withdrawal of  the drug and widespread law 
suits resulting in multi-billion dollar settlements),414 was discovered thanks to a voluntary 
initiative of  Merck itself. As recalled, the major advantage COX-2 inhibitors were 
supposed to offer compared to pre-existing competitors was reduced gastrointestinal risk, 
or more accurately, a reduced risk of  stomach bleeding.415 After approval had been 
granted, Merck undertook a post-marketing study (referred to as a ‘clinical study outcome’, 
                                              
409
 As prescribed by standard procedure in NDAs: see again the information available in the Vioxx ‘Drug 
Approval Package’, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2002/21-
042s007_Vioxx.cfm. 
410
 The concern is raised by the NDA Reviewer whose assessment is contained in the Excerpts from 
Primary Review of NDA 21-042 Osteoarthritis 9 (1999), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_05_F-FDA-Tab-D-1.pdf, 
suggesting the need for a larger database to clarify whether cardiovascular and thromboembolic 
events increased in patients due to Rofecoxib – the datapool available for drug approval was 
statistically insufficient on the matter. 
411
 Ibidem. 
412
 FDA letter of approval NDA 21-042 of May 20
th
 1999, retrievable from the Vioxx ‘Drug Approval 
Package’, at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2002/21-042s007_Vioxx.cfm; see 
also Jümi P. et al., “Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Rofecoxib: Cumulative Meta-Analysis”, The 
Lancet 364, 2004, pp. 2021-2029.  
413
 See the original Vioxx label of 1999, retrievable from the Vioxx ‘Drug Approval Package’, at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2002/21-042s007_Vioxx.cfm. The label did 
contain a warning against potential stomach bleeding as the evidence emerging from pivotal 
pre-marketing trials were insufficient to prove a statistically comparative progress from available 
therapies such as Naproxen. The VIGOR study discussed infra was designed precisely to consolidate 
the claim to gastrointestinal comparative safety. 
414
 The legal repercussions of the Vioxx case are analysed in greater detail infra in the final section. 
415
 Following the Vioxx unfolding of events, a series of hearings were held before the Senate to assess 
the responsibility of the manufacturer and of the agency. The expectations of gastrointestinal safety 
were reported in the hearing: The FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing 
Before the Senate Finance Committee, 108th Cong., 2004. This was only a prospect at the approval 
stage; confirmation only arrived with the results of the VIGOR study, see infra. As previously noted, 
the absence of relevant data on either cardiovascular safety or gastrointestinal advantages raises 
questions over the approval of Vioxx for marketing in the first place.  
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as opposed to ‘pivotal studies’ which form the basis for approvals) to evaluate its benefits 
and reduced risk of  bleeding in comparison to the previously successful anti-arthritis drug 
Naproxen (commercialised by Roche Pharmacuticals as Naprosyn). The study, known as 
the VIGOR study,416 confirmed the comparative benefits of  Vioxx as regards 
gastrointestinal complications but also showed an increase in risk of  cardiovascular events 
ranging from heart attacks to strokes.417 The results showed an increased risk for a dosage 
of  50mg which had only been approved to treat severe pain, the regular dosage being 
25mg.418 VIGOR’s results induced the FDA to solicit Merck to undertake a specific clinical 
study purposely directed at evaluating cardiovascular ADRs.419 Merck refused on “ethical 
and logistical” grounds420 and suggested that an evaluation of  cardiovascular ADRs to 
Vioxx would emerge from the separate clinical study APPROVe, launched in 2000 by 
Merck to investigate the potential of  Vioxx as an alternative treatment for colon cancer.421 
While the results of  the VIGOR study were presented to the FDA in March 2000, it was 
only in 2002 that a revised label was approved to warn consumers of  the potential 
cardiovascular risks that had emerged in the study.422 Controversy ensued, with the 
adoption of  the labelling agreed upon after prolonged negotiations between Merck and 
the FDA containing wording that arguably understated the real extent of  the potential 
harm.423 
 
                                              
416
 Acronym for Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research Trial. 
417
 See Bombardier C. et al., “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and 
Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis”, 343 New England Journal of Medicine, 2000, pp. 
1520-1528. 
418
 As per the original Vioxx label of 1999, retrievable from the Vioxx ‘Drug Approval Package’, at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2002/21-042s007_Vioxx.cfm. 
419
 For a critical account of how the FDA initially required specific trials to measure cardiovascular risk 
but subsequently backed off, see Topol E.J., “Failing the Public Health—Rofecoxib, Merck, and the 
FDA”, 351 New England Journal of Medicine, 2004, pp. 1707-1708. 
420
 Gilhooley M., “Vioxx’s History”, p. 947, referring to the testimony of Dr. Sandra Kweder of the FDA 
in the recalled Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee. 
421
 Acronym for Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx Trial. 
422
 The modifications can be appreciated in the 2002 amended version of the label, retrievable from the 
Vioxx ‘Drug Approval Package’, at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2002/21-
042s007_Vioxx.cfm. 
423
 The new labelling introduced in a specific section, ‘Precautions’, a warning that “caution should be 
exercised when Vioxx is used in patients with a medical history of ischemic disease”, see 2002 label 
ibidem. The wording is arguably vague and insufficient to adequately warn consumers. In 
negotiating the wording, Merck relied on the argument that since no specific studies on 
cardiovascular ADRs had been carried out, the real incidence of Vioxx in cardiovascular ADRs was 
effectively unknown. See Gilhooley M., “Vioxx’s History”, p. 948: Topol E.J., “Failing the Public 
Health”, p. 1707; Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee. 
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Two years later, in 2004, while investigating Vioxx’s potential to prevent colon 
cancer, the APPROVe study began to show a statistically significant increase in the risk of  
cardiovascular ADRs, this time linked to the ‘regular’ 25mg dosage (which was prescribed 
not for severe, but chronic pain).424 It is at this stage that, on the 30th of  September 2004, 
Merck decided to voluntarily withdraw the product worldwide,425 as APPROVe constituted 
for Merck the first solid database of  actual cardiovascular risk linked to Vioxx 
consumption.426 
For the purposes of  our chapter, that is analysing the safety output of  regulatory 
mechanisms (specifically in this section the structural fitness of  pre-market rules to allow 
the emergence of  assessment-relevant knowledge, and conversely the ability of  
post-marketing surveillance duties to facilitate and react to supervening risk discoveries), 
this brief  historical account uncovers at least three critical elements. 
First, the initial emergence of  a potential cardiovascular risk for high doses of  
50mg was completely casual. What enabled it was Merck undertaking a study aimed at 
proving a comparative advantage over a pre-existing treatment as regards gastrointestinal 
complications (the very reason why COX-2 inhibitors had been successfully marketed in 
the first place). The definitive proof  of  increased danger extending to the lower dose of  
25mg came from another study evaluating potential alternative therapeutic benefits of  the 
drug. In other words, it took independent research conducted by Merck itself  for purposes 
that had nothing to do with safety evaluation to make the risk emerge. While it is common 
for new risks to emerge in the course of  unrelated studies,427 it is the ability of  the 
pharmacovigilance system to facilitate new risk discoveries independently from data 
voluntarily gathered by the manufacturer that is in question here.  Pre-marketing approval 
testing was only able to identify the potential harm at a theoretical level, as suggested 
                                              
424
 The full study appeared in early 2005 by Bresalier R.S. et al., “Cardiovascular Events Associated with 
Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial”, 352 New England Journal of 
Medicine, 2005, pp. 1092-1102. 
425
 See report by Sibbald B., “Rofecoxib (Vioxx) Voluntarily Withdrawn from Market”, 171 Canadian 
Medical Association Journal, 2004, doi: 10.1503/cmaj.1041606. 
426
 Gilhooley M., “Vioxx’s History”, p. 950, reporting the testimony of Merck’s CEO Raymond 
Gilmartin at the Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee. 
427
 Pharmacovigilance in order to fulfil its supervisory role is bound to rely on voluntary post-marketing 
studies as well as ADR complaints by physicians and consumers. Not every possible side effect can 
be specifically tested in mandatory post-marketing trials required by the authorising agency. It is 
however surprising that 1) a theoretical look was deemed insufficient to trigger such type of trial, 
and 2) when the first data emerged on actual cardiovascular risks a mandatory trial was still not 
demanded.  
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above. The post-marketing surveillance only identified it as a collateral result of  voluntary 
post-marketing studies oriented at increasing the product’s marketability. 
Second, had it not been for said voluntary studies, it is unclear how and when the 
safety issues related to Vioxx would have been discovered. Let us consider the parallel 
history of  Vioxx’s competitor, Pfizer’s Celebrex. Celebrex, unlike Vioxx, had not been the 
subject of  long-term studies after approval.428 Interestingly, while the very reason for the 
existence of  the COX-2 inhibitors class of  medicines was their gastrointestinal 
comparative benefit as against other classes of  anti-arthritis drugs, no study had been 
conducted to demonstrate the existence and extent of  such a benefit as regards 
Celebrex.429 As a result of  the APPROVe study, now all COX-2 inhibitors including 
Celebrex include extensive warnings for cardiovascular ADRs in their labelling, and the 
range of  cases and patients they can be prescribed to has been significantly limited.430 
While the use of  the information resulting from APPROVe has been satisfactory from a 
safety perspective, it is how the data emerged that raises concerns. If  the regulatory 
scheme relies on voluntary post-marketing studies to uncover potential harm, the question 
is what would happen should manufacturers within the same class of  medicines all act as 
Pfizer did (that is without further post-approval long-term investigations). The question is 
far from being irrelevant as the numbers in the pharmaceutical industry tend to be small.431 
In this case for instance, the competitors were two (Merck and Pfizer), with two alternative 
products (Vioxx and Celebrex). The potential for both limiting themselves to a first 
approval with no immediate further investigations was (and is in other cases) a realistic 
possibility. 
 
                                              
428
 As can be verified researching ‘Celebrex’ in the FDA drugs database, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm, and ‘Celecoxib’ in the EMA database at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/includes/medicines/. 
429
 This has been the object of controversy since the very purpose of COX-2 inhibitors was, as recalled 
several times, to provide a comparative benefit in terms of gastrointestinal safety. The absence of 
substantial proof of said benefit in the ‘Drug Approval Package’, available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/98/20998.cfm, combined with the failure to 
voluntarily undertake long-term studies, are further unresolved questions of the COX-2 saga.  
430
 As per the post-2004 modifications to the Celebrex label, retrievable from the FDA database at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm. Note that Celecoxib has been voluntarily withdrawn by 
Pfizer from the European market: see the relevant European Public Assessment Report, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/EPAR-
Summary_for_the_public/human/000466/WC500044631.pdf. 
431
 As discussed in chapters I and III. 
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The third point, which will be further analysed in the third section, relates to the 
existence of  safer alternatives already in the market. Naproxen, while known to potentially 
cause stomach bleeding, is also a comparatively very safe drug from a cardiovascular 
perspective. The extent and nature of  the harm makes it in general a safer alternative to 
the strong COX-2 inhibitors.432 It is rather difficult to understand why comparative trials 
are still very much absent from our regulatory schemes and only undertaken on a 
voluntary basis by manufacturers to demonstrate marketable comparative benefits.433  
This section focused on a specific case to suggest how risk discovery can be 
accidental (or randomised as per the section’s title). It suggests a struggle of  pre- and post-
marketing regulatory mechanisms to capture and address safety issues. Section 3 will 
analyse general figures on ADRs which suggest that this is not an isolated case (although 
others might not share the same magnitude,434 they occur within the same system and 
therefore the same structural shortcomings).  
It is not the intent of  this chapter to argue that regulation should achieve an 
impossible ‘no-risk’ utopia. As suggested throughout this thesis, and as will be further 
discussed in the next chapters focused on the judiciary, pharmaceuticals by nature can be 
unavoidably unsafe and yet beneficial on balance, or the undiscovered risk they carry may 
only emerge with time. However, the comparative history of  Vioxx and Celebrex does 
suggest the existence of  a component of  fortuity in risk discovery that goes beyond the 
unsurpassable limit of  a proper ‘development risk’.435 This raises legitimate concerns in the 
assessment of  the output of  regulatory schemes, an output the quality of  which is crucial 
both per se and as a legitimating element. As recalled above, the Vioxx crisis led to the 
adoption of  regulatory reforms both in the US and in the EU. The nature of  these 
                                              
432
 Bombardier C. et al., “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen”, 
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reforms and their impact will be discussed in the concluding section 3 of  this chapter.  
 
2.  Avandia - Delays in risk communication and safer alternatives? 
There is a further lesson to be learned from the Vioxx case, and that is the reaction 
time of  the post-marketing surveillance mechanisms. As suggested above, while a generic 
and insufficiently investigated ‘theoretical risk’ of  cardiovascular ADRs was already known 
to the manufacturer at the time of  approval,436 it took three years for the FDA to 
introduce an arguably mild and understated ‘Precaution’ section in Vioxx’s label. Once the 
APPROVe study showed a statistically significant increase in cardiovascular ADRs for 
consumption of  25mg doses, it was Merck itself  that took the initiative and voluntarily 
withdrew the product. It is almost as if  the post-marketing regulatory machinery 
participated as a spectator. While Vioxx is definitely the most famous drug case of  recent 
times, one would be mistaken to treat it as isolated. The issue this section is concerned 
with is the reactivity of  pharmacovigilance systems to the emergence of  newly discovered 
ADRs. The pilot case we will consider is that of  Rosiglitazone (commercially distributed by 
GlaxoSmithKline – GSK – as Avandia).437 The product was first approved by the FDA in 
May 1999, and subsequently in the EU in July 2000 (after initial rejection in October 
1999).438  
An analysis of  the Avandia case reveals that questions were raised from the very 
beginning regarding the reliability of  the datapool. Ever since its first approval in 1999 by 
the FDA, drug reviewers expressed concerns about potential severe ADRs including, inter 
alia, myocardial ischaemia.439 The drug was developed to be a step forward compared to 
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the previous drugs of  the Glitazone class marketed at the time (namely Troglitazone), which 
were known for “rare but potentially fatal hepatotoxicity”.440 This alleged significant 
comparative benefit prompted consistent and pressing lobbying by influential stakeholders 
such as the American Diabetes Association (ADA) and the European Association for the 
Study of  Diabetes (EASD).441 Whether there was an actual need for this new treatment is a 
controversial issue that will be discussed below. While the FDA authorised the drug 
immediately after the agency’s dedicated advisory panel recommended approval442 (largely 
based on the absence of  hepatotoxicity data, and despite the above-mentioned concerns), 
the EMA was unsatisfied by the datapool and in particular stressed the need for a 
long-term study to determine the cardiovascular safety of  the drug.443 The lack of  evidence 
from long-term clinical trials and the resulting paucity of  available short-term evidence 
prompted a rejection in October 1999. 
 The initial decision and its motivations make it rather difficult to grasp why, less 
than a year later, the EMA decided to reverse its initial decision and approve Avandia for 
the EU market despite a lack of  any new evidence to support this change of  view.444 It is 
beyond the scope of  this study to analyse the impact of  industry’s lobbying on specific 
approval procedures,445 although evidence suggests that a significant amount of  pressure 
was placed on the regulators to have the drug approved.446 While this is certainly a 
concerning scenario that questions the independence of  regulators and their decisions,447 it 
is quite interesting to look at the conditions laid down for the approval (interesting for the 
purposes of  this section, uncovering the delays in risk communication and reaction 
provided by the regulatory system). When the EMA approved Avandia through the 
centralised procedure for marketing in the EU, the decision was based on an appeal from 
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GSK to reverse the original assessment.448 The CHMP, to overcome the obstacles posed by 
the weak supportive evidence offered by the manufacturer in its initial MAA, evaluated the 
need for further trials and decided that the approval would be subject to the launch of  two 
post-marketing studies. In particular, one of  these studies was a six-year ‘open label’ trial449 
to investigate the outcomes of  cardiovascular hospitalisation and mortality linked to 
Avandia – the RECORD trial.450 Several critics raised their voices to point out the scientific 
inadequacy of  this trial to thoroughly investigate cardiovascular ADRs.451 It was said that 
the non-blinded nature of  the trial, its low-event rate in a high-risk population, and a 
non-specific protocol design452 were all decisive factors in the substantial failure of  the 
study – which did not reveal in its six-year term any statistically significant difference in the 
rates of  cardiovascular hospitalisation or death resulting from Avandia-based treatments, a 
finding disproved in 2007 as discussed below. Avandia was therefore approved in the EU 
with a warning on the risk of  heart failure in patients with type-2 diabetes and chronic 
cardiovascular conditions453 and with the requirement of  undertaking the RECORD trial, 
but, as suggested, no new evidence was provided in support of  the immediate reversal of  
the original rejection. 
 Avandia quickly became a worldwide best-selling product (a sort of  anti-diabetes 
version of  Vioxx),454 and by 2004 a WHO investigation signalled that, with the 
ever-growing consumption of  the drug, evidence of  cardiovascular ADRs was emerging 
and steadily increasing.455 It was however only in 2006 that both the EMA and the FDA 
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reacted with the approval of  new warnings of  potential cardiovascular events.456 This 
two-year gap between information made available by the WHO and the adoption of  
reactive measures calls into question the effectiveness of  the post-marketing surveillance 
regime. In particular, what emerges is that there is a gap between reporting duties, 
assessment of  emerging data, and consequent reactive measures.457 As the next section will 
discuss, this gap has been largely imputed to an inadequate and at times confusing 
legislative framework where roles and responsibilities of  industry and regulators were (and 
possibly still are) allegedly unclearly identified.458  
 The most significant step forward in identifying the reality of  cardiovascular risks 
related to Avandia consumption emerged in 2007. A group of  scientists concerned by the 
cardiovascular safety of  Glitazone class drugs undertook a meta-analysis459 of  data 
emerging from Avandia trials and published it in the New England Journal of  Medicine 
(NEJM).460 The study for the first time showed the existence of  a “significant increase in 
myocardial infarction” associated with Rosiglitazone as compared to placebo or alternative 
marketed treatments.461 The conclusions of  the study triggered a reaction from the FDA, 
which undertook an independent study the results of  which suggested a statistically 
significant increase in cardiovascular events of  40%.462 It is now essential to underline a 
fundamental fact in this reconstruction. The meta-analysis conducted by the NEJM 
scientists was initially impeded by GSK, which refused to disclose clinical data based on 
the usual Confidential Business Information (CBI) exception.463 However, in 2004 GSK 
had settled a case in the state of  New York in a lawsuit involving failure to disclose the 
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http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/99/21071_Avandia.cfm, and in the  EMA 
EPAR, available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/EPAR_-
_Procedural_steps_taken_and_scientific_information_after_authorisation/human/000268/WC50002
9110.pdf 
457
 See the Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment, 10 December 2008, 
SEC(2008) 2670, vol I, p. 13. 
458
 Ibidem. 
459
 A meta-analysis is a second take on previously conducted trials – it uses statistical methods to identify 
patterns, discrepancies and other statistically significant relationships emerging from multiple 
studies. As such, it is considered the most thorough statistical source of data. 
460
 Nissen S.E., Wolski K., “Effect of rosiglitazone on the risk of myocardial infarction and death from 
cardiovascular causes”, New England Journal of Medicine 356, 2007. 
461
 Ibidem. 
462
 FDA, “Briefing Document Division of Metabolism and Endocrine Products and Office of 
Surveillance and Epidemiology”, July 2007, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4308b1-02-fda-backgrounder.pdf   
463
 As reported by one of the NEJM authors, Nissen S.E., “The Rise and Fall of Rosiglitazone”. See in 
general the discussion in the opening sections of chapter III. 
 122 
 
results of  unfavourable studies related to an increased suicide rate in children and 
adolescents treated with Paroxetine (commercialised by GSK under several brand names, 
the most common one being Paxil). The terms of  the settlement required GSK to disclose 
all clinical trials conducted by GSK after December 2000,464 which allowed the NEJM 
group to undertake the meta-analysis, relying on 42 randomised trials of  which 35 had not 
been published.465 Note that whereas trials data between December 2000 and April 2007 
(when the NEJM group accessed the data) was available, previous trials (including the 
pivotal ones leading to the initial marketing authorisation) are still protected as discussed in 
chapter III. 
 The NEJM study (based on data made accessible by a court case) was a turning 
point in the Avandia saga. Both the FDA and the EMA initially reacted with a further 
modification of  the labelling, introducing renewed warnings to patients for potential 
cardiovascular ADRs.466 Based on the final results of  the RECORD trial, published in the 
Lancet in June 2009,467 both agencies decided to keep the medicine in the market as the 
study showed no significant statistical increase in cardiovascular hospitalisation and 
death.468 However the strong critiques of  the study’s design, revolving around its unfitness 
to effectively achieve its purported goal, weakened its reliability. In July 2010 an FDA 
advisory committee severely criticised the findings of  the RECORD trial and 
recommended a withdrawal of  the product or a significant restriction of  its use.469 The 
agency opted for the latter solution.  Meanwhile, the EMA reached a more definitive 
conclusion in September 2010, recommending a suspension of  the marketing 
authorisation on the grounds that the risks of  cardiovascular ADRs outweighed the drug’s 
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benefit, in particular due to the presence of  safer alternatives in the market.470 
 As for the Vioxx saga, there are at least three lessons we can learn from the 
Avandia case. The first and most striking one relates to prolonged delays in risk 
communication and consequent reactive regulatory measures. Concerns over 
cardiovascular risks were present from the beginning, but the proposed regulatory solution 
was, at first, a requirement for an inadequately designed post-marketing study. More to the 
point, when concerns about cardiovascular events linked to Avandia were finally raised by 
the WHO in 2004, the regulatory response to the issue took two years, with modified 
warnings approved in 2006. Subsequently, when in 2007 the NEJM study offered a 
meta-analysis showing a 30% to 40% increase in risks of  cardiovascular ADRs (confirmed 
to be 40% by the following FDA review), both the EMA and the FDA took three years to 
take corrective measures, eventually significantly restricting the use of  the drug in the US 
and suspending its marketing authorisation in the EU.471  
 The second point, not dissimilar to what has been already suggested for Vioxx, is 
the presence of  safer alternatives in the market, which in turn calls into question the 
necessity of  approval in the first place. In particular, the hepatotoxicity advantage achieved 
by Avandia as compared to previous anti-diabetes treatments proved to be far less 
beneficial than the increased risk factor for cardiovascular events.472 In other words, it 
appears from this reconstruction and the studies it relies upon that the regulatory system 
(in both the US and the EU) allows approval of  under-investigated new products as 
treatments for conditions already widely covered by effective marketed competitors.473 
 The third element, which will be further expanded in chapter VII, is related to the 
availability of  what we have referred to in previous chapters as ‘relevant scientific 
knowledge’. The NEJM study which uncovered statistically significant risks linked to 
Avandia was only made possible by the result of  a court case imposing full disclosure 
obligations (albeit for a limited period of  time) on GSK. The obvious related question 
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being quid when no exogenous element intervenes to impose data availability?  
 
3.  Uncertainty ex ante, insufficiency ex post? 
 The events of  the 2000s, with significant pharmaceutical product-related cases 
questioning the ability of  the regulatory system to deliver effective and safe medicines, 
prompted the adoption of  reforms very much focused on post-marketing surveillance 
roles and the responsibility of  industry and regulators.  The cases analysed in the previous 
sections uncovered a series of  issues, foremost among which include the fortuity of  risk 
discovery beyond the systemic uncertainties of  the scientific process, and long delays in 
risk communication and reactive measures. In the midst of  these fundamental regulatory 
issues lies the policy problem that new drugs are often not needed, as comparatively safer 
alternatives are already marketed. This section analyses these matters through the lens of  
the regulatory reforms adopted by the US and the EU between 2007 and 2012, and 
attempts a critical conclusion on the safety output provided by the regulatory systems 
alone. 
 In the aftermath of  the Vioxx crisis the FDA faced severe criticism for inadequacy 
in the delivery of  safe and effective medicines. The unfolding of  events questioned the 
reliability of  both pre- and post-marketing regulatory measures. However, noting that 
pre-marketing testing is characterised by inherent limitations which could “not be changed 
without adding considerably to the time and expense of  drug approvals, which would 
delay patient access to potentially beneficial drugs”474 (in deference to the pro-marketing 
attitude that emerged as a result of  the ‘drug lag’ described in chapter II), the FDA 
pressured Congress to gain greater post-marketing surveillance powers, in the specific 
form of  increased autonomy to require further clinical trials to face emerging safety 
concerns.475 Until 2007, the pharmacovigilance system was considered adequate to catch 
rare ADRs mostly unrelated to the prescription use of  the products (what are commonly 
referred to as ‘signature damages’), but its shortcomings emerged in its substantial inability 
to effectively uncover the marketed medicine’s contribution to common ADRs (the most 
common kind of  drug-related damage: not a signature one, but an increase in the 
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probability of  a certain type of  ADR).476 In this sense, in the case of  both Vioxx and 
Avandia, the limits of  the pharmacovigilance system emerged quite dramatically. Another 
line of  criticism identified the potential for a conflict of  interest between the pre- and 
post-marketing activities of  the FDA. Specifically, the argument suggests that since the 
division charged with approval of  new products (the FDA’s Office of  New Drugs) is the 
same division vested with post-marketing surveillance authority, this double role might 
very well cause an internal conflict of  interest to the detriment of  accurate and effectively 
conducted pharmacovigilance,477 as the same office would be reluctant to contradict its 
earlier findings. While this latter criticism has yet to be legislatively addressed, Congress 
reacted to the former with the adoption of  the FDAA of  2007478 - the scope of  the Act is 
wider, but there is a specific focus on an expansion of  the FDA’s post-approval authority, 
especially as regards post-approval testing or warning requirements.  
Under the FDAA, the agency has the authority to require a manufacturer to 
undertake a post-approval clinical trial to ascertain the existence of  previously 
undiscovered or under-reported ADRs, based on appropriate scientific data.479 While this 
is certainly a step forward from a scenario dependent on voluntary initiatives of  marketing 
authorisation holders, it is unclear to what extent the Vioxx case would have benefitted 
from the new provision since for approved products the requirement can only be imposed 
on the basis of  new safety information480 – in other words the ‘theoretical’ risk identified 
for Vioxx would not have sufficed, and only after the VIGOR trial could a formal 
requirement have been imposed. In response to the delays in introducing proper warnings, 
the FDAA also reinforced the FDA’s authority to require modifications to the safety 
labelling of  marketed products,481 reducing the pure negotiating space that substantially 
delayed and watered down the labelling changes for Vioxx. This authority is however 
subject to a dispute resolution mechanism which is dealt with on a case-by-case basis by 
the agency following a general blueprint (the legislation leaves ample margins of  
manoeuvre to the agency in the determination of  specific procedures) – which provides 
that disputes over the modification of  product labelling should be determined through the 
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adoption of  a regulation containing a proposed ruling and sufficient time for comments by 
the counterparty.482 To ensure adequate enforcement of  these new mechanisms, the FDAA 
gives the agency authority to impose substantial fines for violations of  required measures – 
the fines can go up to a quarter of  a million dollars for any single violation, to be doubled 
after 30 days of  protracted violation.483  
The 2007 FDAA with the introduction of  fines attempted to tackle another 
essential issue affecting the effectiveness of  post-marketing surveillance: the scarcity of  
financial resources, arguably one of  the major factors responsible for the inability of  the 
agency to promptly react to emerging ADRs.484 The principal source of  revenue for the 
agency to reinvest in safety and efficacy monitoring is the mechanism contained in the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) described in chapter II. In 2012, with the 
adoption of  the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDSIA), 
PDUFA was re-authorised for the fifth time since its first adoption in 1992.485 While 
PDUFA V integrates a series of  new provisions very much focused on risk 
communication mechanisms,486 the financing mechanism based on manufacturers’ fees for 
NDAs is maintained. Since its first adoption, the PDUFA mechanism has produced an 
undeniably significant income and become the major financial resource for the agency’s 
monitoring duties, but its limits in covering the costs of  post-marketing surveillance tasks 
are reported in several FDA studies, such as the 2013 evaluation of  the PDUFA Workload 
Adjuster,487 and the 2008 “Post-marketing Commitments Study Final Report”.488 While 
certainly introducing much-needed improvements to the post-marketing surveillance 
mechanisms, the 2007 legislation is not without its critics. Particularly, the concern is that 
the scope of  the intervention is still insufficient to systematise FDA’s monitoring duties 
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over marketed medicines’ life cycles as the funding mechanism through user fees provides 
insufficient resources.489 This concluding observation on the limited financial resources 
dedicated to the pharmacovigilance system constitutes an appropriate trait d’union to 
discuss the regulatory reforms adopted in Europe between 2010 and 2012. 
 Similarly to the US scenario, the European legislation governing post-marketing 
surveillance has been subject to abundant criticism in the wake of  the pharmaceutical 
cases of  the mid and late 2000s. Originally laid down in recalled Directive 2001/83 and 
Regulation 726/2004,490 the pharmacovigilance system was subject to extensive revision, 
first in 2010 with the adoption of  Regulation 1235/2010 and Directive 2010/84,491 and 
finally in 2012 with the adoption of  Directive 2012/26.492 The reasons for this legislative 
intervention were identified by the EMA in a 2008 Impact Assessment presented by the 
Commission to the European Parliament.493 The assessment underlines how despite 
pre-marketing approval procedures and requirements (which are in any event never 
expected to provide a risk-free result), ADRs are “the fifth most common cause of  death 
and are responsible for 3-10% of  all admissions to hospitals in the EU”.494 The report 
extensively describes the effects of  the shortcomings in the EU post-marketing 
surveillance regime, with a series of  estimates reported below:495 
• 0.12% – 0.22% of  hospital admissions result in death due to an ADR, 
corresponding to 100,800 - 197,000 deaths annually in the EU. 
• 3 – 10 % of  hospital admissions are caused by ADRs corresponding to 2.5 – 8.4 
million annually in the EU. 
• 2.1 – 6.5% of  hospitalised patients suffer an ADR, corresponding to 1.8 – 5.5 
million annually in the EU. 
• ADR-related costs other than those caused by hospitalization are estimated at € 63.2  
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billion annually in the EU. 
• € 79 billion represents a reasonable estimate of  the total societal cost of  ADRs 
occurring in the EU. 
 
In analysing the reasons for this less than optimal scenario, the EMA recognised 
that the original framework for the post-marketing surveillance mechanism contained in 
the pre-2010 legislation was out-dated, as it was still very much modelled on the scheme 
adopted in the 1960s and subsequently amended (but never restructured) in 2001 and 
2004.496 This failure to properly update and modernise the system is therefore identified as 
the main cause of  its weaknesses, which are grouped in a series of  major categories.  
First, the out-dated system did not provide a clear division of  roles and 
responsibilities between the central regulator (EMA), MS authorities, and marketing 
authorisation holders, which resulted in delays in risk communication as well as low levels 
of  post-marketing compliance.497  
Second, the shortcomings of  the decentralised marketing authorisation procedure 
emerged in this field (as well as in the pre-marketing one discussed in chapter II), slowing 
down the European level of  decision-making in addressing ADRs. Because legal 
provisions on referrals of  emerging risk were unclear they were rarely used, with 
consequent divergent and incoherent actions taken at MS level.498 
Further, the reporting rules proved to lack proactivity on the side of  the EMA. For 
instance the fact that post-marketing requirements were simply described, not conducted 
by the authority, rendered compliance difficult to achieve (in the Avandia case, the inability 
of  the EMA to conduct the RECORD trial itself  was a prominent factor in its substantial 
failure).499 Moreover, there was a recognition that post-marketing studies, being 
                                              
496
 Ibidem, p. 12: “The 2001-Review did not include a systematic review of the EU pharmacovigilance 
rules and did not assess their effectiveness” – noting subsequently, pp. 13-14, the permanence of 
disharmony in pharmacovigilance rules and requirements. 
497
 Ibidem, p. 15. Notably, a similar conclusion is restated in EMA, “One-year report on human 
medicines pharmacovigilance tasks of the European Medicines Agency”, Doc Ref 
EMA/171322/2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/pharmacovigilance/2014_ema_oneyear_pharmacov_en.pdf.  
498
 Commission of the European Communities, “Impact Assessment”, p. 16: this lack of coherence seems 
to be improving with the new legislation, as reported in EMA, “One-year report on human 
medicines pharmacovigilance”. 
499
 Commission of the European Communities, “Impact Assessment”, p. 17, and on the shortcomings of 
the RECORD trial see the discussion infra. 
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substantially left to the initiative of  the manufacturers, were “frequently conducted for 
promotional rather than safety reasons”,500 providing only poor quality data (as for 
instance in the Vioxx case, the VIGOR study was designed for the sole purpose of  
identifying a comparative advantage as against its direct competitor). 
In light of  these observations, the EU reacted with the above-mentioned 
legislation in 2010 and 2012. The choices made are not dissimilar from what we have 
already observed in the US. One of  the most significant changes is a stronger role for the 
EMA in requiring and supervising post-marketing studies to assess specific safety 
concerns.501 Based on the Vioxx experience, which highlighted that it is not only highly 
innovative biotechnological products that carry the risk of  widespread and possibly fatal 
ADRs, the new legislation extends the scope of  application of  Risk Management Plans 
(RMPs, a post-authorisation road-map for complementary testing and monitoring duties to 
guarantee a “prospective safety evaluation of  products”, originally limited to a restricted 
list of  innovative products) to all new MAAs if  required.502  
The proactive risk management conducted by the EMA under the new legislation 
is to be considered an positive step in providing better quality data on the one hand, and 
simplifying the convoluted and unclear partition of  roles and responsibilities of  the 
previous legislation. However, while the more central role of  the EMA has certainly had 
the merit of  rationalising an otherwise disharmonious legislative field, similarly to what has 
been said about the FDA, a crucial residual concern revolves around the lack of  financial 
resources. Before the adoption of  the 2010-2012 legislation the lack of  funding to 
guarantee effective post-marketing monitoring was a generally recognised phenomenon. 
The issue with the recent reforms is that they do not introduce any increase in resources 
for the implementation of  their new provisions.503 The idea is that simplification should 
                                              
500
 Ibidem, p. 17. 
501
 See in particular art. 1(4) inserting a new art. 10a in Regulation 726/2004 providing that: “1. After the 
granting of a marketing authorisation, the Agency may impose an obligation on the marketing 
authorisation holder: (a) to conduct a post-authorisation safety study if there are concerns about the 
risks of an authorised medicinal product […]”. 
502
 See the new arts. 104(3) and 104a(2) of Directive 2001/83, and EMA, ‘Guidelines on good 
pharmacovigilance practices (GVP)’, Doc Ref EMA/838713/2011 Rev 1*, 2014, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2012/06/WC500129
134.pdf.        
503
 The new legislation introduces a mechanism similar to the one provided by the American PDUFA – 
see the discussion infra. For an extended criticism of the failure to provide EMA with new financial 
resources in spite of a greater centrality of its role, see Grattini S., Bertele V, “Anything new in EU 
pharmacovigilance?”, European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 67, 2011. 
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guarantee a significant decrease in expenses, saving essential resources to be fruitfully 
reinvested in the conduction of  post-marketing duties. However, the scope of  the reform, 
and in particular the extension of  RMPs to all product applications, could prove a serious 
obstacle to the achievement of  the legislative goals. Similarly to the American PDUFA, the 
2010 legislation empowers the EMA to charge fees to manufacturers applying for 
marketing authorisation,504 but whether this is sufficient to fund the extensive 
post-marketing surveillance activities with which the agency is entrusted is unlikely.505 
Whereas the FDA study on compliance with post-marketing requirements shows that only 
30% of  post-marketing commitments are fulfilled by manufacturers,506 no data is available 
on fulfilment percentages in the EU, where all that is available is a generic 
acknowledgment that “frequently post-authorisation safety studies are not conducted or 
completed”.507 Since the legislation has been in force for less than three years (it came into 
force in July 2012), a few more years will be necessary to appreciate whether the new 
legislative provisions are fully effective and the financial resources adequate.  
We concluded chapter III with a remark that uncertainty seemed to permeate 
pre-marketing scrutiny because the provenance and reliability of  data proved difficult if  
not impossible to assess. Chapter IV suggested that traditional forms of  legitimacy 
supporting this rather uncertain scenario are fundamentally absent, and that it is therefore 
only from an analysis of  the output of  the system that one can extrapolate a legitimation 
of  its rules. In this sense, the conclusion of  this chapter is interlocutory. The above 
description of  the safety output suggests that risk discovery is characterised by elements 
of  fortuity that are more the product of  imperfect regulatory mechanisms than of  
unavoidable scientific hazards, while the reaction time of  the regulatory system can prove 
to be lengthy and ineffective. Important reforms have been put into place to face these 
challenges, but the regulators while legislatively empowered may struggle to find adequate 
                                              
504
 See the new art. 67(3) of Regulation 726/2004 as amended by Regulation 1235/2010: “The Agency’s 
revenue shall consist of a contribution from the Union and fees paid by undertakings for obtaining 
and maintaining Union marketing authorisations and for other services provided by the Agency, or 
by the coordination group as regards the fulfilment of its tasks […]”. 
505
 See the negative evaluation released by the Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council on fees payable to the European Medicines Agency for the conduct of 
pharmacovigilance activities in respect of medicinal products for human use”, COM(2013) 472 final 
– based on the related Opinion released by DG SANCO, April 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/sec_2013_0372_en.pdf. 
506
 FDA, “Postmarketing Commitments Study Final Report”.  
507
 Commission of the European Communities, “Impact Assessment”, p. 17. 
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resources to fulfil their tasks.  
The four chapters dedicated to the institutional design of  pharmaceutical 
regulation paved the way for the argument that the regulatory system cannot be 
self-sufficient in the pursuit of  consumer safety. The following chapters will discuss the 
potential for courts to constitute the necessary exogenous elements to open up and 
complement the closed system as we described it in the opening chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI508 
 
THE LENS OF THE JUDICIARY IN PHARMACEUTICAL SAFETY 
RENEWED ROLES FOR TRADITIONAL RULES? 
 
 
 After analysing the regulatory dimension of  pharmaceutical safety and underlining 
some of  its problematic features, the next chapters will be dedicated to the lens of  the 
judiciary in pharmaceutical safety. As the most prominent role of  courts in pharmaceutical 
cases is to adjudicate tort claims in product liability suits, the analysis discusses the 
development of  US and EU product liability rules confronted with pharmaceutical cases. 
The focus of  this chapter is on two specific aspects: foreseeability of  risk and compliance 
with regulatory requirements. The purpose is to create a link between the regulatory 
mechanisms and court litigation by addressing issues that are of  the essence in both sets 
of  rules: their relationship to risk and its assessment. The intent is therefore to set the 
scene as regards the attitude of  liability rules towards risk in pharmaceutical products, 
because it is within the sphere of  tort law that the following chapters will examine to what 
extent it is possible to rely on courts for the purposes of  refining the quality of  risk 
assessments, legitimising the system, and enhancing the delivery of  safety. 
  
1.  Pharmaceutical products and the law of  torts 
There is an antique dispute over the liability regime that would best fit 
pharmaceuticals. The reason for this is easily understandable if  we consider the inherent 
                                              
508
 This chapter is partially based on a previous work, Rizzi M., “Regulating risks in pharmaceutical law: 
the need of an optimal interplay between products safety and products liability”, Opinio Juris in 
Comparatione, Vol. 1/2011, Paper No. 2, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857434, and 
on the forthcoming Rizzi M., “Non-Measurable Negotiations – The EU between Transnational 
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals and Private Law”, in Cremona M., Micklitz H.-W., Private Law in 
the External Relations of the EU, Oxford University Press. 
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risk that characterises these products.509 The impossibility of  absolute safety poses 
inevitable questions over the extent to which a producer can be held liable for damages 
caused by his products. The issue is further complicated by the extensive regulatory 
oversight established for pharmaceutical products that we have described above, because 
of  the financial and time burdens imposed by such regulations.510 
 Whether and how pharmaceuticals should be treated differently from other 
types of  products has “consumed more time and effort than about any other 
particularized issue of  products liability law”.511 There is indeed a paradox that is inherent 
to medicines, appropriately described by M. Stuart Madden: “as one of  the greatest 
triumphs of  the twentieth century, their powerful chemicals and biologics save millions of  
human beings from suffering and death; yet, these same chemicals also cause great 
suffering and death”.512 While all medicines create risks and benefits, and a measure of  
                                              
509 It is interesting for the purpose of defining the unavoidability of risk in pharmaceutical products to 
recall the definition of “unavoidably unsafe” as provided by comment k of Section 402/A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Comment k states: “Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some 
products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for 
their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding 
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very 
serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a 
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the 
unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared and 
accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. 
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason 
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in 
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity 
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of 
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognisable risk. The seller of such products, again with the 
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the 
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their 
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable 
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.” 
510 See the discussion in chapter II, and for an overview of cost issues see Hodges C., European 
Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 48: “The average cost of discovering and developing a 
new drug is now put at over $800 million and rising at an annual rate of 7.4% above general price 
inflation: Boston Consulting Group, A Revolution in R&D: How Genomics and Genetics are 
Transforming the Biopharmaceutical Industry, Boston, 2003; DiMasi J., Hanson R.W., Grabowski 
G., “The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs”, Journal of Health 
Economy, 22, 2003. It is well known that the potential profits can be enormous. It has been 
commented that the increasing cost of drug development is likely to promote the situation where 
companies invest only in the development of those new drugs that are expected to yield peak annual 
sales greater than $500 million: Rawlins M.D., “Cutting the Costs of Drug Development?”, Nature, 
3, April 2004.” 
511 Henderson J.A., Twerski A.D., “Drug designs are different”, Yale Law Journal 151, 2001. 
512 Madden M.S., “The enduring paradox of products liability law relating to prescription 
pharmaceuticals”, Pace Law Review vol. 21, 2000. 
 135 
 
hazard is unavoidable,513 the question is how to strike the optimal balance between these 
risks and benefits, and indeed how to adequately identify them in the first place, given that 
product labelling alone cannot always properly warn consumers of  the inherent risks of  
taking the medicine514 and therefore cannot be delegated the task of  consumer safety. 
 The impossibility of  a perfect regulator makes the issue a pressing one. At a 
general level, Christopher Hodges among others points out that legislative, budgetary, and 
political constraints clash with “the ideal of  a perfect regulatory body that optimally 
protects the public from exposure to potentially harmful products”.515 Specifically, we have 
analysed in chapter II the process of  detachment of  technical bodies from the legislative 
circuit, while chapters III and V have pointed at the structural and budgetary limitations 
hindering adequate levels of  monitoring of  clinical trials sites, on the one hand, and the 
shortcomings of  post-marketing surveillance on the other. Hodges’ critiques must then be 
coupled with the substantial uncertainties and legitimacy issues raised by the 
transnationalisation of  pharmaceutical regulatory procedures as described in chapters III 
and IV. In this context this thesis takes the position that product liability should be 
normatively considered an active component of  the concept of  ‘pharmaceutical safety’, 
complementing and legitimating regulatory procedures and decisions.516 
 Setting aside for the moment the claim regarding their pedagogical potential, there 
is now a need to give a descriptive résumé of  tort law attitudes towards risk. The answer is 
necessarily multi-faceted. There are national experiences where, due to shortcomings 
occurring in regulatory practices, product liability law has a role to play in compensating 
persons harmed unnecessarily by defective drugs, in deterring production and sale of  
unsafe products, and in promoting drug safety, but on the basis of  a system of  rules which 
                                              
513 It is worth noting that there is a common understanding, especially in US literature, that drug hazard is 
inherent and simply cannot be removed.  While this is true to a certain extent, the hazard in some 
drugs may be reduced or eliminated by changing the prescribed dosage, the active ingredients in 
combination drugs, or the inert ingredients used in a drug. A discussion from a legal rather than 
pharmacological perspective can be found in Green M., “Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, 
and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections”, 30 Seton Hall Law Review 207, 199. 
514 See for example Smith R., “The Vagueness of Informed Consent”, 1 Individual Health Law Review 
109, 2004. 
515 Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 48. On weaknesses in the regulatory 
schemes, see for an analysis from the ‘tort law perspective’ Rabin R., “Reassessing Regulatory 
Compliance”, 88 Georgetown Law Journal 2049, 2000. 
516 The idea of complementarity has been recently restated by Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability 
and Regulation, Hart Publishing, 2013, see for example pp. 161-162. The analysis, very much 
centred on the concept of regulation providing minimum standards complemented by tort litigation, 
will be extensively referred to in the descriptive analysis. 
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is substantially a negligence one.517 The United Kingdom provides a valid example of  this 
attitude, as does the European Product Liability Directive as interpreted by the ECJ, which 
provides, despite a strict wording, a relatively negligence-oriented regime.518 Other 
countries on the other hand, such as Spain or Germany, opt for strict liability for harms 
caused by pharmaceutical products.519 The United States is characterised by a unique 
evolution from the strict liability wording of  the Restatement (Second) on Torts to the current 
negligence-based Restatement (Third), with a significant intermission. As recalled in the 
opening chapter, in 2006 the FDA adopted unilaterally the doctrine of  preemption for 
FDA-approved new products, shielding manufacturers compliant with federal regulation 
from state tort claims. The line of  argument adopted by the Supreme Court to overcome 
this unprecedented attempt to exclude liability claims will be an essential feature of  this 
analysis. 
  
2.  The United States approach to pharmaceutical tort litigation 
The opening chapter highlighted that a key element of  both regulatory and liability 
assessments is ‘relevant knowledge’. Therefore, the issue of  interest here is to identify the 
attitude of  product liability law towards that concept. In the US, the key idea is the one 
referred to as ‘state of  the art’, which is a mutating concept that has never been 
comprehensively defined, either by courts or by statutes, as suggested by David Owen520 
and several other North-American scholars.521 More precisely, while state statutes or 
courts, singularly considered, have a working definition of  what is to be considered ‘state 
of  the art’, a uniform federal conception is absent, and the Restatements on Torts (Second and 
                                              
517 The topic is discussed by Reimann M., “Liability for defective products at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century: emergence of a worldwide standard?”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 
2003, and subsequently restated up until the recent work of Goldberg R., Medicinal Product 
Liability and Regulation. The reference to negligence rules in drug litigation will be further explored 
infra. 
518
 See below the discussion on the seminal case C-300/95 Commission of the European Communities v 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ECR 1997, I-02649. 
519
 See below the discussion on the Spanish Ley 22/1994, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil Por Danos 
Causados por Productos Defectuosos and the German Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln 
(Arzneimittelgesetz - AMG), of 24 August 1976. 
520 Owen D., Products liability law (2nd ed.), Hornbook Series, Thomson West Group, 2008, 
pp. 675-681; Owen D., Montgomery J., Davis M.J., Products Liability and Safety, Foundation Press, 
2014. 
521 For example Henderson J.A., Twerski A.D., Products liability – problems and process, 5th ed., 
ASPEN Publishers, 2004; and a recent confirmation by Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability, 
p.  69. 
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Third) have steered clear of  the issue. There are several causes that may explain this 
phenomenon. The simplest is to look at the problem from a semantic point of  view. ‘State 
of  the art’ is an incomplete phrase: you need to know about which particular ‘art’ you are 
referring to in a particular situation. In other words the question is: state of  the art of  what? 
The answer varies from state to state, being considered in some cases as the most 
up-to-date scientific knowledge, in others as the industrial customary practice.522 
To summarise, in American product liability law, ‘state of  the art’ is an unrefined 
concept whose meaning and proper role are in continuous evolution. In the impressive 
variety of  definitions and interpretations of  such a phrase, it is possible to identify a thin 
common theme emerging from the cases and the statutes: “reluctance to impose liability 
on manufacturers for dangers that were unknowable, or unpreventable, at the time their 
products were sold: reluctance to hold producers responsible for risks they cannot 
control”.523 This common theme has led to a theoretical mutation of  the idea of  ‘state of  
the art’ from Restatement (Second) to Restatement (Third), which is interesting and potentially 
helpful to understand the further evolution of  the legal regime of  pharmaceutical product 
safety in the US. The Restatement (Second) imposed a strict liability regime for damages 
caused by defective products, adopting the so called “consumer expectation test” to 
evaluate the safety of  the products.524 To attenuate the potentially excessive harshness of  
the rule, the American Law Institute (ALI) introduced comment j to section 402A, regarding 
the duty to warn for producers of  unavoidably unsafe products.525 Such a duty is imposed 
only for foreseeable risks (but foreseeability is linked with the most up-to-date scientific 
knowledge available).526  
 
                                              
522 Owen D., Products liability law, pp. 677-678, presenting abundant quantitative research on the 
relevant case law. See also Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability, pp. 170-171; and in general 
Owen D., Montgomery J., Davis M.J., Products Liability and Safety. 
523 Owen D., Products liability law, p. 675. 
524 See the wording of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §402 A and the related discussion in Kysar 
D.A., “The Expectations of Consumers”, Columbia Law Review 103, 2003. 
525 Comment j states: “The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for 
example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against them.  
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the population 
are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which 
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give 
warnings against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill 
and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.” 
526 See the leading cases Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (California 1988) and Beshada v. John 
Mansville Products Corp, 1001 N.J. 221 A.2d 1099 (New Jersey Supreme Court, 1982). 
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The ‘consumer expectation test’ has been the object of  severe criticism, 
fundamentally based on the observation that, framed as it is in the Restatement (Second), the 
test is somewhat amorphous and provides “eager and insufficient guidance to fact-finders 
charged with the difficult task of  assessing the adequacy of  a product design”.527 In 
response to these criticisms, the ALI produced the Restatement (Third) in 1998. As regards 
pharmaceutical products, it is noticeable that the new restated rules, to overcome potential 
harshness and vagueness, abandoned the straight interpretation of  comment j and brought 
back the idea of  “reasonableness”, moving away (de facto if  not expressly) from strict 
liability, and introducing elements typical to negligence rules instead. Section 6(c) of  the 
Products Liability Restatement (Third) provides: “A prescription drug or medical device is not 
reasonably safe due to defective design if  the foreseeable risks of  harm posed by the drug 
or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits 
that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of  such foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of  patients.”528  In 
other words, the new rule introduces a very narrow test for liability. While criticisms of  the 
Restatement (Second) focused on its excessive scope, the Restatement (Third) has been rejected 
by certain commentators529 and the Nebraska Supreme Court530 for making recovery 
practically impossible. However, on balance, the new test has received the approval of  
leading scholarship as being “basically correct”531 in comparison to the vague nature of  the 
former rules. 
 
3.  The European Product Liability Directive for medicines 
Turning to the EU attitude towards risk in liability claims, the European Product 
Liability Directive, while embracing a strict liability regime,532 incorporates the idea of  
                                              
527
 Kysar D.A., “The Expectations of Consumers”, p. 1715. 
528 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 6(c). 
529
 See for example the contributions by Vandall F.J., “Constructing a Roof before the Foundation is 
Prepared: the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 2(b) Design Defect”, University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 30, 1997; Conk G.W., “Is there a Design Defect in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?”, Yale Law Journal 109, 2000; Kysar D.A., “The 
Expectations of Consumers”.  
530
 In the case of Freeman v. Hoffman La Roche Inc. 260 Neb. 552, 618 N.W.2d 827, 2000. 
531
 Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability, p. 41; Owen D.G., “Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling 
a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare debate”, Connecticut Law Review 42, 2010, p. 750. 
532
 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ 1985 L 210, arts. 1, 4, and 6. 
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‘development risk’, described by Jane Stapleton533 as a slightly more refined concept than 
its American counterpart. A ‘development risk’ is an unknowable risk that cannot be 
foreseeable because the state of  scientific and technical knowledge, at the time the product 
is put into circulation, is not such as to enable the risk to be identified.534 The European 
Court of  Justice has given a quite controversial interpretation of  article 7(e) of  the EU 
Directive 374/85 in the case C-300/95 Commission v. United Kingdom, stating that the 
provision is not specifically directed at the practices and safety standards in use in the 
industrial sector in question but concerns “unreservedly . . . the state of  scientific and 
technical knowledge including the most advanced level of  such knowledge”.535 The state 
of  knowledge is, according to the Court, not that of  which the actual producer “actually or 
subjectively was or could have been apprised, but the objective state of  scientific and 
technical knowledge of  which the producer is presumed to have been informed”.536 The 
Court does not develop this interpretation further. For instance, an explanation of  the key 
phrase “state of  knowledge”, and an accurate definition of  “knowledge” as opposed to, 
for instance, a preliminary “hypothesis”, are absent.537 The very high standard that at first 
sight the Court sets for producers regarding discoverability is, moreover, limited by the 
next part of  the Court's analysis. The only basis it offers for the presumption of  the 
producer’s knowledge of  the defect is that the relevant knowledge must have been 
“accessible” at the time at which the product was put into circulation.  However, no exact 
explanation of  what the Court means by the word “accessible” is offered,538 thus leaving 
considerable margins of  manoeuvre to national courts, and reintroducing an element of  
“reasonableness”539 that should be excluded by definition in strict liability. 
 
                                              
533 In Stapleton J., Products Liability, London Butterworths, 1994. 
534 Directive 374/85/EC, art. 7(e): “ It shall be a defence for the producer to prove: . . . (e) that the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such 
as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.” 
535
 Case C-300/95, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland ECR 1997, I-02649, §26. 
536 Ibidem, §27. 
537 Mildred M., “The Development Risk Defence”, in Fairgrieve D., Product Liability in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 167-170. This discussion is developed in 
chapter VII. 
538 Case C-300/95, Commission v. United Kingdom, §28. 
539
  The Court states explicitly that the relevant knowledge is meant to include “all data in the 
information circuit of the scientific community as a whole, bearing in mind, however, on the basis of 
a reasonableness test the actual opportunities for the information to circulate”: ibidem, §24. See 
chapter VII for a deeper discussion. 
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 A necessary observation to make is that in parallel to the EU’s Directive aimed at 
harmonising product liability legislation in the Member States, the field of  pharmaceutical 
product liability presents a high degree of  variability across the EU for two sets of  
reasons. On the one hand there are multiple and significant exceptions to the general 
regime, such as the provisions of  the German Law regulating pharmaceuticals 
(Arzneimittelngesetz), and the Spanish Law (Ley 22/1994, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil Por Danos 
Causados por Productos Defectuosos), both providing a more ‘pure’ strict liability for 
pharmaceutical damages than that provided by the Directive as interpreted by the ECJ.540 
This is not the place to discuss in depth the historical reasons that led to this situation. It is 
however worth recalling that it reflects a response to drug disasters in the course of  the 
20th century. Germany was heavily hit by the Thalidomide disaster. The legislation that was in 
place at that time (Germany was the first European country to have a special legislation for 
pharmaceuticals, adopted in 1961541) appeared unable to sufficiently ensure drug security 
or provide a basis for recovery of  damages by injured drug consumers. The new Act of  
1976 purported to eliminate these deficiencies, establishing, among other provisions, strict 
liability claims in relation to damages caused by pharmaceutical products. In a recent case, 
the CJEU has confirmed the validity of  the German provisions, even the amendments 
posterior to the entry into force of  the Directive.542 As regards Spain, the reasons are 
substantially similar, as the country has been hit by four major drug disasters in the space 
of  three decades.543 
 On the other hand, in its interpretation of  article 13544 of  Directive 374/85/EC, 
the Court held that any scheme of  product liability “founded on the same basis as that put 
in place by the Directive and not limited to a given sector of  production does not come 
within any of  the systems of  liability referred to in article 13 of  the Directive”.545 On the 
basis of  this reasoning, and considering pharmaceuticals as a specific “sector of  
                                              
540 Reimann M., “Liability for defective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century: emergence 
of a worldwide standard?”, and Wandt M., “German approaches to Product Liability”, Texas 
International Law Journal 34, 1999. 
541 Gesetz uber den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln, 1961. 
542
 Case 310/13, Novo Nordisk Pharma GMbH v. S., ECR 2014. 
543 See for a discussion Vega M.I.A., “The Defence of Development Risks in Spanish Law”, Consumer 
Law Journal 144, 1997. 
544 Article 13 provides: “This Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have 
according to the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability 
system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.” 
545 See Case C-183/00 Gonzàlez Sànchez vs Medicina Asturiana SA ECR 2002, I-3901. 
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production”, countries such as France and Italy have applied general tort law rules to 
pharmaceutical product liability claims.546 We will come back to these scenarios below. 
 
4.  A system’s reaction to major irritations: the US federal preemption of  
tort law 
This section describes a recent trend in American pharmaceutical product liability 
litigation that exemplifies how the pharmaceutical regulatory system, as we identified it in 
the opening chapter, attempts to protect itself  when subject to major irritations which 
challenge its self-sufficiency. 
In 2006,547 a new doctrine (the doctrine of  preemption) gained momentum in the 
sphere of  drug litigation in the US. Until then, the FDA used to consider its risk/benefit 
analysis as setting a floor but not a ceiling for product safety. FDA approval would 
authorise a product to be marketed, but manufacturers would still be held responsible if  a 
court later decided that a product was defective or a warning was inadequate. Over the past 
decade, however, this view had been called into question by regulators arguing that the 
FDA review process should set both floor and ceiling to foster marketing and availability 
of  new products.548 Therefore, FDA approval of  a new product should not simply indicate 
that the product can be marketed, but should be the final word in the safety assessment of  
that new product. The argument goes on, claiming that the threat of  tort liability deters 
pharmaceutical companies and device makers from developing much-needed new 
technologies.549 Whenever those innovations are delayed if  not abandoned altogether, “the 
                                              
546 See among others Ponzanelli G., “Armonizzazione del diritto v. protezione del consumatore”, Danno e 
Responsabilità, 2002; and Busnelli F. D., Ponzanelli G., La responsabilità del produttore tra legge 
speciale e codice civile, in Il danno da prodotti in Italia, Austria, Repubblica Federale di Germania, 
Svizzera, a cura di S. Patti, Padova 1990. 
 547 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological 
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (24 January 2006, effective June 30, 2006), 21 C.F.R. Pts. 201, 
314, 601. 
548 Sharkey C.M., “Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State 
versus Federal Courts”, NYU School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n. 
08-04, 2008; Sharkey C.M., “Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of 
Tort Law”, De Paul Law Review, 56:227, 2007; Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: 
Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”, Yale Journal of Health 
Policy, Law & Ethics, 2005; IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety, in The Future of Drug 
Safety – Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public, 2006. 
549 Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System”, p. 590; and see also for a discussion Philipson T.J., Sun 
E.C., Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability Exemption in Presence of the FDA”, NBER 
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cost is felt not merely in financial terms but also in the suffering of  people whose illnesses 
could have been treated with the new drug or device”.550 These critics argue that the tort 
system should not be permitted to re-determine product safety, as courts may unduly 
nullify the assessments of  the FDA’s expertise:551 the risk being that non-expert juries and 
judges will make weaker assessments in terms of  scientific robustness and objectivity.552 It 
has been strongly argued contra, however, that such a statement is inadequate because of  
the weakness of  the FDA’s post-marketing surveillance process, essentially based on data 
furnished by the pharmaceutical industry itself, rather than autonomously managed by the 
agency.553 While the 2007 FDAA measures were supposed to balance this critical situation, 
as described in chapter V, the Avandia case suggests that post-marketing scrutiny is still 
underperforming. 
The evolution of  the relationship between product liability and product safety in 
the US shows a significant shift, in the past fifteen years, from a consumer-friendly to a 
much more producer-friendly tendency. It has been argued that the emergence of  the 
doctrine of  preemption promoted by the FDA can be explained in light of  the agency’s 
need to regain authority and reliability after the Vioxx case described in chapter V. An 
argument could be made here that when confronted with a major irritation, the 
pharmaceutical closed and self-perpetuating system (as presented in chapter I) has tried to 
‘defend itself ’, moving the ‘capture’ of  rule and decision-making power a step further: that 
is, by unilaterally shielding its decisions from any external influence and control.  
                                                                                                                                    
Working Paper Series, 15603, 2009; Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., “Is the Food and Drug Administration 
Safe and Effective?”, NBER Working Paper Series, 13561, 2007. 
550 Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System”, p. 590. 
551 See the Preamble to Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934. 
552 Empirical data rather indicate that juries do better than their critics assert at handling technical issues, 
that juries are not as eager as some think to award damages against business defendants, and that 
punitive damages are awarded rarely in product liability suits (and mainly in cases involving 
egregious misbehaviour). See on the point Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System”, 
pp. 592-593; more recently Hans V.P., “Judges, Juries and Scientific Evidence”, Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications, Paper 302, 2007; and chapter IX of this thesis. 
553 There is abundant literature on the point.  See the contribution by Carpenter D., Reputation and 
Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA, Princeton University 
Press, 2010. Older arguments asserting that the FDA’s reliance on the regulated company to supply 
the necessary safety data can lead to problems include McGarity T.O., “Beyond Buckman: Wrongful 
Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts”, Washburn Law Journal, 41, 2002 
(arguing that “[w]hen the onus is on the regulatee to provide data establishing that its product is ‘safe 
and effective’  . . . , the temptation is strong for a company to discount data indicating that the 
product may not meet the statutory test”); see also Noah B.A., “Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing 
Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare”, 49 Catholic University Law Review, 449, 470-471, 
2000. 
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The doctrine of  preemption initially attracted a surprising level of  support from 
courts, for example from the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case Rowe v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche Inc. (March 2007).  This endorsement was particularly surprising in light of  the active 
and central role that the New Jersey Supreme Court had played in the historical 
development of  product liability law, from the case Beshada v. John Mansville Products Corp to 
the famous Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, applying section 402A of  Restatement (Second) in its 
strictest interpretation.554 A turning point was however reached in March 2009, when the 
US Supreme Court, in Wyeth v. Levine,555 overruled the doctrine of  preemption in drug 
litigation. In this decision, the opinion of  the Court, delivered by Justice Stevens, clearly 
opines that state tort law cannot be considered an obstacle to the achievement of  safety 
assessments by the FDA, but is rather a complement to it.556 The fact that no Congress 
statutes clearly provide a preemption clause for FDA’s decisions goes in this very 
direction,557 and the majority opinions in Wyeth promote the idea of  complementarity 
whereby regulatory compliance sets a minimum standard but not a definitive risk 
assessment.558  
There is still room to question whether the preemption debate is over in drug 
litigation. On the one hand, as it appears from the facts of  Wyeth, the defendant failed to 
disclose full information to the FDA regarding alternative and safer uses of  the drug.559 
More precisely, what the defendant was seeking in Wyeth was not a simple ‘preemption 
defence’, but a narrower ‘impossibility by preemption defence’. In other words, the 
defendant was arguing that it could not introduce a new element (that is, the alternative 
safer use of  the drug) in the labelling on its own motion, since the label had been 
approved by the FDA. As such, it argued, the state court was preempted from finding the 
                                              
554 Beshada v. John Mansville Products Corp, 1001 N.J. Super. 221 A.2d 1099, 1982; Feldman v. Lederle 
Lab., 257 N.J. Super. 163, 1992. 
555 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 2009. 
556 Ibidem, opinion of the Court, Part IV. 
557 In pharmaceutical product cases, implied preemption was applied by considering federal agency 
(FDA) determinations as substitutes for Congressional intent. Deferring to the agency position on 
preemption of state common law is however troublesome: see for a general discussion Davis M.J., 
“The New Presumption against Preemption”, Hastings Law Journal, 61, 1217, 2010. 
558 As implied by scholars such as Owen D.G., “Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law 
Gap in the Health Care debate”, Connecticut Law Review, 42, 2010, p. 733 ff, noting “the continued 
decline of the federal preemption doctrine as a bar to warning adequacy claims against drug 
manufacturers”; but see also Ausness R.C., “The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of 
Prescription Drugs”, 65 Food & Drug Law Journal 247, 2010, suggesting a more cautious approach. 
559 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, opinion of the Court, Part III. 
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claimant liable for failure to warn.560 On the other hand, and on a more general note, the 
Court rejected Wyeth’s argument that tort claims “interfere with Congress’s purpose to 
entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling decisions that strike a balance between 
competing objectives”,561 holding that such an argument relies on an “untenable 
interpretation” of  congressional intent and an “overboard view” of  an agency's power to 
preempt state law.562 This statement has the effect of  narrowing down substantially the 
space for implied preemption, and claiming back for state institutions the power to decide 
when and how individuals should be put in the conditions to react against procedures and 
decisions that affect them. 
 Notwithstanding the clear wording of  this particular judgment, it might be too 
early to argue that federal preemption cannot be invoked tout court in drug cases (whereas it 
seems hardly disputable that it is precluded when the defendant fails to operate proactively 
on the basis of  all information in his possession). As colourfully noted by Mary Davis, 
“trying to make sense of  preemption opinions [of  the Supreme Court] reminds one of  
being on a roller coaster […] The uncertainty of  where the coaster will go, while 
exhilarating for the time, is also exhausting and frustrating”.563 A fair comment, if  we 
compare Wyeth with the previous high-profile implied preemption case decided by the 
Supreme Court, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,564 where the Court displayed a significantly broader 
approach to the issue.565 Further, another quite significant and distinct decision was taken 
two years after Wyeth in the case of  PLIVA, Inc v. Mensing.566 The Court in the PLIVA case 
established a de facto ‘two-tier drug liability system’ by recognising that in the realm of  
generic drugs, the doctrine of  preemption can still be relied upon.567 
 
                                              
560 Ibidem, opinion of the Court, Part III: the Court concluded on this point that “[i]mpossibility 
preemption is a demanding defense. […] Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for 
it to comply with both federal and state requirements. The CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to 
unilaterally strengthen its warning, and the mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan’s label does 
not establish that it would have prohibited such a change.” 
561 Ibidem, opinion of the Court, Part IV. 
562 Ibidem. 
563 Davis M.J., “On Restating Products Liability Preemption”, Brooklyn Law Review, 74, 2009, p. 776, 
noting the level of inconsistency in Supreme Court judgments on preemption over the last two 
decades. 
564 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 2008, pp. 1007-1008. 
565 Davis M.J., “On Restating Products Liability Preemption”, pp. 770 – 771. 
566
 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2011. 
567
 The case and the two-tier litigation are well discussed in Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability, 
p. 150 ff. 
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5.  The necessary relationship between regulation and product liability 
The questions for the purposes of  this work are whether the tort law rules briefly 
recalled above are, by their nature, able to complement regulation through the delivery of  a 
higher standard of  scientific knowledge; whether these rules are able to exercise effective 
control over the outcome of  regulation; and how they interact with said regulation.568 
The regulatory and litigation systems could theoretically operate entirely 
independently, as they are two separate and independent bodies of  law. It seems however 
unrealistic to advocate total independence: “it seems clear that the agencies’ expert 
assessments of  product safety should not be irrelevant in litigation arising from asserted 
safety defects. Rather, the dispute is over what the effect of  the agency’s safety 
determinations should be.”569 Given that even in the absence of  formal connections an 
interplay between the two regimes exists, the question becomes how to make it work to 
promote best availability of  knowledge that is relevant for safety assessments, and to 
exercise a control that we have defined as legitimating for the relevant regulatory process. 
As noted above, for a period of  time in the US the FDA’s expert balancing of  
product risks and benefits was interpreted as leaving no room for disagreement within the 
tort system (indeed, this is still the case for generic products) on the basis that there could 
be no justification for tort claims to ‘second-guess’ the FDA’s judgements, and such 
second-guessing would be likely to produce undesirable results when rejecting experts’ 
assessments.570 However, it has also been pointed out that the FDA cannot foresee and 
address all product safety issues ahead of  time, and that the agency may not have the 
ability to respond quickly enough to issues when they first arise after a product enters the 
market.571 Courts, in the process of  considering the effects of  agency determinations, have 
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 The specificities of each category of toxic products is such that a certain degree of separation from 
other fields is inevitable. However, for a comprehensive account of the legal and moral aspects of 
the debate around regulation and litigation in the field of tobacco, see the essential Howells G., The 
Tobacco Challenge, Ashgate, 2011.  
569 Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role 
of Litigation”, p. 609. 
570 See Davis M.J., “The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA”, Boston 
College Law Review, 48, 2008, pp. 1089-1094; Davis M.J., “Discovering the boundaries: Federal 
Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling Products Liability Actions”, University of Kentucky Law 
Journal, 2005. This was to some extent already suggested by Posner R., Economic Analysis of Law. 
5th ed., New York, Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1998. 
571 In addition to the discussion laid down in chapter V, several authors have stressed the shortcomings of 
FDA regulation: see among others Davis M.J., “The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products 
Liability and the FDA”, Davis M.J., “Discovering the boundaries: Federal Preemption of 
 146 
 
constantly balanced these competing considerations. The 2006 departure from the 
traditional approach, with the FDA autonomously establishing that certain types of  its 
determinations should preclude litigation altogether, presented major issues. As correctly 
identified by the US Supreme Court in Wyeth, a total detachment of  the regulatory system 
from any form of  external influence and oversight is undesirable. The impact of  the 
PLIVA decision in preempting tort claims related to generics will have to be measured in 
time. 
 It has been accurately argued that permitting FDA approval to preclude the 
possibility of  tort liability does more than ensure that product safety decisions are reserved 
to the FDA, because preemption of  tort litigation removes the opportunity for litigation 
to proactively complement the FDA’s activity of  monitoring product safety.572 Moreover, 
taking into account the classic compensatory function of  tort law, preemption de facto 
denies compensation to persons harmed by a product by the mere fact of  that product 
having been approved by the agency, even if  they were harmed after a safety problem first 
emerged but before the FDA took regulatory action to remove the product from the 
market or require additional warnings573 (Vioxx and Avandia provide two easy examples).  
 The pharmaceutical regulatory system is complex and vulnerable as described in 
the previous chapters.  Christopher Hodges asserts that “it is undoubtedly true that the 
system is complex and provides a number of  competing interests which a properly 
regulated society must seek to balance”.574 To describe the scenario, the term 
“multi-regulation”575 has been used by scholars. The very considerable sums of  money 
                                                                                                                                    
Prescription Drug Labeling Products Liability Actions”, and Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort 
System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”; and contra see 
Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability Exemption in Presence of 
the FDA”, and Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., “Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?”. 
572 Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role 
of Litigation”, p. 615 ff.; a conclusion upheld by the US Supreme Court in Wyeth. 
573 This is the case more often than one might think due to the weaknesses of the FDA’s post-marketing 
surveillance system. The issue is raised by, among others, IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug 
Safety”, in The Future of Drug Safety – Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public; 
Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability Exemption in Presence of 
the FDA”; Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., “Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?”; and 
Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the 
Role of Litigation”, who accurately describes the differences in the budgets dedicated to the post- as 
opposed to the pre- marketing surveillance procedures, the post-marketing being underfunded and 
less than perfectly organised. 
574 Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 47. 
575 Ibidem, quoting Hancer L., “Pharmaceutical Policy and Regulation: Setting the Pace in the European 
Community”, in Davis P., Contested Ground: Public Purpose and Private Interest in the Regulation 
 147 
 
involved in the success or failure of  pharmaceutical products576 can be distracting. It is 
correspondingly important in this sector that there should be “continuous confidence in 
the appropriateness and strength of  the design and operation of  the system, and rigorous 
compliance with its regulatory standards, through periodic review of  its operation and 
transparency”.577 While in chapter V the Vioxx and Avandia cases were presented as 
neutrally as possible, they invite consideration of  possible claims of  misconduct, 
suggesting potential systemic bias, secrecy, and the potential for fraudulent production of  
safety data, especially in toxicology or clinical research.578 The Vioxx case alone, in which 
Merck failed to disclose relevant safety data relating to known potential risks of  
cardiovascular ADRs, demonstrates that such concerns are not groundless.579  In this 
sense, the decision of  the Supreme Court in Wyeth is to be welcomed and supported as a 
positive reaction to a misplaced attempt to isolate an imperfect regulatory system from 
necessary balancing mechanisms. 
  
6. The European form of  pharmaceutical product liability preemption 
 The European scenario suggests different reflections. Regulatory 
compliance is not considered proof  of  safety. The only defence explicitly mentioning 
                                                                                                                                    
of Prescription Drugs, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
576 Boston Consulting Group, A Revolution in R&D: How Genomics and Genetics are Transforming the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry, Boston, 2003; DiMasi J., Hanson R.W., Grabowski G., “The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs”, Journal of Health Economy, 22, 2003, 
pp.  51-185; Rawlins M.D., “Cutting the Costs of Drug Development?”, Nature, 3, April 2004, 
p. 360; see a more recent account by Herper M., “How Much does Pharmaceutical Innovation Cost? 
A Look at 100 Companies”, Forbes, 2013. 
577 See the discussion in chapters I and II; Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 
p. 48; and Medawar C., Hardon A., Medicines Out of Control? Antidepressants and the Conspiracy 
of Goodwill, Amsterdam 2004, and its review Collier J., “Regulating Regulators”, the Lancet, 363, 
June 2004. In this light, for the American scenario, see Avorn J., MD, Powerful Medicines - The 
Benefits Risks and Costs of Prescription Drugs, Vintage Books, 2005. For a converse view that 
medicine safety is well regulated, see Silcock J., Pritchard C., To Heal and to Harm: An Economic 
View of Drug Safety, London, Routledge, 2003; Kanavos P., Ross-Degnan D., “Measuring, 
Monitoring and Evaluating Policy Outcomes in the Pharmaceutical Sector”, in Mossialos E. et al., 
Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Striving for Efficiency, Equity and Quality, Open University 
Press, 2004. 
578 For discussion of whether unfavourable studies may not be published or reported quickly enough, see 
Hylton K, “Preemption and Product Liability, a Positive Theory”, Boston University School of Law, 
WPS n.03-17, 2005; from a more ‘journalistic’ perspective, see “SSRIs: Suicide Risk and 
Withdrawal”, 361 the Lancet, June 2003; Laurance J., “Sexorat Ban Raises Doubts over Drug 
Licensing System”, The Independent, 11 June 2003. Progress is expected in the EU thanks to the 
new regulatory framework. 
579 See chapter V and in particular the discussion of delays in risk communication. 
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regulatory requirements is the one provided by article 7(d) of  the Product Liability 
Directive580 – on the basis of  which a producer will be shielded from liability where “the 
defect is due to compliance of  the product with mandatory regulations issued by public 
authorities”. Short of  that, compliance with regulatory requirements is not an automatic 
defence for manufacturers.  
The problems lie elsewhere. The EU has traditionally maintained a different 
approach to redress in case of  damages (and generally to correction of  regulatory failures), 
relying heavily on compensation and indemnification schemes based on insurance and 
social security systems rather than on tort litigation.581 Arguably, this has created a sort of  
de facto preemption of  product liability litigation. The aggregate statistics on product 
liability litigation in the EEA over a time span of  twenty years, collected by the 
Commission in a series of  quinquennial reports from 1995 to 2011,582 confirm that 
European product liability has faced structural obstacles in attaining a primary role in 
victims’ compensation. It is beyond the scope of  this chapter to analyse in depth the range 
of  reasons leading to this observation, but it is possible to identify some essential factors. 
In 2003 Mathias Reimann identified five explanations583 for why product liability litigation 
is a major feature of  the American legal system while it lags behind in Europe (and in the 
rest of  the world in his analysis). These explanations have to do with institutions (US 
courts being traditionally more activist than the European ones – relying on specific 
features ranging from the role of  juries to exponentially higher damage awards),584 
procedures (the much higher availability of  aggregate litigation in the US makes it 
dramatically easier for plaintiffs to prove the existence of  both defect and causation, not to 
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 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ 1985 L 210. 
581 As thoroughly explained, in an analysis that remains substantially valid over ten years later, in 
Reimann M., “Liability for defective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century: 
emergence of a worldwide standard?”, 51 American Journal of Comparative Law, 2003) 751. See 
brief discussion in the text. 
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 Commission Report, First report on the application of Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for 
defective products COM(1995) 617 final; Commission Report, Second report on the application of 
Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products COM(2000) 893 final; 
Commission Report, Third report on the application of Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability 
for defective products COM(2006) 496 final; Commission Report, Fourth report on the application 
of Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products COM(2011) 547 final. The 
reports show the low impact of product liability litigation in the EEA, with a tendency to increase 
over the years as discussed infra. 
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 Reimann M., “Liability for defective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century”. 
584
 Ibidem, pp. 807 and 812-816. 
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mention the availability of  stronger discovery rules),585 the legal profession (European 
lawyers have a much lesser tendency to specialise than their US colleagues),586 the role of  
insurance (first party insurance is still the European prime method of  victims’ 
compensation, through public or semi-public or private insurance, and/or no-fault 
compensation schemes),587 and the broader social environment (the level of  publicity that 
product liability law receives in the EU, from media attention to the political debate, is 
simply incomparable to the US scenario).588 A common assumption underlying this 
divergence between the two sides of  the Atlantic is that the EU is politically committed to 
achieving product safety through public (or publicly administered) regulatory requirements 
whereas the US relies more substantially on private litigation.589  
However, a closer look at the recalled Commission Reports on the application of  
the Product Liability Directive in the EEA shows a progressive increase in the volume of  
litigation and out of  court settlements.590 The reasons identified are an increase in 
“consumer awareness, better organisation of  consumer groups or improved means of  
accessing information”.591 While these explanations certainly play a significant role, we 
submit that there is more to the picture. Recent cases have called into question the 
reliability of  the well-established European regulatory architecture for pharmaceuticals.592 
Aggressive litigation in France on the widely dispersed medicine Mediator593 has led to a 
withdrawal of  the product from the market, signifying the existence of  renewed scope for 
a complementary approach.  
This observation is corroborated at a more general level by Daniel Kelemen who 
has recently argued that the European Union is progressively shifting towards a model of  
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 Ibidem, pp. 816-822. 
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 Ibidem, pp. 822-832. See also the series of Commission Reports referred to supra. 
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 Reimann M., “Liability for defective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century”, 
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 Ibidem, p. 810; see also Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety; Howells G., 
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Law Journal, 2000. 
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European Union, A report for the European Commission (2003) MARKT/2001/11/D, p. 39, 
discussing the progressive increase in out of court settlements. 
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 See the brief description supra in section 2 of this chapter. 
593 See the latest judgment in a prolonged saga – Tribunal Administratif de Paris, n. 1312345/6 (2014). 
Civil litigation involving the producer Laboratoire Servier is still pending. 
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‘adversarial legalism’ (or Eurolegalism). This developing model departs from the traditional 
heavy and quasi-exclusive reliance on regulators and technical bureaucracies in favour of  
judicial litigious mechanisms – a European version of  regulation through litigation.594 This 
convergence of  US and EU towards a judicialisation of  regulatory matters requires a 
discussion of  both the EU liability rules (and subsequently of  their accessibility which will 
form the object of  chapter VIII).  
 
7.  Uncovering the EU pharmaceutical product liability fragmentation 
Aside from the difficulties in establishing a consolidated litigation practice, the EU 
scenario poses two fundamental questions concerning (1) the harmonisation of  liability 
rules, and (2) the links between the systems of  regulation and liability. The two problems 
are to some extent related. 
(1) As regards tort law, harmonisation of  pharmaceutical product liability in 
Europe remains unachieved, for two substantial reasons. The first and most obvious one is 
the presence of  special regimes specifically put in place in this field by some Member 
States, especially Germany and Spain as recalled above. The second reason is that the 
implementing process of  the EC Directive 374/1985 on Product Liability has been long 
and complex, and the outcomes are still not entirely clear, due to the reluctance of  the 
Member States to retreat from their judicial and doctrinal interpretations of  the subject in 
favour of  a centralised model that is, at least in some cases (like France or Italy), less 
favourable for the consumer. With its rulings of  year 2002
595
 (a position maintained in 
2014) the Court of  Justice has clarified that the model provided by the Directive, despite 
the literal wording of  article 13,
596
 has to be considered the only general system of  
product liability in the EU, and that parallel regimes can survive only if  they provide 
liability systems of  a different type, or special liability systems relating to specific types of  
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 Kelemen R.D., Eurolegalism, Harvard University Press, 2011; and Kelemen R.D., “Eurolegalism and 
Democracy”, Journal of Common Market Studies 50, 2012; see also the analysis by Strong S.I., 
“Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue?”, 
Notre Dame Law Review 88, 2012. 
595 Case C-52/00 Commission v. France [2002] ECR I-3827 and Case C-183/00 Gonzàlez Sànchez v. 
Medicina Asturiana SA [2002] ECR I-3901. 
596 Directive 374/85/EC, article 13: “The Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person 
may have according to the rules of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability 
system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.” 
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products. That means, as a consequence, that the ruling of  the ECJ in the case of  
Commission v. United Kingdom,
597
 on the proper meaning of  the development risk defence, 
has to be considered the definitive interpretation of  the defence across Europe in the 
application of  the Directive. So in the Member States in which pharmaceutical cases are 
subject to the Directive’s regime, a producer will be held to the Directive’s standard, 
whereas in Member States having a special regime, the producer will be held to a different 
standard.  There is more. In Member States applying general tort law provisions to specific 
products (such as pharmaceuticals), the standard the producer will have to reach will 
change again. In Germany, plaintiffs are able to obtain full compensation under the 
Arzneimittelgesetz by proving that they suffered damages from the contested pharmaceutical 
product.
598
 The producer is responsible on a strict liability basis with supplementary duties 
to provide information.
599
 Elsewhere, in England, a producer will be able to defend 
himself  if  he proves that the damage came from a development risk, as interpreted by the 
Court of  Justice, meaning that knowledge of  the risk (if  it existed at the moment the 
product entered the market) was not reasonably and objectively accessible and obtainable 
for the producer.
600
 Finally, in Italy, if  we assume the applicability of  article 2050 cc
601
 to 
this type of  claim,
602
 for the producer to avoid liability the burden of  proof  is harsher 
than under the Directive’s regime, since the defendant has to show he took “all appropriate 
measures to avoid the damage”, in the way such a provision is interpreted by the courts.
603
 
                                              
597
 Case C-300/95 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland ECR 1997, I-02649. 
598 Arzneimittelgesttz § 84. How ‘simple’ that is in practice is an entirely different issue, which goes to 
the core of the dynamics of the tort system, involving its accessibility. The issue will be explored 
below through case studies. 
599
 This will be discussed in greater detail in chapters VII and VIII. 
600 This interpretation suggests a substantial analogy with the negligence regime that is provided by s. 
6(c) of the Restatement (Third) on Torts. 
601 Article 2050 of the Italian civil code provides: “Chiunque cagiona danno ad altri nello svolgimento di 
un’attività pericolosa, per sua natura o per la natura dei mezzi adoperati, è tenuto al risarcimento, se 
non prova di avere adottato tutte le misure idonee a evitare il danno”. 
602 Which can be the case if we consider that general tort law rules can be applied as special liability rules 
for specific types of products (as pharmaceuticals are). See case Cass civ., 29 April 2005, n. 8981: 
“Posto che la disciplina della responsabilità da prodotti difettosi si affianca e non si sostituisce alla 
disciplina codicistica sulla responsabilità per danno [...] il produttore risponde dei danni cagionati 
dal vizio di progettazione del suo prodotto qualora siano provati la sua colpa nella causazione 
dell’evento, ed il nesso causale tra il vizio della cosa ed il pregiudizio.” 
603 The producer has to show positively that he took all possible measures and techniques to avoid the 
damage, even the most advanced and abstractly possible ones, no matter the costs or the feasibility; 
for a discussion see Recano P., La responsabilità civile da attività pericolose, CEDAM, 2001, 
pp. 200-210. 
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 (2) The second question goes with the first. How are the regulatory and litigation 
systems linked? There are two interesting provisions in the EC Directive 2001/83 on 
pharmaceutical safety.  The first is in article 25: “Authorisation shall not affect the civil and 
criminal liability of  the manufacturer and, where applicable, of  the marketing authorisation 
holder.” The second is in article 61.4: “The fact that the competent authority does not 
refuse a marketing authorisation pursuant to paragraph 2 or a change to the labelling or 
the package leaflet pursuant to paragraph 3 does not alter the general legal liability of  the 
manufacturer or as appropriate the marketing authorisation holder.” 
 What is “the general legal liability of  the manufacturer”? To which regime of  civil 
liability does Directive 2001/83 refer itself ? Aims of  systemic coherence would suggest 
that it refers to the Product Liability Directive, which was intended to cover “all 
movables”, therefore including pharmaceuticals – with the exception of  countries such as 
Germany with specific exceptional liability regimes. That is the case for example in the 
UK. But here arises a problem of  linkage between the two regimes. The Product Liability 
Directive, given the defence provided by article 7(e), limits its effects to the moment the 
product enters the market. The relevant knowledge to be considered to assess a producer’s 
liability is the knowledge available at that moment. The ECJ made this point clear in its 
ruling against France604 (the implementing legislation of  which rendered the development 
risk defence available only to the producer that could prove ten years’ monitoring after the 
product entered the market).605 The problem is the quality of  that knowledge, which arises 
from a procedure that appears to be structurally fragmented, with uncertain results. It has 
been pointed out that such an outcome is paradoxical.606 Liability rules, which are 
supposed to play a role ex post in risk management, are bound to the ex ante state of  
knowledge, whereas regulation (with the pharmacovigilance system) is taking care of  the 
ex post (through the pharmacovigilance and the post-marketing surveillance powers of  
regulatory agencies), notwithstanding that regulation is typically meant to prevent adverse 
events (and therefore to play its role mainly ex ante).607 In other words, for pharmaceutical 
products, the Product Liability Directive does not seem to work. And in the light of  
enhancing consumer safety, such fragmentation works to the detriment of  both access to 
                                              
604 Case C-52/00 Commission v. France. 
605 This legislation was overruled explicitly because the two fields were meant to be kept separated. 
606 Cafaggi F., The institutional framework of European Private Law, p. 191 ff. 
607 Ibidem. 
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justice and the level of  protection in practice (if  damages occur outside the boundaries of  
the Directive and the consumer has to sue in negligence, he will have to prove the fault of  
the defendant, which is, as has been exhaustively discussed by lawyers and scholars, 
extremely difficult).608 Basically, in countries where pharmaceuticals undergo the discipline 
of  the Product Liability Directive, the link between regulation and liability provides a 
shape-shifting liability regime, depending on the timing of  the damage and of  the related 
imperfect knowledge. 
 Interesting scenarios are those of  countries that apply general tort law provisions 
as special product liability regimes for pharmaceutical products.  In Italy, the application of  
article 2050 cc as interpreted by the courts fits quite well with the idea of  complementing 
the regulatory system’s decisions, as it ensures the possibility of  cross-fertilisation between 
the two systems, the latter being likely to be enriched by the outcomes of  litigation.609  
First, in any case of  damage caused by pharmaceuticals, the Italian judicial model of  
pharmaceutical product liability ensures the applicability of  the same regime regardless of  
the timing of  the damage and of  the related knowledge (contrary to those countries where 
pharmaceuticals are subject to the Directive’s regime). Secondly, there is no development 
risk defence (which implies a ‘negative proof ’ that the state of  knowledge was not such as 
to enable the existence of  the defect to be discovered, with all the uncertainties related to 
‘state of  knowledge’ brought in by such a defence), but rather a positive burden of  proof  
upon the producer to prove that he took ‘all appropriate measures’, as noted above.610 
  
 
                                              
608 A few words to recall the origins of product liability in the US and the EU: in both scenarios, the first 
concern was to shift the burden of proof from the claimant to the defendant, in order to balance the 
asymmetric distribution of information and economic means. For an overview see among others 
Ponzanelli G., La responsabilità civile - Profili di diritto comparato, Il Mulino, 1992. 
609 See among others Green M.D., “Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest 
Case”, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 30, p. 482 (“Sometimes it is the tort system 
that uncovers instances of non-compliance with FDA regulatory standards, rather than the FDA 
itself.”); and in general Viscusi K. (ed.), Regulation through Litigation, AEI Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, 2002, and Kelemen R.D., Eurolegalism. 
610 See the discussion supra, and the Italian cases Cass civ., 29 April 2005, n. 8981; Tribunal of Venice, 
14 February 2005; Tribunal of Rome, 20 April 2002, Diritto e Giustizia, 2002; Cass civ. 27 July 
1991 n. 8395, Rep. Foro It., 1992; Cass civ. 15 July 1987 n. 6241, Foro It, 1988. 
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8.  A renewed role for old rules? 
 What can we make of  this analysis for the purposes of  this study? This question 
will be developed in the following three chapters through a discussion of  significant case 
law, and finally turned into a normative claim in the final chapter.  It is however necessary 
to embed the analysis of  product liability rules in the larger discourse of  this thesis.  
 Unsurprisingly, product liability rules tend to be very narrow in the identification 
of  the legal matter to be litigated and solved. The overview suggests that the two classic 
roles are in play, compensation and deterrence, with a higher emphasis on one or the 
other, depending on the national system at stake. The attempt here is to move forward and 
push the boundaries of  the liability laws towards a new role, which we have defined as a 
‘pedagogical’ one. Such a move requires courts to overcome their natural deference to 
formal regulatory compliance, questioning not only the presence of  a defect in a litigated 
product, but, more to the point, the origins of  such a defect, beyond the boundaries of  
mere negligence or strict liability. 
 There is in other words room to call for a move in courts’ attitude to surpass the 
walls of  party-party litigation, entering the broader (but essential) space of  regulatory 
compliance in its substantial dimension: does the permeation of  exogenous elements into 
domestic frameworks described in chapter III compromise the quality of  the regulatory 
assessment and its compliance with said domestic requirements? And does the safety 
delivery provided by the regulatory system as described in chapter V provide a legitimate 
basis for deference? The questions may seem far-fetched, but the overview of  liability 
rules we have just provided seems to open the door to a margin of  manoeuvre for judges 
to side-step the impasse and reframe the issue: why, given the requirements laid down by 
law, does a product formally compliant with said requirements harm consumers? Mere 
scientific uncertainty, fault, or flaws in a regulatory framework allowing second-best 
assessments? This would be the idea of  a ‘hard look doctrine’ applied to the 
pharmaceutical regulation of  safety, an idea that we will develop in the final chapter after 
questioning to what extent it is feasible and realistic to rely on courts for improving data 
quality, legitimacy, and safety delivery. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
RELYING ON COURTS 1 
IMPROVING SCIENTIFIC DATA QUALITY AND AVAILABILITY? 
 
 
 What now requires analysis is the judiciary’s contribution to the availability and 
quality of  scientific data, the levels of  participation understood in terms of  access to 
justice, and the delivery of  safety. 
 This chapter tackles the first aspect. Evidence suggests that through judicial 
intervention, scientific evidence that gets lost or withheld in the regulatory process can be 
uncovered and integrated in specific risk assessments, or made generally available for more 
diverse purposes. As the first section will discuss, through focused interventions courts can 
impact access to information beyond the boundaries of  a single case – and arguably all the 
way to legislative reform.  While the oversight thus provided is occasional and necessitates 
a more diffuse and continuous supplement, the outcome, as shall be discussed, is 
potentially far reaching. The second section engages with the fundamental issue of  partial 
data. There appears to be a significant level of  awareness within the judiciary regarding the 
flaws of  the regulatory framework counterbalanced by a generally deferential approach to 
regulatory findings which typically restrains courts from questioning the origin of  
emerging safety issues – the regulatory architecture itself  – confining the enquiry 
exclusively to specific conduct instead.  
 
1.  Breaking the circle: data availability through court intervention 
 The first step in discussing courts’ ability to improve accessibility of  data, and 
consequently the quality of  regulatory assessments, requires an analysis of  court cases 
directly impacting the disclosure of  new scientific evidence. In this sense, the analysis can 
move forward from the observation suggested in chapter V during the discussion of  the 
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Avandia case. As recalled, the turning point of  the prolonged saga of  Rosiglitazone occurred 
in 2007 with a research initiative conducted by a group of  scientists who published in the 
NEJM a meta-analysis on cardiovascular ADRs related to the successful anti-diabetes 
medicine.611 What is interesting for the purposes of  this chapter is the enabling factor that 
allowed the NEJM scientists to access essential unpublished trials data. Upon the initial 
refusal of  GSK to release relevant data (a surprising move, one might think, in light of  
what follows), scientists discovered that a 2004 settlement had imposed full disclosure on 
the company as of  December 2000.612 The settlement was a result of  the case People of  the 
State of  New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, initiated by the State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, 
in the Supreme Court of  New York.613 The case involved an antidepressant of  the widely 
popular SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor) class, Paroxetine (commercially 
branded as Paxil by GSK)614. The AG’s case was built on a series of  previous lawsuits615 
launched across the US seeking compensation for severe ADRs related to the use of  Paxil 
– including an alleged significant increase in suicidal and homicidal tendencies, especially in 
child and adolescent populations.616 A particularly contentious element of  the case was, in 
Spitzer’s submission,617 the fact that prescription to juvenile populations was an ‘off-label’ 
use – that is, a use different than what is prescribed by the authorised label, typically under 
the direction of  a physician. While legal per se,618 the problematic aspect in the case at hand 
                                              
611
 The meta-analysis showed an increase in the risk of cardiovascular ADRs of up to 40% associated 
with the use of Avandia: Nissen S.E., Wolski K., “Effect of Rosiglitazone on the Risk of Myocardial 
Infarction and Death from Cardiovascular Causes”, New England Journal of Medicine 356, 2007. 
612
 See the account of the principal investigator of the NEJM study, Nissen S.E., “The Rise and Fall of 
Rosiglitazone”, European Heart Journal 31, 2010, p. 774: “The manufacturer of rosiglitazone 
declined [access to trials data]. Then serendipity intervened. In 2004 the state of New York had sued 
GSK alleging that the company had failed to publish the results of unfavourable studies […]”. 
613
 People of the State of New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, filed on June 2, 2004 – case file available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/glaxo/nyagglaxo60204cmp.pdf. 
614
 See FDA Approval Letter for NDA 20-031/026, retrievable from Paxil ‘Drug Approval Package’, 
available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2001/20-031S026_Paxil.cfm. 
615
 For example, a class action was filed in August 2001 in Los Angeles focused on the withdrawal 
symptoms; in September 2001 a case was filed in Philadelphia and another in Wyoming alleging 
violent outbursts related to Paxil use – see the discussion infra. 
616
 In particular, the Wyoming case highlighted that the risk of increased violence and/or suicidal 
tendencies related to Paxil was known and inadequately warned for as a theoretical possibility 
(especially in juvenile populations) at the time of marketing approval: see Estates of Tobin Ex Rel. 
Tobin v. SmithKline, 164 F.Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Wyo. 2001). 
617
 People of the State of New York v. GSK, case file, p. 2. 
618
 An off-label prescription entails the use of the medicine for a non-approved therapeutic indication, 
age range population, dosage or method of administration. Physicians are legally allowed to 
prescribe off-label within strict ethical guidelines, all of which require full disclosure of relevant 
information. See the US FDAMA (discussed in chapter II). In Europe off-label prescription 
regulation is left to Member States, which in general endorse the possibility of relying on 
physicians’ expertise (Italian and French regulatory authorities are particularly active in the 
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was the strong commercial campaign that had been launched by GSK to promote said 
off-label use of  Paxil to both the public and physicians.619 
 A short parenthesis is required at this point. One of  the elements which 
recurrently emerged in the analysis offered in chapter V was the presence and availability 
on the market of  treatments similar or alternative to the problematic new products (this 
was observed both for Vioxx and for Avandia).620 In a class-specific version of  the same 
problem, in the case of  SSRI antidepressants, the first medicine of  the class to hit the 
market was Fluoxetine (marketed by Eli Lilly as Prozac).621 Following the swift success of  
this new type of  depression treatment, a series of  ‘me too drugs’ hit the market in rapid 
succession (such as Pfizer’s Zoloft and Paxil itself).  A me too drug is a medicine 
structurally very similar to a product already on the market, with only minor variations in 
the chemical composition, typically targeting the same patient population.622 Of  the 
various SSRIs marketed at the time, only Zoloft was initially approved for prescription to 
minors.623 However, the need to aggressively market a product minimally diverging from 
the ‘original’ triggered a massive direct-to-consumer advertising campaign by competitors 
such as GSK, coupled with an equally thorough promotion directed at physicians.624 The 
drive to cover the largest potential target population formed the basis for lobbying for off-
label juvenile use. 
 As a result of  the increasing number of  product liability lawsuits contesting 
Paroxetine’s psychiatric ADRs, the submission of  AG Spitzer contained allegations of  
                                                                                                                                   
promotion of off-label use, especially when it constitutes a valid and more affordable alternative 
treatment). 
619
 People of the State of New York v. GSK, case file, p. 9: “GSK has repeatedly misrepresented the safety 
and efficacy outcomes from its studies of paroxetine as a treatment for MDD in pediatric population 
to its employees who promote paroxetine to physicians […] GSK Paxil Product Management stated 
‘Paxil demonstrates REMARKABLE Efficacy and Safety in the treatment of adolescent 
depression’”. 
620
 As discussed in chapter V, the necessity of approving both Vioxx and Avandia in the first place was 
undermined by the presence of comparatively safe and already marketed therapeutic alternatives. 
621
 See FDA Letter of Approval for NDA 18-936/S-064, retrievable from Prozac ‘Drug Approval 
Package’, available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2003/18936S064_Prozac.cfm.   
622
 On the impact of me-too drugs on the pharmaceutical market see the interesting study conducted by 
Forbes highlighting the tension between the negative impact on innovation and R&D for truly 
innovative treatments and the positive impact on competition and product prices: LaMattina J., 
“Impact of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs on Health Care Costs”, Forbes, January 2015. 
623
 See initial approved FDA labelling, retrievable from Zoloft ‘Drug Approval Package’, available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/99/19-839S026_Zoloft.cfm. 
624
 As reported again in People of the State of New York v. GSK case file, pp. 9-10. 
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“repeated and consistent fraud” by GSK in concealing relevant data on Paxil’s potential 
ADRs related to suicidal trends in juvenile populations (as well as allegations of  essential 
lack of  effectiveness in those populations).625 Significantly, the submission referred 
specifically to failure to publish clinical trials outcomes which showed inconsistent results 
regarding the safety and efficacy of  the treatment in juvenile populations.626 That allegation 
revolved around the fact that ‘off-label’ prescriptions require physicians to be in 
possession of  all relevant information, short of  which a producer would be misleading the 
practitioner and defrauding the final consumers.627 Spitzer’s lawsuit was therefore very 
much centred on the availability and accessibility of  data relevant to safety assessment 
which GSK had failed to disclose to the FDA (and more obviously, in its advertising 
campaign to patients and physicians) while formally complying with NDA application 
requirements.628 The interesting feature of  this case for the purposes of  our study is that 
the AG’s submission did not venture into the merits of  the Paxil-related ADRs, but 
focused rather on the inaccessibility of  information aimed at guaranteeing the highest 
levels of  relevant knowledge for the safety assessment of  the drug (in this case by 
physicians rather than by the approving agency). 
The impact of  Spitzer’s lawsuit was remarkable. In August 2004 GSK agreed to 
settle the case, paying a sum of  $2.5 million and, more importantly, opening up its clinical 
trials register on an open access website.629 The terms of  the settlement required GSK to 
publicise all trials related to safety and efficacy of  Paroxetine in juvenile populations, but 
more generally to establish a company register providing summaries of  all clinical research 
undertaken as of  December 2000 for a period of  10 years630 – a requirement which 
facilitated important and measurable subsequent improvements in safety assessments of  
other products, as in the case of  Avandia. This settlement also triggered a positive domino 
effect, with the prominent association Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of  
                                              
625
 Ibidem, pp. 6-7.  
626
 It is noteworthy that the results of an investigation conducted by the UK MHRA revealed the 
existence of nine clinical trials conducted by GSK between 1994 and 2002, two of which showed no 
statistically significant benefit at all: Garland J.E., “Managing Adolescent Depression in the New 
Reality”, British Columbia Medical Journal 46, 2004. 
627
 See People of the State of New York v. GSK case file, pp. 6-16 and reported studies. 
628
 See Approval Letter for NDA 20-031/026, retrievable from Paxil ‘Drug Approval Package’, available 
at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2001/20-031S026_Paxil.cfm, and see contra 
the People of the State of New York v. GSK case file. 
629
 The trials data were made accessible in the GlaxoSmithKline Clinical Study Register at 
http://www.gsk-clinicalstudyregister.com/. 
630
 See the terms of the settlement in People v. GlaxoSmithKline Plc, WL 1932763, S.D.N.Y. 2004. 
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America (PhRMA – which, as discussed in chapter IV, is a voting member of  ICH) 
promoting the adoption of  similar registers among all major American manufacturers.631 
The dynamic of  this case is of  interest, with a line of  product liability cases triggering a 
state lawsuit specifically focused on data availability, which managed to exert a significant 
impact on the dispute at hand but had much further reaching and more fundamental 
consequences. However, while the results of  the GSK settlement are significant, their 
limits are just as evident. There are two clearly problematic aspects. On the one hand the 
time limitation built into the settlement (with full accessibility of  company-sponsored trials 
granted for a period of  10 years, in other words the average duration of  a single 
pre-approval process)632 allows for only a restricted number of  products to be investigated 
in full – as seen in chapter III, even in the case of  Rosiglitazone access to pivotal trials 
submitted for marketing authorisation has not been possible, which perpetuates the 
uncertainty over the quality of  data available for approval.633 On the other hand, a 
company-specific measure has inherently limited scope. While PhRMA did promote 
clinical trials registers within all major manufacturers, these have tended to be selective and 
incomplete as the trials reported are typically limited to voluntary post-marketing studies.634  
A different account of  court-imposed access to trials data emerges from a line of  
cases involving a series of  decisions taken by the EMA. These decisions were specifically 
directed at requiring the release of  clinical trials results from the pharmaceutical 
companies AbbVie and InterMune, each relative to one marketed product. It should be 
preliminarily observed that all three cases are of  a particular nature. Unlike AG Spitzer’s 
initiative in New York, they do not follow a strain of  product liability litigation, but were 
rather triggered by a request for access to information filed by direct competitors of  the 
marketing authorisation holders with the EMA. With two decisions adopted between late 
2012 and early 2013,635 the agency took an executive decision to grant third parties (in this 
case the competitors) access to both non-clinical and clinical summaries of  studies related 
                                              
631
 See the initiative launched in October 2004 by PhRMA, the PhRMA Clinical Study Results Database, 
at http://www.clinicalstudyresults.org/, including data from Pfizer, Merck, Eli Lilly, GSK, and 
others. 
632
 See the references in chapters II and III on timelines of product development and marketing. 
633
 As noted in chapter III, GSK responded to a direct request from the author for access to information 
in that case with a reference to the approved FDA label.  
634
 On a discussion of voluntary post-trials see chapter V. 
635
 See the final EMA decisions, Doc Ref EMA/748792/2012 of 14 January 2013, and Doc Ref 
EMA/24685/2013 of 15 January 2013. 
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to two pharmaceutical products that had been approved for marketing in 2007 and 2011.636 
The legal grounds for EMA’s decision to require data disclosure were to be found in the 
combined reading of  articles 2 and 4(4) of  Regulation 1049/2001637 on public access to 
documents.  In the agency’s opinion, the specific information requested fell within the 
category of  documents which clearly need to be disclosed. 
The marketing authorisation holders refused to deliver the relevant information, 
rebutting the EMA’s position with the argument that clinical summaries should be covered 
by the exception laid down in article 4(2) of  Regulation 1049/2001 – on the basis of  
which access to documents can be denied when the relevant information is of  a 
confidential nature and no overriding public interest justifies disclosure (the exemption 
known as Confidential Business Information (CBI)).638 Rejecting this argument, the EMA 
proceeded to confirm access to the requested information on the basis that clinical studies 
should not be regarded as confidential information, and restating that as per article 4(4) “it 
is clear that the document shall […]be disclosed”.639 The marketing authorisation holders 
then filed an appeal to the General Court (GC) which, in early 2013, reversed both the 
EMA’s decisions.640 Supporting the view that the information requested by the interested 
third parties was indeed of  a confidential nature, the President of  the GC ordered the 
agency to refrain from disclosing the requested clinical studies reports.641 As suggested in 
chapter III, these decisions de facto sanctioned, on the one hand, a wide discretionary 
power of  industry in controlling the publication of  data, and on the other hand, a strong 
tendency to uphold commercial confidentiality or individual privacy over transparency and 
access to information.642 
                                              
636
 AbbVie’s Humira, see EMA EPAR Doc Ref EMA/178267/2015, and InterMune’s Esbriet, see EMA 
EPAR Doc Ref EMA/64972/2015. 
637
 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents OJ 2001 L 145/43. 
638
 Article 4.2 provides: “The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of: — commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including 
intellectual property […] unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure”. 
639
 Case C-398/13 EMA v. AbbVie Inc §22 and Case C-390/13 EMA v. InterMune Inc §15 (both orders of 
the Vice-President of the Court). 
640
 Case T-44/13 Order of the President of the General Court, 29 April 2013, AbbVie v. EMA, OJ C 189; 
Case T73/13 Order of the President of the General Court, 25 April 2013, InterMune v. EMA, OJ C 
189. 
641
 Ibidem. 
642
 See in particular the reasoning of the President of the GC as reported in the subsequent appeal Case 
C-390/13 EMA v. InterMune Inc, specifically at §§18-19 where the President rebuts EMA’s change 
of policy in data disclosure. 
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Unsatisfied with the GC’s decisions, the EMA filed three appeals at the CJEU, 
which, in two substantially identical cases, set aside the orders of  the President of  the 
GC.643 Interestingly, while acknowledging that the argument adopted by the marketing 
authorisation holders and accepted by the GC at first instance was erroneous, and that a 
consistent interpretation of  the legislation and the relevant case law644 could not lead to the 
conclusion that clinical studies fall within the category of  confidential information (a 
position at odds with the substantial inaccessibility of  pivotal trials reported in chapter 
III), the court was unable to reach a final judgment, thus referring back the case to the GC 
to reassess the matter. As a result of  this appeal, AbbVie promptly started a collaboration 
with the EMA which led to the end of  the lawsuit, as the parties agreed on a set of  
redacted information to be made available. The agreement appears to satisfy the agency’s 
requests on behalf  of  the interested third parties while protecting financially sensitive 
information, which remains with the marketing authorisation holder.645  
This line of  cases was discussed in chapters III and IV alongside the approval 
process for the new EU regulation on clinical trials,646 which places significant focus on 
clinical trials accessibility.647 It is hard to measure the concrete impact that the recalled 
access to trial information cases had in fostering that approval, but the timing is 
suggestive. The essential features of  this legislation have been described earlier, but the key 
critical elements can be recalled briefly. First, the wording of  the new requirements 
remains uncertain as regards the extent of  the CBI exemptions,648 and only a close 
monitoring of  actual enforcement practices will clarify if  and to what extent such 
                                              
643
 The recalled Case C-398/13 EMA v. AbbVie Inc  and Case C-390/13 EMA v. InterMune Inc . 
644
 The reasoning is based in particular on Order of the President in Case C-404/01 P(R) Commission v. 
Euroalliages and Others, ECR I-10367; Order of the President in Case C-445/00 R Austria v. 
Council [2001] ECR I-1461; Order of the President Case C-335/99 P(R) HFB and Others v. 
Commission ECR I-8705; and Case C-278/13 P(R) Commission v. Pilkington Group [2013] ECR 
I-00000. 
645
 REUTERS, “AbbVie drops legal action in EU drug secrecy case”, 3 April 2014. 
646
 Regulation (EU) 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical 
trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ L 158, 
27.05.2014, which was swiftly approved in April 2014, after two years’ discussion. 
647 Regulation (EU) 536/2014 arts. 80-82. See the discussion in chapters III and IV. 
648 Toussaint B., “EU Clinical Trials Regulation”, 381 the Lancet 9879, 2013, pp. 1719-1720; Gøtzche 
PC., “Deficiencies in Proposed New EU Regulation of Clinical Trials”, 345 British Medical Journal, 
e8522, 2012; Bonini S. et al., “Transparency and the European Medicines Agency – Sharing of 
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provisions are effective.649 The new legislation is also non-applicable to products marketed 
before its entry into force,650 which suggests that the real impact of  the new regulation will 
be perceivable for newly marketed drugs only in some 10 to 15 years from now. Finally, 
given the wording of  article 1, the regulation applies to all clinical trials conducted “in the 
Union”,651 implying that the issue of  publication of  trials conducted in third countries is 
yet to be legislatively addressed, except where special reporting duties are provided for.652 
 The conclusion of  this first section is necessarily interlocutory. While non-liability 
cases in both the US (although, as discussed, the Spitzer case was triggered by previous 
lawsuits so the link exists indirectly) and the EU show that courts can have a major impact 
and a proactive role in fostering access to data, the risk is that interventions of  this kind 
may remain sporadic as it is unclear what levels of  follow-up can be guaranteed. The US 
settlement allowed for only temporary full data disclosure by one specific company for a 
decade. Moreover, the absence of  directly affected parties (that is, damaged plaintiffs) in 
the proceedings reduces the desired diffuse bottom-up monitoring effect of  court-based 
intervention. The EU cases for instance have been (at least partially) settled through the 
intermediary role of  the EMA without direct involvement of  the interested information 
seekers. The case law did however accelerate the approval of  the new regulation, which is 
an important result, not to be understated despite the critiques raised above. In other 
words the examples raised in this section show how court cases can have a concrete 
positive impact on data accessibility (both directly and indirectly), with the caveat that a 
less episodic form of  post-marketing control relying on courts requires the involvement 
of  interested parties. 
The following section goes therefore back to pure product liability cases. The goal 
is to examine the attitude of  courts towards regulatory compliance, and their concept of  
knowledge availability, in order to determine whether a form of  diffuse and continuous 
oversight can be provided via private liability claims. 
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 See the discussion in chapter III. 
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2.  Enhancing assessment levels: beyond formal compliance 
 As suggested, the goal here is to show how the concept of  regulatory compliance 
as accepted by the judiciaries in both the US and the EU allows for thorough review of  
the specific cases with which courts are confronted. The idea is to do so by recounting 
critical decisions that have contributed to defining the contemporary concepts of  
compliance and knowledge accessibility. While the discussion will focus on specific cases 
that have contributed to build product liability consolidated concepts, the section should 
be read keeping in mind the endgame of  the thesis. Therefore, while focused on ‘classic’ 
issues of  product liability, the section is meant to constitute a substantial brick in paving 
the way to the argument that courts can operate as reviewers of  approval processes, and 
indirectly of  the standards involved. 
 As already discussed in chapter VI, regulatory compliance is not a defence per se. 
While in the US the doctrine of  preemption represented a vigorous attempt to introduce a 
de facto compliance defence, the reasoning in Wyeth v. Levine provides solid ground for 
rebuttal. The facts of  that case are of  interest to our study. The pharmaceutical product in 
question was Promethazine (commercially distributed by Wyeth as Phenergan).653 The 
medicine is an anti-nausea treatment that can be administered in several forms, particularly 
with two types of  injection. The first, known as “IV-push”, requires the drug to be 
injected without intermediary measures directly into the patient’s circulatory system, while 
the second typology of  injection is the “IV-drip” which injects the drug into a saline 
solution progressively ‘dripping’ through a catheter into the patient’s venous system.654 In 
the case at hand Ms Levine was injected with the “IV-push” method and as a result 
suffered a severe ADR leading to the amputation of  her arm.655 What caused the initial 
ADR leading to the dramatic conclusion was the fact that Phenergan is a highly corrosive 
medicinal, and direct exposure of  arterial blood during injection can cause gangrene.656 
The claim that Ms Levine raised in the subsequent lawsuit brought against Wyeth was that 
warnings of  potential dangers related to the “IV-push” method of  administration were 
                                              
653
 See FDA Letter of Approval for NDA #007935 in ‘Drug Approval Package’, available at 
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insufficient and understated in the drug labelling. Moreover (an essential point for us) she 
produced evidence suggesting that the intravenous injection of  Phenergan should not 
have been allowed in the first place as unreasonably dangerous. The evidence reported 
unreasonable risk factors for both injection methods.657 After losing the case both at first 
instance and in the Supreme Court of  Vermont,658 Wyeth took its challenge to the US 
Supreme Court. The appeal brought by the company revolved around the argument that a 
failure to warn claim at state level (as initiated and won by Ms Levine in Vermont) should 
be preempted by FDA’s approval of  the labelling.659  
The Supreme Court’s reasoning, briefly suggested in chapter VI, opens the door 
(or rather does not shut it) to a conception of  regulatory compliance as a minimum 
standard, explicitly acknowledging the centrality of  the role of  courts in cases of  this sort. 
Courts, the argument goes, have an essential role in promoting rather than ignoring the 
emergence of  relevant assessment knowledge. Wyeth’s appeal relied on the FDA’s 2006 
Preamble,660 alleging both the impossibility of  modifying the labelling without prior FDA 
approval, and more generally the fact that state tort law requirements to improve the 
product label by reinforcing warnings on injection risks would defeat the objectives laid 
down by federal regulation on product labelling.661 The Supreme Court rejected both 
arguments and it is worth reporting the rationale of  the decision. 
First, the impossibility by preemption appeal was dismissed on the ground that 
‘newly acquired information’ can and should be integrated in drug labelling without the 
necessity of  formal FDA approval. Additional information (in the form of  more extensive 
warnings, or information pertaining to the dosage or use of  a certain substance) should 
not be barred by the precondition of  a federal approval when oriented at increasing 
product safety and ameliorating the safety of  usage.662 The Court’s reasoning develops the 
idea that the accumulation of  information over time implies that it is the manufacturer 
that must be primarily responsible for the adequacy of  its labelling (not the regulator), and 
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that the ‘information available’ should encompass the widest possible spectrum, including 
evidence emerging in state courts. As a matter of  fact, Ms Levine had presented evidence 
of  significant risks related to the injection of  Phenergan, as well as evidence of  a series of  
previous clinical cases involving similar injuries deriving from the same form of  
treatment.663 The Court dismissed the argument that it was impossible to comply with 
both the FDA’s labelling approval regime and state tort law requiring amendments to the 
product’s label. To be receivable such an argument would have required proof  that “the 
FDA would not have approved a change to the label”664 based on the new information – 
an assumption rightly considered unreasonable by the Court. 
As for the second argument, relating to the danger of  state tort law defeating the 
purpose of  federal regulations, the Court explains that exclusive reliance on the FDA is 
not a sustainable way of  promoting drug safety.665 We have discussed in chapters III and V 
that regulatory agencies suffer from a lack of  financial resources necessary to accomplish 
the task of  regulatory oversight (both pre- and post-marketing). In Wyeth, the Supreme 
Court expands upon the issue by recognising that the scarcity of  resources available to the 
FDA is particularly affecting the post-marketing phase (in yet another implicit criticism of  
the PDUFA mechanism of  funding), in which the agency alone is unable to effectively 
monitor all potential emerging risks.666 In this context, state tort law has to function as a 
complement to regulatory requirements in allowing the discovery of  “unknown drug 
hazards” and in incentivising “manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly”.667 With an 
apt choice of  words, Richard Goldberg describes the role of  tort law as a “catalyst”668 for 
the emergence of  risk-related information.  
The decision in Wyeth goes far in the direction suggested by this thesis that courts 
should perform a role in improving data quality. In particular, the concept that compliance 
alone is not a viable patent of  safety is the metaphorical ‘key’ for a court to take a ‘hard 
look’ at approval processes – the idea that we shall further develop in chapter X. It must 
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be reiterated however that the subsequent decision in PLIVA Inc v. Mensing669 is rather 
surprising, as by allowing preemption of  state tort cases in lawsuits involving generic 
drugs, the Court contradicted the argument suggested above that information related to 
pharmaceutical risk is an incremental process for which manufacturers are primarily 
responsible. 
In the European scenario, a ‘compliance defence’, although regularly advocated for 
by representatives of  the industry,670 is not on the cards. As suggested in chapter VI the 
only defence explicitly mentioning regulatory requirements is the one provided by 
article 7(d) of  the Product Liability Directive,671 on the basis of  which a producer will be 
shielded from liability where “the defect is due to compliance of  the product with 
mandatory regulations issued by public authorities”. Short of  that, regulatory compliance 
provides “strong evidence” that the product is not defective, but without freeing a 
producer from liability.672 In other words the correct observance of  a given standard, in 
product liability litigation, is strong but not conclusive evidence of  a product’s safety. This 
is confirmed by the wording of  article 25 of  Directive 2001/83/EC on the basis of  which 
a marketing authorisation “shall not affect the civil and criminal liability of  the 
manufacturer and, where applicable, of  the marketing authorisation holder”.673 More to 
the point of  this chapter, it is important to determine the attitude of  courts to improving 
the scientific data supporting safety assessments. Assuming that compliance is not an 
obstacle per se, the discussion should focus on the limits to the scope for introducing 
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emerging scientific knowledge in court cases. In order to do so, an essential judgment that 
has inspired a number of  subsequent decisions throughout the EU674 is the ECJ judgment 
in Commission v. United Kingdom.675 While we have identified in chapter VI some critical 
elements of  it, we attempt here to give a more in-depth account of  the reasoning of  the 
ECJ, and to measure the impact of  the decision as regards the ability of  national courts to 
improve the quality of  safety assessments. 
The key element of  the decision (largely based on the opinion delivered by 
Advocate General Giuseppe Tesauro) concerns the concept of  ‘the state of  scientific 
knowledge’ and its reasonable accessibility. In particular, the Court sided with the AG’s 
opinion in defining the state of  scientific knowledge as not commensurate with “the views 
expressed by the majority of  learned opinion, but with the most advanced level of  
research which has been carried out at a given time”.676 The decision expands the 
argument by suggesting that even isolated opinions should be considered as an integral 
part of  the scientific material to be assessed – since in the scientific community even 
minority opinions can rise to become widely accepted views.677 The Court is therefore 
leaning towards the highest level of  inclusiveness, attenuated only by the requirement that 
such relevant knowledge has to be reasonably accessible. Here the argument for a 
construction of  the role of  courts as providers of  higher data accessibility and quality 
requires a reading of  the decision along the lines of  what was initially suggested by 
Tesauro. The Advocate General’s argument had posited that the reasonableness of  
accessibility should be measured against the level of  knowledge that could be expected 
from the highest rank of  expertise required in highly technical fields.678 Read in that light, 
the Court, while introducing a reasonableness requirement, decided the case in a way not 
dissimilar from the position taken almost fifteen years later in Wyeth, according to which 
manufacturers (which are to be considered as in possession of  the highest levels of  
expertise in drug development) are ultimately responsible for the integration of  emerging 
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knowledge in risk assessments:679 thus gearing up courts to function, again, as catalysts of  
knowledge production. While the reasonableness test does introduce limits to what can be 
expected from marketing authorisation holders, the example provided by the Court to 
define the boundaries of  the test appears to limit its scope to truly borderline cases 
involving measurable barriers to access.680 The application of  the Court’s rationale in major 
tort cases involving toxic or biological products has been indeed leaning towards 
inclusiveness of  emerging knowledge, as confirmed for example in the seminal UK case A 
v. National Blood Authority.681  
In a different but related area of  European product liability, a strong signal 
confirming the Court’s inclination towards accessibility and uncovering of  scientific 
knowledge comes from the very recent CJEU decision in the Novo Nordisk Pharma case.682 
The court has held that national product-specific legislation imposing stricter liability 
mechanisms than the one provided by the Product Liability Directive is not affected by the 
Directive’s regime as per article 13.683 While this was always the goal of  the provision, the 
novelty consists of  the fact that amendments posterior to the adoption of  the Directive’s 
regime are protected (and not only the legislation existing at the time the Directive was 
notified). This was of  particular importance in the Novo Nordisk Pharma case, where the 
provision placed under scrutiny was a 2002 amendment to the Arzneimittelgestez (AMG) 
introducing paragraphs 84(2) and 84a.684 The adoption of  paragraph 84(2) introduced a 
presumption that, when the pharmaceutical product administered is generally capable of  
causing harm, the damage is caused by the product. Paragraph 84a introduced a consumer 
right to “require the manufacturer of  a medicinal product to provide him with information 
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on the adverse effects of  that product”685 when the facts of  the case suggest that the 
product has caused damage. The CJEU recognised that the German legislation does not 
“undermine the effectiveness of  the system of  liability provided for under Directive 
85/374”,686 but rather aims to eliminate or reduce the asymmetry of  information between 
the manufacturer and the consumer, helping the latter to prove defectiveness and 
causation.687 The combination of  the two suggested factors represents a powerful means 
of  both consumer protection and judicial monitoring. It is quite significant that the CJEU, 
in sanctioning the strong German legislation, is endorsing a complementary approach. The 
case at hand involved Ms S. suffering ADRs related to the use of  the anti-diabetes 
medicine known as Levemir688 marketed by Novo Nordisk. After suffering from 
lipoatrophy as a result of  Levemir injections she required the manufacturer to provide her 
with full disclosure of  side effects data pursuant to article 84 AMG.689 The decision of  the 
CJEU in response to the initial refusal of  Novo Nordisk (which had relied on the exact 
wording of  the Product Liability Directive, from which the further obligation laid down in 
the AMG is absent) sets a promising tone for the future of  pharmaceutical product 
liability litigation. 
Whereas the attitude of  US and EU courts towards access to and inclusion of  
relevant scientific knowledge in liability assessments has developed through time 
independently and in adjacent rather than juxtaposing fields, the conclusions are not 
dissimilar. The common theme emerging is that both judiciaries are in principle oriented 
towards an active role for liability law in considering and promoting the uncovering of  
scientific knowledge relevant to safety assessments. Regulatory compliance is interpreted 
as a strong element supporting claims of  safety by marketing authorisation holders (what 
we have referred to as a ‘deferential’ approach).  The challenge is to adjust the inclusive 
attitude to relevant information analysed in this chapter and to focus it on the weaknesses 
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of  regulatory outputs that emerged in chapters III and V. The ‘keys’ to open up the system 
– or more accurately the legal tools and interpretative inclinations – are already in place. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
RELYING ON COURTS 2 
PARTICIPATION IN COURTS – CAUSATION AND ACCESS DILEMMAS 
 
 
  We consider here the issue of  access to justice in pharmaceutical cases to question 
the ability of  courts to undertake the suggested complementary function. To discuss 
accessibility in a manner functional to the scheme of  this thesis, the focus needs to be on 
two separate but very much mutually influential aspects. First, a complex issue that links 
the themes of  data availability and access to justice is that of  causation. The opening 
section of  the chapter discusses the intricacies of  reconstructing the causal links between 
the use of  a pharmaceutical product and allegedly related harms to show how this essential 
step constitutes a major hurdle in accessing judicial oversight. The second section 
confronts the long-lasting debate opposing individual and collective redress. The question 
whether courts can constitute democratic agents seems to receive a more positive answer 
when mechanisms of  collective redress are in place, because when individual cases are 
brought to court, the obstacle of  causation can often be simply too burdensome for single 
parties. 
  
1.  Intricacies of  causation: statistical evidence and individual reports 
 Causation in product liability claims, and especially in toxic products litigation, is 
without question the toughest burden placed on plaintiffs claiming compensation.690 A 
                                              
690
 Product liability and tort law literature in general is consistent on this point. See among others 
Owen D., Montgomery J., Davis M.J., Products Liability and Safety, Foundation Press, 2014; 
Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation, Hart Publishing, 2013; Goldberg R. (ed.), 
Perspectives on Causation, Hart Publishing, 2011; Owen D.G., “Dangers in Prescription Drugs: 
Filling a Private Law Gap in the Health Care debate”, Connecticut Law Review, 42, 2010; Owen D., 
Products liability law, 2nd ed., Hornbook Series, Thomson West Group, 2008;
 
Brüggemeier G., 
Common Principles of Tort Law – A Prestatement of the Law, BIICL, 2006; Cranor C., Toxic Torts 
 172 
 
major complicating factor is the need to provide the court with two layers of  proof  – a 
double element which, with different characteristics, is substantially present across both 
the US and the EU. First, the product must be shown to be capable of  causing the alleged 
harm in general, and secondly, a plaintiff  must prove that the product in question did in fact 
cause the harm in the specific case.691 
 An essential yet contentious tool used in courts to assess causal links is 
epidemiology. An epidemiological study is normally of  significant statistical value as it 
analyses “the distribution and determinants of  health-related states or events (including 
disease), and the application of  this study to the control of  diseases and other health 
problems”.692 Typically, what epidemiology allows for is the identification of  patterns and 
trends in controlled populations – for instance a comparative analysis of  the health 
conditions of  a selected population exposed to a specific substance or environmental 
condition as opposed to a non-exposed control group. As recalled, in the realm of  product 
liability litigation, a plaintiff  must prove both general and specific causation. Therefore, in 
theory, since epidemiological studies are based on populations rather than single 
individuals, they serve very well the purpose of  demonstrating general causation, as they 
are able to reveal statistical associations between a given pharmaceutical and a the alleged 
harm.693 However, the individual characteristics of  the specific case normally require proof  
of  specific causation to be constructed on more extensive information than statistical 
epidemiological data.694 
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 Interestingly, a significant trend in American litigation695 has been progressively 
reducing the gap between the two elements of  causation, by bridging the concepts of  legal 
and scientific proof. The generally accepted standard in civil litigation requires plaintiffs to 
prove their case on a balance of  probabilities, and a result above 50% normally 
corroborates a causal link. This relatively clear-cut evidentiary attitude is not mirrored by 
any equivalent in the scientific world, where no fixed statistical criteria are considered 
universally sufficient to prove a causal link. The bridging initiative conducted by American 
courts attempts to merge the epidemiological concept of  ‘relative risk’ with the necessity 
for a simplified judicial evaluation based on a balance of  probability over 50%. The idea 
goes as follows: a relative risk is defined as the ratio of  probability of  occurrence of  a 
given event (in the case of  a medicinal product this can be the occurrence of  an ADR) in a 
controlled group exposed to a substance, to the occurrence of  the same event in a 
controlled non-exposed group. The idea developed by the American judiciary is that when 
the ratio is double, the general statistics can be relied on to prove specific causation.696  
 While extremely appealing for its relative simplification of  an otherwise intricate 
issue, this approach, known as the ‘double risk theory’, is subject to a vast array of  
criticisms focused on the alleged arbitrariness of  this judicial choice.697 Opposing voices 
point out the alleged substantial unreliability of  the theory in cases where the biological 
mechanisms triggering a certain outcome are unknown,698 and therefore statistical evidence 
is little more than random if  not adequately contextualised. This line of  thinking, which 
has unsurprisingly found vigorous supporters in the reporters for the Restatement (Third) of  
Torts,699 rejects the use of  statistical evidence for proof  of  specific causation. As recalled in 
chapter VI, the third Restatement adopts a very restrictive approach to pharmaceutical 
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liability claims, firmly based on reasonableness criteria, one of  which entails that a causal 
link requires non-statistical evidence of  individual circumstances leading to the damage.700 
 The simplicity of  the double risk theory has however gained supporters across the 
Atlantic, and European courts have demonstrated an inclination towards the use of  
statistical and epidemiological evidence in the delicate exercise of  proving causal links. In 
particular, a line of  cases in the UK courts has thoroughly discussed the matter, albeit 
without reaching a clear conclusion. The arguments, which constitute an appropriate 
summary of  the state of  the debate, focus around two contrasting views. On the one hand 
an approach aimed at facilitating the plaintiff ’s task suggests that when a series of  potential 
causes coexist in a given case, the plaintiff  can prove the existence of  a causal link by 
“showing that the tortious exposure has at least doubled the risk arising from the non-
tortious cause or causes”.701 This view was expressed in the UK Court of  Appeal by 
Smith LJ in the leading asbestos case Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd.  In contrast with this 
attitude, in the Supreme Court’s judgment in the same case, Lords Kerr and Rodger opined 
that epidemiological evidence is unreliable in assessing specific causation; general statistical 
proof  simply cannot constitute the foundation upon which a judge can decide whether 
exposure to a certain substance actually caused the damage in an individual case.702   
The heated judicial debate evident in the Sienkiewicz case must be confronted with 
the reality of  a ‘double risk theory’ significantly gaining momentum in its “adjusted 
version”.703  A middle-ground take on the dispute over the reliability of  epidemiological 
evidence for proof  of  specific causation emerges from an older pharmaceutical product 
liability case in the US. In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Havner,704 the Supreme Court of  
Texas anticipated the subsequent divide between advocates and detractors of  the ‘double 
risk theory’ by stressing that epidemiological evidence can form a strong evidentiary basis 
for general causation, and also constitute an important building block of  specific 
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causation. It does however need to be corroborated by supporting factors because 
epidemiology only illustrates an ‘association’ between product and harm, and causation 
requires evidence of  additional individual elements.705 The factors to be considered are 
manifold, and relate for instance to the personal medical history of  the patient.706 The key 
is not to mistake an association, showing in aggregate figures a statistical recurrence of  a 
given event under given circumstances, with the more stringent concept of  causation of  
the single event – as observed in abundant literature, the two do not necessarily coincide 
without further evidence.707 The Sienkiewicz UK Supreme Court judgment refers to Merrell 
Dow insofar as Lord Rodger stresses the necessity of  evaluating non-statistical elements 
with particular attention to “temporality”.708 In his reasoning, temporality should factor in 
when a certain association between a pharmaceutical product and an ADR is established 
statistically, but the ADR could be caused by other factors. In this situation, the fact that 
the ADR occurred immediately after taking the medicine could, together with the 
epidemiological evidence, amount to proof  of  causation.709 While eloquently presented, 
this view fails to consider an important aspect. Temporality in pharmaceutical ADRs is 
seldom of  an immediate nature except in the relatively rare case of  some signature 
damages.710 If  temporality is to be a decisive factor, proof  of  causation in long-term ADRs 
would become increasingly difficult.  
While epidemiological studies cannot possibly be the sole mechanism to prove a 
causal link (which would hinder access to justice in any case where an individual ADR is 
not yet supported by aggregate statistics, and nonetheless non-statistical evidence exists to 
support causation),711 we suggest that the greater reliance on statistical studies begun in the 
US and reaching Europe is generally to be welcomed as a positive development.712 It allows 
for complex cases to be heard and evaluated with adequate attention to contextual studies, 
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while in time courts can progressively develop know-how in managing complex evidence 
of  this sort.713 The ‘double risk theory’ bears a certain risk of  oversimplifying the 
relationship between scientific and legal proof, but when corroborated by supplementing 
factors (provided these are not too narrowly defined) statistical evidence does play a role in 
increasing the accessibility of  judicial remedies.714 
 Epidemiological studies are however not only potentially subject to criticism as 
tools in proving causation, as discussed above, but are simply not always available.  In the 
absence of  aggregate studies demonstrating statistical incidence, an alternative source of  
evidence lies in individual reports supporting causal reconstructions – which can take the 
form for example of  compiled data from expert bodies, or expert testimonies. The 
abundance of  reporting and expert witnessing in the US has triggered a rather restrictive 
response from the Supreme Court in a famous trilogy of  cases.715 The excesses of  expert 
witnesses are a well-investigated weakening feature of  the American legal system, where 
what is supposed to be a sporadic and case-specific activity has developed in time into a 
proper lucrative profession, often detached from reliable scientific methods.716 In order to 
shield the legal system from what has been picturesquely defined as “junk science”,717 the 
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.718 has developed a relatively 
stringent test for the acceptance of  individual reports and expert testimonies. The case of  
Daubert revolved around the admissibility of  scientific evidence based on the precedent in 
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Frye v. United States,719 which had set the rather vague requirement that new scientific 
evidence or methods to be admissible should have “general acceptance” in the scientific 
community.720 In Daubert the Supreme Court pronounced a better-defined approach based 
on a series of  criteria aimed at ensuring that expert testimonies should be “based on 
appropriate science pertinent to a legal decision”.721 By this means the judge was assigned a 
central role in preliminarily assessing the soundness of  both the evidence and the 
methodology.722 The success of  Daubert is measurable in the formulation of  the revised 
Federal Rules of  Evidence which now require that: 723 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of  an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 
of  fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of  reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of  the case 
While answering a very rational necessity – that of  eliminating low quality reports from 
admissible evidence – judges have upon occasion exercised this gatekeeping function in an 
overly restrictive way,724 rejecting not only evidence for the case at hand, but moving in the 
direction of  general inadmissibility of  individual case reports lacking support in aggregate 
data.725 While this has had an impact in ‘traditional tort cases’,726 examples from the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program suggest that there is room for a more 
flexible (and actually more literal) interpretation of  the Daubert rule.727 Vaccination 
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compensation claims have been allowed to rely substantially on individual case reports in 
the absence of  statistical epidemiologic studies – based on an evaluation of  temporality 
and lack of  alternative causal triggers. 
 This brief  discussion of  causation and admissibility paves the way for the 
following section, where issues of  access to justice will be analysed through the dichotomy 
between individual and collective redress. What emerges from this first section is that 
courts are struggling to reconcile the disparate ideas of  legal and scientific proof. While 
the US has battled with judicial ‘junk science’ and opted for restrictive approaches to 
individual reports (although this seems to be attenuated at least in vaccination cases, which 
could open the door to a more inclusive attitude for medicinal products), what we observe 
is a general trend common to the US and the EU of  allowing greater reliance on statistical 
methods of  proof  – at least in the form of  a growing inclination towards aggregate 
epidemiological statistics when available. As will be discussed in the following section, this 
has the effect of  simplifying proof  of  causation to a greater extent in collective redress 
cases than it does in individual ones. A significant alternative is that offered by the German 
Arznemittelngestz (AMG), discussed in chapter VII. The AMG in section 84(2)728 creates a 
presumption of  specific causation when the product is shown to be capable of  causing the 
damage in general (a proof  typically relying on epidemiological studies). The presumption 
is rebuttable by the defendant who is however required to disclose any and all relevant 
information in his possession relating to the contested ADR. This scheme will be further 
discussed in the next section.  
Beyond pharmaceutical products, the CJEU has very recently confronted the issue 
of  causation in related fields, in particular medical devices, in the Boston Scientific cases.729 
Here the court, on the one hand, creates a presumption of  defectiveness where products 
belonging to the same group or production series have potential defects – in which case 
the product under specific scrutiny “may be classified as defective without there being any 
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need to establish that that product has such a defect”,730 thus considerably alleviating the 
victim’s burden of  proof. On the other hand, corroborating a favourable interpretation of  
causal requirements for claimants suffering from injuries in health-product related cases, 
the Court broadens the spectrum of  damages imputable to the manufacturer to cover 
collateral damages such as those deriving from surgical operation for the replacement of  a 
defective medical device.731 
  
2.  Participation in litigation: different shades of  access to justice  
The issue of  causation is closely linked to the general theme of  accessibility of  the 
court system, which we touch upon to evaluate the surrogate participatory function of  the 
judiciary. The argument here is that despite substantial criticisms culminating in a judicially 
and politically hostile attitude, the US model of  class actions still represents the best 
option to guarantee accessibility to courts and, in turn, a diffuse form of  bottom-up 
control of  regulatory practices through litigation. It has been observed that American 
courts and governments have been less and less inclined to promote class actions for 
numerous reasons.732 First, the relatively easy criteria laid down by law in 1966733 triggered 
as of  the 1980s a rush to litigation in mass torts cases, especially those involving asbestos 
or Agent Orange.734 While saluted positively as an effective means of  ensuring plaintiffs’ 
compensation and creating a strong deterrent for potential mass tortfeasors, the pattern of  
class action lawsuits turned rapidly in the 1990s into a relatively easy means of  obtaining 
multi-million dollar settlements.735 The simple creation and certification of  a class became 
quickly a compelling threat for defendants to the extent that class certification became the 
passport to big settlements accepted by defendants to avoid the prospect of  financially 
devastating jury judgments.736 After important court decisions tackling the issue by 
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allowing class certification review by appellate courts,737 a statutory intervention introduced 
the new rule 23(f) of  the Federal Rules of  Civil Procedure (FRCP), which formally vested 
courts of  appeals with the power of  permitting appeals “from an order of  a district court 
granting or denying class action certification”.738 Establishing clear criteria for permitting 
appeals and certification reviews has been a prolonged and consuming exercise that courts 
have engaged with for over a decade.739 While a full reconstruction of  each argument goes 
well beyond the scope of  this chapter, the net result has been universally accepted as being 
fundamentally favourable to defendants, restricting significantly the margin of  manoeuvre 
for plaintiffs to get a class certified.740 As observed by Robert Klonoff, while FRCP applied 
only to federal cases, “the most egregious examples of  class action abuse had occurred in 
the state courts”.741 The response to this incongruence came in 2005 with the adoption of  
the controversial Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which contains detailed procedures 
ensuring that most cases involving class certification can be removed from state courts to 
federal circuits.742 The requirements permit de facto the removal of  any case involving an 
amount of  $5 million or more, with little regard to diversity between plaintiffs and 
defendants or state of  origin criteria.743 
The new legislation, coupled with a stringent reading of  rule 23(f), has been 
constructed in such a way that now, since a 2001 decision by the Seventh Circuit,744 the 
merits of  a case are often reached at the preliminary class certification stage – thus erecting 
an initial threshold often fatal to aggregate plaintiffs seeking certification.745 What is 
interesting however is that while the general trend is indisputably towards a severe 
limitation in the scope of  class actions, none of  the defining cases contributing to this 
progressive restriction involved pharmaceutical product litigation. The most notable 
intervention on admissibility of  evidence regarding pharmaceuticals remains the recalled 
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Daubert case, which had a different aim.  
To obtain a class certification plaintiffs must now satisfy the criteria laid down in 
rule 23(a) and (b) of  the FRCP, in particular the main requirements enumerated in 
subsection (a): numerosity (that is, a minimum number of  members which would make it 
impractical to nominate them separately as independent parties), commonality (which refers 
to a common legal and factual ground implying that a single solution covers the full class), 
typicality (meaning that the claims of  the named parties are typical to all class members), 
and adequacy (requiring named plaintiffs to represent the interests of  the entire class).746 
This construction is very much functional in a pharmaceutical case involving 
epidemiological evidence. In particular, while the epidemiological evidence constitutes 
proof  of  general causation, the aggregation of  class members based on the criterion of  
commonality represents a preliminary consolidation of  specific causation evidence. By 
recognising patterns among class members associated by similar factual elements (for 
instance exposure to a certain substance, time of  exposure, nature of  the ADR, severity of  
the ADR, time lapsing between exposure and harmful event), the class certification 
process creates the basis for greater reliability of  the evidence and stronger proof  of  
causal links – in other words, the very constitution of  the class based on commonalities 
adds specificity to general statistics.747 In this sense it is not entirely surprising that while 
severely criticised and facing limitations in a vast range of  fields, class actions are still a 
lively feature of  American pharmaceutical litigation. Several cases posterior to the 
adoption of  both rule 23(f) and the CAFA bear testimony to this – Avandia, to come back 
to one of  the cases analysed in chapter V,748 is a major but not isolated example.749 The 
recent study by Klonoff  on “The Decline of  Class Actions”, while very thorough in 
compiling restrictive case law rejecting class certifications, does not enumerate a single 
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drug case (except In Re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc.,750 which preceded the adoption of  rule 
23(f), and was resolved by the Wyoming district court through a decision that the class 
certification had been appropriate under the circumstances).  Why does pharmaceutical 
product liability class litigation appear resistant in an otherwise hostile context? An 
explanation based on our previous discussion of  causation suggests that the very nature of  
a class, which invites the uncovering of  statistical data in a closed and controlled group, is 
the most effective corroborating factor of  general statistical evidence. The anchoring of  
pharmaceutical class actions to the commonality requirement seems capable of  protecting 
them from the restrictive interpretation recently adopted by the Supreme Court in the 
contentious case of  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.751  In this judgment the Supreme Court 
explained that the common legal or factual claim should be “capable of  class-wide 
resolution”, which implies that “determination of  its truth or falsity will resolve an issue 
that is central to the validity of  each one of  the claims in one stroke752 – a natural feature 
of  claims related to ADRs.753  
Despite the strong critiques raised against the mechanism of  US class actions and 
the rather vehement attacks this mechanism has suffered from limiting Supreme Court 
decisions, its value in enabling victims to obtain a form of  judicial remedy is still 
recognized and argued for. In particular John Coffee, in a very recent study, makes a 
compelling case for class actions with the goal of  maintaining, provided a series of  
necessary reforms are implemented, the crucial aspect of  what he defines ‘entrepreneurial 
litigation’ – the safeguard of  meritorious claims that would not be asserted in the absence 
of  class mechanisms.754 More so, the author ventures into the possibility for the model of  
a “Private Attorney General” to be exported globally.755 Without entering into the details 
of  such a complex proposal, it is worth noting the resilience that the concept of  
representative lawsuits has maintained over decades of  controversial operation. 
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Identifying class actions as the best fitted means of  ensuring access to justice in 
pharmaceutical litigation entails the obvious setback that the European scenario does not 
offer equivalents to the American model. The reasons are to be found in the diverse legal 
traditions of  European states, and it is noteworthy that the contemporary debate is still 
very much anchored to traditional views in this regard.756 The major and most persistent 
objection to class actions, similar to what triggered the restrictive trend observed in the 
US, is the risk of  excessive and uncontrolled litigation outbreaks.757 While the concern is 
legitimate as the US experience shows, it is also true that, as briefly suggested, careful 
regulation and adequate judicial oversight can significantly reduce the issue. That 
notwithstanding, the European version of  collective redress is a significantly different 
phenomenon, with reduced impact on civil litigation. For example, Italy and Germany do 
have national laws on collective redress mechanisms.758 However the German legislation is 
limited to litigation involving capital markets, excluding other civil law types of  claims, 
while the Italian law offers an intermediary service whereby a consumer association can 
start a lawsuit on behalf  of  interest groups, but the success of  this venture has been so far 
limited.759 An equivalent of  the US mechanism based on careful construction of  a class 
sharing key common features and, by virtue of  those commonalities, enhancing the 
statistical significance of  individual events with a view to proof  of  specific causation does 
not exist. 
In a series of  studies dedicated to the state of  collective redress in Europe, 
Christopher Hodges identifies a number of  reasons for the European court systems not to 
venture into a US-style class action mechanism. These concerns are focused on the high 
transaction costs of  litigation schemes, which in turn should suggest a preference for more 
traditionally European solutions characterised by the presence of  public bodies monitoring 
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compensation mechanisms.760 Unsurprisingly, the current European trend goes very much 
in the direction of  compensatory alternative dispute resolution schemes, which have been 
defined by the Directorate General for Health and Consumers Affairs (DG SANCO) as 
the “favoured approach for consumer redress at EU level”.761 This policy orientation 
culminated in the adoption of  the alternative dispute resolution Directive 2013/11.762 The 
limiting feature of  a system purely based on alternative dispute resolution is obviously that 
the post-factum control exercisable by a court gets lost. But more to the point of  our 
analysis, the mechanism provided by the Directive is limited to “contractual obligations 
stemming from sales contracts or service contracts”,763 and article 2.2(h) establishes an 
explicit exception for prescription, dispensation and provision of  medicinal products764 – 
limiting the potential applicability of  the Directive to non-prescription medicines.  Aware 
of  the limits of  the current approach, the Commission has released a series of  
non-binding recommendations765 on the adoption of  collective redress mechanisms by 
Member States. While encouraging MSs to adopt collective redress schemes, the authors 
of  these recommendations explicitly suggest that the desired result is “a balanced 
approach to improve access to justice for citizens while avoiding a US-style system of  class 
actions and the risk of  frivolous claims and abusive litigation”.766 The initiative is still 
relatively confined, as national legislatures are generally yet to incorporate the 
Commission’s recommendations. But the issue of  access to justice is recognised, and this 
should be a factor in future legislative developments. The area of  consumer protection in 
particular is repeatedly identified as necessitating adequate enforcement mechanisms for 
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effective protection of  consumer rights.767 
While the current European model revolves around alternative dispute resolution 
and cautious initiatives encouraging the adoption of  national legislation on collective 
redress, the issue of  access to justice, in the sense of  access to public courts, remains a 
difficult one. In a complex analysis of  national legal tradition confronted with EU 
tendencies, Hans-W. Micklitz has developed the idea of  “access justice” in the EU. 
Interestingly he identifies it as conceptually linked to the common law notion of  equity – 
access, in this reconstruction, is the key to mitigating not the rigidities and iniquities of  the 
common law, but the failures of  the EU regulatory schemes.768 But how does EU law allow 
for the “realistic opportunity” to obtain compensation and enforcement of  one’s rights? 
Certainly the adoption of  Directive 2013/11 is a step forward from a situation in which 
consumer protection was suffering from limited access tools to ensure consumer rights 
enforcement.769 However, reliance on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as 
conciliation or mediation) is, as already stated, insufficient in a field (such as 
pharmaceutical regulation) which stands in need of  external oversight (possibly, reliance 
on an ombudsman could be helpful) – not to mention that the Directive is expressly 
non-applicable to prescription medicines, which are inherently more potentially harmful 
than non-prescription ones. Beyond the limiting effect of  the exception in article 2.2(h), 
the issue is that compensation is only one side of  the problem. To effectively tackle 
deterrence on the one hand and, more to the point, regulatory oversight on the other 
hand, access to justice in its more traditional sense is an inescapable issue. Obstacles to 
accessing the judicial system – setting aside in this context economic responses such as 
contingency fees which have been repeatedly ostracised by both commentators and EU 
institutions – need careful reflection at least around issues of  causation. In a study on the 
“Common Principles of  Tort Law”, Gert Brüggemeier correctly identified that toxic tort 
litigation in Europe suffers from a double handicap compared to the US: a substantive and 
a procedural one.770 The substantive obstacle consists of  the difficulties in proving medical 
causation that have been described in the previous section – for the proof  of  which 
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individual cases tend to be ill-suited. On the other hand there is a procedural problem in 
that the absence of  a European class action mechanism often produces serial cases with 
lower chances of  success and higher individual burdens – not to mention, ironically, the 
elevated transaction costs of  multiple lawsuits.771 Correctly, the author suggests that “the 
American law in this area is more developed”.772 
The conclusion of  this chapter is necessarily a composite one. Access to justice in 
this area is not only linked to the traditionally identified financial and economic burdens of  
the European court system compared to the American one (the classic example being the 
presence in the US of  contingency fees, a clearly litigation-friendly mechanism).773 A more 
complex reading of  the theme links access to courts with proof  of  causation, and we have 
argued that the class-identification mechanism set out in rule 23 of  the FRCP actually 
appears to create a virtuous circle.  Indeed, the aggregation of  individuals sharing a given 
factual commonality (ADRs in pharmaceutical cases) allows on the one hand the 
construction of  a class with the single goal of  common resolution of  a common problem, 
while contributing from the pre-trial phase to building the evidentiary foundations of  both 
general and specific causation. Absent similar mechanisms in the EU, access to justice 
maintains its causal difficulties. The comparatively inferior number of  cases litigated in the 
EU as against the US is unsurprising given that venturing upon an individual product 
liability claim necessitating complex health-related evaluations is still, to put it a bit 
dramatically, an act of  courage. Of  course individual cases do go to court, as discussed 
both in chapter VII and in the previous section, and when they do, decisions may be 
reached with significant impact – for example regarding the emergence of  scientific 
knowledge, as suggested by the discussion in chapter VII. It is also true that, in theory, 
high numbers are not essential for the purpose of  relying on courts for the review of  
regulatory standards (the claim of  the thesis to be developed in chapter X). However, 
when it comes to assessing the viability of  courts in the role of  democratically accessible 
agents, the current scenario is less than optimal. How the EU will respond to the challenge 
of  access to justice in a field where cooperation with the US is close and bound to get 
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closer is an issue to be monitored in the years to come. The impression is that, at the 
moment, the US court system is still better equipped to provide the ‘judicial governance’ 
and the diffuse ‘bottom-up’ oversight of  regulatory mechanisms suggested in the opening 
remark above and in the first chapter.  
We can however conclude with two positive observations for the EU. First, 
national experiences can reveal alternative means of  facilitating individuals in court claims. 
The German legislation recently endorsed by the CJEU is an interesting alternative to a 
class action method. In the presence of  epidemiological evidence demonstrating that the 
product can cause harm in general, the law creates a rebuttable presumption that it did in 
fact cause harm in the specific case. Secondly, the relative increase in litigation figures 
demonstrated by the succession of  Commission product liability reports774 over 20 years, 
combined with the recent recommendations to MSs on the adoption of  collective redress 
mechanisms, are signals that the debate is alive – access to justice, interpreted as access to 
public courts and not only to alternative dispute resolution schemes, is viewed as an issue 
requiring attention. It is possibly more than a significant coincidence that this slow but 
steady increase in litigation demand follows in time the described evolution of  regulatory 
schemes and their pressure points.  
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CHAPTER IX 
 
RELYING ON COURTS 3 
COURTS AND LITIGATION OUTPUT: ADEQUATE COMPLEMENTS? 
 
 
This third and final chapter on the role of  the judiciary and litigation in 
complementing regulatory processes touches upon the complex issue of  the adequacy and 
reliability of  litigation outcomes in a complex field such as pharmaceutical safety, and 
provides an opportunity to reassemble and evaluate the themes emerging in the previous 
chapters.  
 
1. Two major arguments contra judicial involvement 
It is worth recalling the classic arguments against judicial oversight of  the outputs 
of  technical regulatory processes mentioned in the Introduction. These are essentially two. 
First, it is argued that courts are unprepared to tackle difficult scientific issues, and should 
therefore defer to the outcome of  regulatory assessments (if  the possibility of  review is to 
be entertained at all). The second argument is that litigation is an inefficient means of  
regulatory oversight because of  the inherently high transaction costs and prolonged 
timelines involved. Correlated to both, there is a more general argument that product 
liability cases do not provide any measurable social benefit, and that a system based on 
regulatory minimum standards and self-regulatory market incentives is best suited for the 
governance of  product safety at large. 
This chapter addresses the arguments in turn, with no ambition to rebut them in a 
definitive fashion, but rather by suggesting pointers to the adequacy on the one hand and 
fruitfulness on the other of  court cases in the pharmaceutical context. To this end, the 
following section briefly analyses how the alleged technical incompetence of  courts can be 
overcome in practice by their ability to make important value-based judgment calls in the 
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face of  uncertainty – with impacts and implications possibly reaching beyond the 
boundaries of  the single case at hand. This has been discussed previously when addressing 
causation; here the analysis reassesses that discussion to advocate for the substantive 
adequacy of  judicial decision-making.  
The final section revisits a series of  cases considered in previous chapters which 
underpin the claim that fortuity of  risk discovery and delays in swiftly addressing safety 
issues upon their discovery are structural to the regulatory system. Experience from these 
cases points to the existence of  an identifiable and non-negligible trend where, in the 
presence of  emerging safety issues, the regulatory system takes action as a consequence of  
litigation – either after the case has started or after it has been decided or settled. 
Administrative actions such as suspension of  marketing authorisation or re-labelling of  
products have often lagged behind private litigation initiatives. This failure (episodic but 
recurrent) to act upon safety issues, analysed in chapter V, makes room for the argument 
that courts can and are in fact exercising an important surrogate post-marketing 
surveillance function. The observations provided in the following pages should pave the 
way for the concluding chapter and for the argument that the patterns highlighted 
throughout this thesis call for a renewed role of  courts in tackling safety issues at their 
origin.  
 
2. Scientific and emerging evidence – a case for judicial value judgments 
The first issue to address here is whether the court system is adequately equipped 
to face challenges as highly technical and scientific as those deriving from ‘toxic tort’ cases 
– in particular, pharmaceutical product liability litigation. The debate is a long-lasting one, 
but a few elements in support of  courts’ adequacy for this purpose can be briefly 
summarised with a bird’s eye view of  contentious issues in the American and European 
scenarios.  
American scholars are divided for example on the appropriateness of  jury trials 
involving highly regulated products (and medicines in particular), as lay persons are 
allegedly unfit to review scientific evidence. The concern is particularly focused on the 
alleged eagerness of  juries to side with plaintiffs and award exorbitant punitive damages 
based more on sympathy for the victims than sound evidence (the major argument for 
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applying the doctrine of  federal preemption to FDA-approved products).775  
While the concern is understandable, it appears to be more of  an abstract 
preoccupation than a concrete problem given that several studies suggest that juries are 
capable of  evaluating complex evidence under proper judicial guidance.776 Such guidance 
should allow for decisions to be based on proper evidentiary grounds and not on some 
form of  prejudice against corporate defendants – this is also suggested by studies on the 
even distribution of  trial outcomes.777  Moreover, the alleged inclination of  juries to 
indulge in punitive damages appears to be less frequent in product liability claims than is 
often argued. The trend in adjudication suggests that judgments involving significant 
punitive damages only really occur in the face of  “egregious misbehaviour”778 – that is, the 
very purpose for which they were designed.779 As for the robustness of  trial evidence, the 
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demanding tests developed for the admissibility of  scientific evidence, particularly in the 
most contentious forms of  expert witnesses and reports, constitute a strong safeguard 
against the risk of  ‘junk science’, or more to the point, actually biased evidence.780 In his 
essential contribution to the study of  toxic tort litigation in America, Carl Cranor has 
persuasively argued that juries perform their duties to decide on the facts of  complex cases 
in a generally competent manner,781 with the safeguard that the trial system allows for 
judicial oversight and intervention when a jury decides in favour of  one party “but a judge 
[finds] that no reasonable jury could come to such a conclusion”,782 in which case juries’ 
verdicts can be overturned.  
For the avoidance of  doubt, this is not meant to be an argument in favour of  jury 
trials in general – such an argument would require a study on its own and is too complex to 
be addressed here. This is simply, as suggested above, a ‘pointer’ to the fact that the 
American judicial system does possess structural antidotes to the risks of  decisions tainted 
by incompetence or bias. 
Aside from the specific context of  jury trials, the adequacy question extends to 
courts in general, and judges in particular. Are judges equipped to confront highly 
technical and scientific matters? The question is a delicate one and has been the subject, 
again, of  prolonged debates.783 A contribution that we propose here is that, facing 
uncertain evidentiary scenarios, courts seem to be adequately equipped to make the 
necessary value judgments required for decisions in specific cases. The complex judicial 
discussions regarding the appropriate criteria for establishing proof  of  causation (and 
specific causation in particular) are a testimony to the ability of  courts to, first, engage with 
the subject, and, in time, self-educate towards better understandings of  complex technical 
questions. The fascinating discussions of  general versus specific causation provided by the 
UK Court of  Appeal and Supreme Court on the one hand, and the US and Texas 
Supreme Courts on the other, are instructive examples of  legal decision-making on the 
                                              
780
 See the discussion in chapter VIII on the Daubert trilogy of cases, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. 113 S. Ct. 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 1993, General Electric Co. v. Joiner 118 S. Ct. 
512 Ed 508, 1997, and Kumho Tire Co v. Carmichael 119 S Ct 1167, 1999. 
781
 Cranor C., Toxic Torts, p. 70 ff on ‘Judge-Jury responsibilities’; and Jasanoff S., Science at the Bar, 
p. 114 ff. 
782
 Cranor C., Toxic Torts, p. 42. 
783
 We refer to the literature suggested in the beginning of the chapter; the European perspective is 
considered in Goldberg R., Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation, Hart Publishing, 2013; 
Stapleton J., “Factual Causation, Mesothelioma and Statistical Validity”, Law Quarterly Review 128, 
2012; Goldberg R. (ed.), Perspectives on Causation, Hart Publishing, 2011. 
 193 
 
basis of  controversial evidence.784 Interestingly, a major criticism directed especially to the 
Anglo-American courts in their evolving interpretation and use of  epidemiological 
evidence highlights the ‘policy-like’ nature of  these decisions (or to use the term adopted 
above, the value-based nature of  the judgments).785 There is little doubt that this is the 
case. Courts do act as surrogates of  policy makers when confronting cases permeated by 
scientific uncertainty. What is argued here is that, in the face of  imperfect regulatory 
schemes contributing to the level of  uncertainty beyond its unavoidable and systemic 
measure, this ‘surrogate’ role is essential.  
The role of  courts in evaluating and admitting evidence extends to complex 
decisions on development risk and emerging issues. The issue has been explored in chapter 
VIII, identifying a common theme in the Western judicial attitude leaning towards a strict 
interpretation of  what is to be considered ‘reasonable access’ to scientific knowledge 
related to issues of  emerging risk in liability assessments. This delicate exercise has been 
another field of  judicial development with interesting convergences. Wyeth v. Levine786 has 
readjusted the tone in American product liability, with a decision that recognises the limits 
of  the regulatory system and shifts the bulk of  the responsibility of  safety monitoring 
back into the manufacturer’s camp after a temporary exclusive reliance on the FDA’s 
role.787  
As observed, this attitude is not dissimilar to the interpretation of  development 
risk in the EU. This interpretation, in a legal framework free of  a pure regulatory 
compliance defence, highlights the responsibility of  the manufacturer in taking into 
account the highest levels of  relevant scientific knowledge.788 The interpretation of  what 
should be considered reasonably available shows a certain degree of  variance across MSs, 
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as discussed in chapter VI.789 A common thread seems to emerge nonetheless in 
judgments from different legal contexts, stemming from the original ECJ decision in 
Commission v. United Kingdom.790 The concept of  reasonable availability, overcoming the 
paradox of  a liability assessment exclusively tied to pre-marketing assessment 
knowledge,791 since its original ECJ construction, has been adopted and refined by national 
case law – we have referred to, for example, the UK case A & Ors v. National Blood 
Authority792 in chapter VII. For the purposes of  evaluating the competency of  courts in 
managing litigation involving complex scientific evidence, another example from a 
different national experience is of  use.  
The Italian judiciary has throughout the 1990s and 2000s elaborated a concept of  
manufacturers’ responsibility in relation to emerging relevant knowledge that runs in 
parallel with the European one, and, although based on a different legal framework, 
reaches converging conclusions. The leading case involves the bio-tech medicinal product 
Trilergan. The case involved a patient alleging liver intoxication (hepatitis B in the specific 
case) caused by use of  Trilergan, the active ingredient of  which is derived from human 
gamma-globulin.793 The reasoning of  the Corte di Cassazione in interpreting article 2050 
of  the Italian Civil Code revolves around the responsibility of  the manufacturer beyond 
his formal regulatory duties.794 The interesting element of  this case is that while Trilergan 
had successfully complied with the safety requirements and passed the test methods for its 
blood component as prescribed by law, the producer Crinos S.P.A. was found to have 
failed to demonstrate compliance with its supervening ‘duty of  care’. In particular, what 
grounded the decision of  the Court was the existence of  an experimental test elaborated 
by an Italian university at the time the product was under review for marketing approval.795 
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The test was showing significant results at the time, and although not yet accepted by the 
general scientific community (and not yet enshrined in the required regulatory standards), 
the Court considered that it would have been reasonable to expect that the producer of  a 
highly specialised product would be informed of  the existence of  new experimental 
techniques – in particular, the new testing methodology for identifying potential 
hepatotoxicity of  composite medicinals derived from blood products.796 In interpreting 
article 2050, which requires the manufacturer to demonstrate taking all appropriate steps in 
order to avoid the risk of  damage, the Court held Crinos liable for failure to fulfil its legal 
duty. The conclusive decision of  the Corte di Cassazione,797 released around the same time 
as the Commission v. United Kingdom judgment, shows a substantial parallel with the idea of  
‘availability’ developed by Advocate General Tesauro and adopted by the ECJ. This judicial 
interpretation has set the tone of  Italian pharmaceutical product liability, and has been 
confirmed in subsequent cases.798  
In 2012, the Tribunale di Sassari,799 in a judgment involving post-chemotherapy 
and odontological pharmacological treatments, confirmed the judicial idea of  ‘availability’ 
while adopting the implementing legislation of  the Product Liability Directive800 instead of  
the traditional article 2050.801 The case involved a patient who suffered a severe ADR as a 
consequence of  toxic interactions between the said two pharmacological treatments, as a 
result of  which the patient decided to sue the manufacturer for failure to fulfil its 
precautionary duties. The Court observed that epidemiological evidence showed a 
statistically significant correlation between the post-chemotherapy treatment under 
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scrutiny and post-dental surgery treatment.802 The Court however found in favour of  the 
defendant on the basis that the specific ADR suffered by the patient in question had been 
only atypically defined at the time of  the treatment.803 A solid definition of  the ADR at 
stake and its statistical correlation to the post-chemotherapy treatment only emerged after 
the patient had undergone the treatment and therefore after the manufacturer could have 
acted upon the emerging knowledge – an interpretation of  ‘reasonable’ availability which is 
arguably in line with the ECJ judgment and its national successors discussed above. The 
paucity and scarce circulation of  the evidence at the relevant time, considered by the Court 
to be insufficient to hold the producer liable, differs substantially from the Trilergan 
situation involving a university-developed experimental test at a relatively advanced stage. 
This brief  summary of  courts’ management of  complex evidence suggests 
significant capacity within the judiciary to confront highly technical matters and strike 
balanced decisions with the available legal tools. While these decisions are certainly 
characterised by a degree of  ‘policy-making’ (entailing value-based judgments), the 
argument here is that this should not be dismissed or criticised as overstepping, but rather 
welcomed as positive exogenous oversight of  regulatory procedures. While the approval 
process is constructed on scientific evidence, regulatory outputs (both at the regulatory-
design level and at the decision-making one) are very much based on what has been 
colourfully defined as “trans-science”804 – a discipline at the crossroads between pure 
science and policy involving decision-making on the basis of  partial information, but more 
generally grounded on a “conventionally established” scientific basis, which is inherently 
different from a proven scientific truth.805 The brief  overview presented here (and the 
observations made in chapter VII) suggests that courts have been shown to possess the 
ability of  engaging and complementing the trans-scientific discourse, adding valuable 
external insights to an otherwise self-referential system.  
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3.  Post-marketing judicial surveillance – a snapshot of  timing, 
compensation, and regulatory value  
The second possible criticism of  the ability of  courts to complement regulatory 
oversight of  pharmaceutical safety relates to the inherent lengthiness and inefficiencies of  
litigation proceedings, which are comparatively ill-suited for a task that requires prompt 
remedial action in the face of  emerging risks.806 The observations provided in chapters V, 
VII, and VIII seem however to contradict this assumption, as they show rather how 
administrative reactive measures suffer from structural delays, and in many cases are taken 
after litigation has been initiated (if  not after its conclusion). The following pages offer a 
snapshot of  the major cases analysed throughout the previous chapters in an attempt to 
highlight the timeliness of  litigation reactivity compared to administrative action. 
Vioxx – The timeline of  administrative measures was discussed in chapter V. First 
approved in 1999, the drug underwent a series of  labelling revisions after the VIGOR 
study showed an increase in the risk of  cardiovascular ADRs, and was voluntarily 
withdrawn by the marketing authorisation holder Merck in September 2004 – after the 
subsequent APPROVe trial demonstrated that the statistical increase of  cardiovascular 
events related to Vioxx use was significant. Litigation swiftly ensued (the first cases were 
filled in 2005 after the withdrawal),807 with varying outcomes, until the company decided in 
2010 to settle aggregate claims for a total of  roughly $4.5 billion.808 A subsequent 
settlement followed in 2011 with 44 individual states to resolve pending civil disputes for a 
total of  another $950 million.809 The outcomes of  litigation suggest that US victims were 
adequately compensated within a time span of  five to six years from the withdrawal.810 
Since Vioxx has been on the European market for roughly the same period of  time as the 
US, individual cases in Europe might be expected to have reached settlement, but no 
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 In past years the case against litigation of product liability claims has been strongly made for example 
by Polinsky M., Shavell S., “The Uneasy Case for Product Liability”, Harvard Law Review 123, 
2010; but see also the European debate on the preferability of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to court litigation, referred to in chapter VIII. 
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 Rogers v. Merck 6:2005 cv 02172 Alabama, 2005. 
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See the report by Drug Watch International, available at http://www.drugwatch.com/vioxx/lawsuit/.   
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 See ibidem.  
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 See the discussion in Lahav A. D., “Rough Justice”, March 2, 2010, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562677, suggesting that large settlements using statistical methods to 
compensate plaintiffs from the settled sum are currently the fairest method of compensation; but see 
also Erichson H., Zipursky B., ‘Consent versus Closure’, Cornell Law Review 96, 2011, suggesting 
that out of court settlements of this magnitude favour closure over consent of the plaintiffs (resulting 
in reduced compensation). 
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aggregate evidence to that effect is available.  
In the Vioxx case, the litigation system had accordingly no visible impact on the 
specific regulatory process and only a compensatory function. It must however be noted 
that the case is rather exceptional insofar as it involves a voluntary withdrawal after less 
than five years of  presence on the market. On the other hand, the subsequent regulatory 
reforms triggered by the saga have been discussed in chapter V. 
Avandia – Again, we have illustrated the major steps in chapter V. As recalled, 
initial doubts about the cardiovascular safety of  this anti-diabetes treatment led to different 
evaluations by the FDA and the EMA (who approved the product a year later on appeal by 
the manufacturer GSK). The turning point in the regulatory surveillance process was an 
independent meta-analysis published in June 2007.811 Following this event, the FDA and 
the EMA approved revised labelling containing ‘black-box’ warnings against the risk of  
cardiovascular ADRs. In 2010, subsequent reviews at the FDA prompted severe 
restrictions on the use of  the drug, while the EMA opted for a suspension of  the 
marketing authorisation. In 2010, and prior to both FDA and EMA final interventions, 
GSK was facing approximately 13,000 lawsuits in the US alone. The company reached a 
$460 million settlement in July the same year to close about 10,000 cases.812 In 2012 GSK 
reached a further agreement with the US Department of  Justice to settle charges relating 
to data withholding for about $3 billion.813 As for Vioxx, potential European lawsuits may 
have been settled individually, however numbers are not available. The Avandia timeline 
suggests that litigation and regulation proceeded at the same pace once relevant data were 
uncovered, with litigation producing a first major aggregate settlement three years after the 
start of  proceedings and a final comprehensive one in 2012 – encompassing both Avandia 
and other alleged misbehaviour by GSK. We are unable to provide equivalent numbers for 
the European market, but it is worth noting how EMA’s suspension followed swiftly 
(September 2010) upon the first mass settlement.  
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 See again Nissen S.E., Wolski K., “Effect of rosiglitazone on the risk of myocardial infarction and 
death from cardiovascular causes”, New England Journal of Medicine 356, 2007. 
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 See the report by Drug Watch International, available at 
http://www.drugwatch.com/avandia/lawsuit.php. 
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See US Department of Justice, “GSK to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations 
and Failure to Report Safety Data”, Press release of 2 July 2012, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/justice-news/.  This settlement covers misbehaviours related to a wider range 
of drugs including Paxil, see infra. 
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Paxil – The regulatory and litigation history of  Avandia is inextricably linked to 
Paxil. While the direct outcomes of  both the Vioxx and Avandia litigation were exclusively 
compensatory (the timeline suggests a consecutio between the first mass settlement in the US 
and the European suspension, but the material impact is unmeasurable), Paxil is interesting 
for two reasons. First, as recalled in chapter VII, the initial private lawsuit, successfully 
alleging failure to adequately warn for risk of  violent and suicidal tendencies associated 
with withdrawal upon suspension of  treatment, was a 2001 Wyoming case.814 Here the 
FDA acted following the litigation outcome with the issue of  a warning on severe 
withdrawal symptoms.815 Secondly, chapter VII discussed extensively how, as a result of  
growing civil litigation relating to side-effects in juvenile populations under off-label Paxil 
treatment, the New York Attorney General launched a lawsuit immediately settled by 
GSK.816 Beyond compensation, the regulatory outcome in this case was twofold – general 
and specific. At a general level the settlement required the compulsory publication of  all 
trials for a ten-year period (which allowed for instance the decisive meta-analysis of  
Avandia in NEJM). As for the specific case, three months after the settlement the FDA 
released an internal review of  clinical trials data confirming the increase of  risk in suicidal 
tendencies in adolescent populations and resulting in label review.817  
Phenergan – The Phenergan case has been analysed for its regulatory implications. 
The initial lawsuit brought by Ms Levine on the adverse effects of  intravenous methods of  
administration found her successful at both instances in the State of  Vermont.818 The 
interesting feature of  the case, confirmed by the Supreme Court judgment discussed in 
chapters VII and VIII, is to be found in the ulterior requirement prescribed by the 
Vermont courts to adequately warn of  risks related to the injectable version of  the drug. 
The ramifications of  the case for the US in terms of  interactions between regulatory 
frameworks and litigation have been discussed. The impact on the specific case is also 
noteworthy. Following the Supreme Court judgment, in September 2009 the FDA imposed 
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discussion in chapter VII. 
815
 In December 2001: see the revised labelling available in the FDA ‘Drug Approval Package’, available 
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 Levine v. Wyeth 944 A 2d 179, 184 Vermont, 2006 – see the discussion in chapter VII. 
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a ‘black box’ warning for all injectable forms of  Promethazine.819 
Trilergan, Genhevac, Levemir – Although less spectacular than the multi-billion 
American settlements, European cases have proven capable of  impacting the output of  
regulatory assessments, with litigation outcomes both supplementing and anticipating 
regulatory measures. As discussed above, Trilergan established the principle of  a regulatory 
assessment to be adjusted and refined in light of  the manufacturers’ superior knowledge 
of  a highly technical field (a conception not dissimilar to that adopted by the Vermont 
court in Wyeth – that FDA assessments are a “floor and not a ceiling”).820 The case on the 
Hepatitis C vaccination in France821 has been briefly mentioned in chapter VIII while 
addressing common tendencies in various judicial settings regarding the interpretation of  
specific causation. The French cases supplemented the original regulatory safety 
assessment by allowing individual reports and non-statistical evidence to establish a causal 
link between vaccination and a series of  neurological disorders – even in the absence of  
supporting general epidemiological data. Finally, with the CJEU decision of  2014 
confirming the validity of  the German AMG in its amended version,822 the German courts 
could require the manufacturer of  Levemir to disclose all relevant information relative to 
the contested ADR – a beneficial result for the regulatory post-marketing surveillance 
regime, predominantly based on manufacturers’ disclosure. 
The chapters dedicated to the judicial lens in pharmaceutical safety point at three 
interrelated conclusions. First, chapter VII suggests that courts do have an impact on data 
availability. They do so by either deciding cases or driving them to settlement, or with 
specific procedural decisions oriented at data disclosure. Second, chapter VIII discussed 
the intricacies of  ‘toxic torts’ involving complex scientific evidence, in which it is much 
easier for the litigation system to be a proxy for participatory mechanisms in the presence 
of  consolidated collective redress schemes (and in particular American class actions). 
Where these mechanisms are absent, the compensatory function of  litigation is reduced, 
but the complementary regulatory function is preserved when cases do reach the courts. 
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Third, the brief  recapping exposition in this chapter argues that courts can indeed be an 
adequate instrument of  post-marketing oversight, as they can show relative competence in 
addressing complex trans-scientific matters, as well as a reaction time comparatively 
competitive with that of  regulatory measures. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
REASSEMBLING THE PUZZLE 
THE DOUBLE CASE FOR JUDICIAL COMPLEMENTARY GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 This final chapter reassembles the puzzle towards the concluding argument in 
favour of  an enhanced role of  courts in complementing regulatory schemes of  
pharmaceutical safety. The material covered throughout eight substantive chapters is re-
systematised here and confronted with the questions and hypothesis initially raised in 
chapter I. The first two sections accordingly assess the results of  the analysis of  the 
institutional design and of  the judicial lens in pharmaceutical safety. On these premises, the 
third section will suggest that a judicial ‘hard look’ at regulatory processes can provide 
substantial assistance in enhancing consumer safety. The Introduction opened the floor for 
a debate as to whether problematic regulatory features, exacerbated by the increasing 
transnational development of  standards and procedures, call for renewed in-depth 
surveillance from a perspective external to the regulatory system’s mechanisms. The 
conclusions emerging are as follows. 
 
1.  Closed regulatory systems and problematic outputs 
 After giving an overview of  what we called different types of  rebus in 
pharmaceutical regulation, the thesis developed an analysis of  the regulatory architecture, 
referred to as ‘the institutional design’. The reconstruction in chapter II served the 
purpose of  tracing the developmental path of  pharmaceutical regulation in the two major 
markets which form the general investigative object of  the thesis: the US and the EU. In 
light of  the transnational developments of  the last decades, the description of  the 
institutional design also involved the ICH, as a crucial forum for guidelines and standard-
setting.  
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 What emerged from this first step was a progressive evolution of  the major 
regulatory agencies throughout three successive phases. The first phase we have defined as 
the acquisition of  an ever greater independence by agencies and what can be referred to as 
their internal ‘bodies of  expertise’ vis à vis political institutions (both in the policy-making 
and in the decision-taking stages). The second phase, logically following the initial one, 
consisted of  the creation and consolidation of  a significant asymmetry between the formal 
distribution of  power among political institutions and agencies, and the substantial exercise 
of  said power – in particular with the consolidation of  de facto decision-making power in 
the hands of  specialised committees such as the CDER and the CHMP. While formally a 
great deal of  decision and policy-making power remained within political institutions (for 
example with the Commission remaining the final decision-maker acting upon EMA’s 
advice), the actual exercise of  power became fundamentally outsourced to agencies that 
have been organising that exercise independently. The third phase identified was the shift 
to the transnational space, where a dichotomy exists between the transnational nature of  
the regulatory process and the domestic design of  the regulatory frameworks. The 
description of  the ICH in the concluding section highlighted the peculiar nature of  this 
transnational forum, the uncertain physiognomy of  which questions its ability to introduce 
a reliable international regulatory structure. 
The description of  the institutional design and its progressive separation from the 
rest of  the public sphere, coupled with the transnational shift, required a ‘questioning’ of  
three salient aspects. The first element, analysed in chapter III, involved the quality, 
provenance, and compatibility to receiving markets of  scientific data resulting from 
outsourced clinical trials. The chapter started from the hypothetical premise that a 
dichotomy between domestically designed regulatory frameworks and transnational 
practices can create difficulties for the quality of  safety and efficacy assessments. The 
argument suggests that strong domestic regulations can be vulnerable when permeated by 
exogenous factors that are not fully accounted for. In particular the concern lies in the 
effectiveness and the level of  safety delivery that can be expected from a transnational 
practice shoehorned into domestic schemes. This chapter had to be constructed on the 
basis of  aggregate numbers, as product-specific research was undermined by the 
substantial inaccessibility of  essential data (an obstacle which the recent EU Regulation 
536/2014 will possibly surmount, if  only for future EU-based research). The results of  the 
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chapter’s analysis highlighted a preoccupying degree of  uncertainty, specifically relating to 
four major factors: (1) structural deficiencies in third countries’ data control quality, (2) 
divergences in therapeutic culture between testing and receiving markets, (3) ethical 
misconduct with scientific implications (especially from the ROW region), and (4) issues 
related to patient recruitment, treatment-naïvety, and genetic aspects of  treatments’ 
success or failure. The tentative conclusion reached was that since consensus on the 
phenomenon of  out-sourcing trials is widespread among scientists and regulators, and 
consensus on the ambiguity of  the quality of  the resulting scientific data is broad within 
the scientific community, a concrete legal issue ensues regarding substantial compliance 
with requirements of  safety and efficacy in the receiving markets. Coming back to the 
initial hypothesis laid down in chapter I, according to which the increasing number of  
bodies involved in the approval process of  new medicines across the world generates non-
negligible levels of  uncertainty as to the quality of  the emerging data, the findings of  
chapter III, while not conclusive, open the floor to a debate. 
As argued in chapter I, the development of  pharmaceutical regulation poses 
problems not only on the effectiveness but also on the legitimacy side. Thus, chapter IV 
shifted the focus of  the ‘questioning’ to the provenance, law-making mechanisms, and 
sources of  legitimacy of  the rules governing regulatory practices, in particular as regards 
the acceptance of  foreign data. The intent was to uncover the mechanisms through which 
strong but domestically oriented regulatory frameworks absorb external inputs. Following 
the recalled scheme of  threefold regulatory evolution, the analysis was focused on the 
second and third evolutionary phases, namely the detachment of  regulatory power from 
political oversight and the ensuing shift to the transnational arena, entailing a problematic 
dichotomy with the domestic nature of  regulatory systems. The conclusions here were 
twofold. On the one hand, the analysis suggested that the mechanisms of  alternative 
deliberative democracy, very much relied upon at the EU level and somewhat in the US, 
according to which decisions are reached (short of  classic representative democracy 
mechanisms) via stakeholder consensus, are unfit for the transnational scenario led by the 
ICH. The carefully crafted EU procedural standards succumb in the ICH arena to a 
negotiating logic the process of  which is hardly measurable. Facing substantial difficulties 
in shaping a legitimating mechanism at the rule-making stage, the alternative is an output-
based legitimacy – based on the efficiency and efficacy of  the policy results. The 
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concluding observation in this sense was focused on the duality of  policy objectives typical 
of  pharmaceutical regulation: facilitating marketability of  products and ensuring end-user 
safety. The first limb of  the policy commitment is consistently pursued by the regular 
implementation of  regulatory guidelines oriented towards expedited and efficient 
marketing approval. As for the protection of  health and safety, the materials analysed 
throughout the thesis suggest a measure of  caution, and invite in-depth reflection on the 
consequences of  clinical-trials outsourcing and resource limitations of  monitoring 
agencies. The second hypothesis laid down in chapter I suggests that the ICH is upholding 
trade considerations as a primary goal, and achieving that goal through public-private 
negotiations where core choices on levels of  risk exposure are negotiated. The discussed 
centrality acquired by ICH Guidelines such as the GCP or the SPCT for mutual 
recognition of  clinical trials data seems to substantiate this hypothesis. 
To put the institutional design to the test of  safety delivery, chapter V offered an 
evaluation of  safety outcomes through the analysis of  a series of  cases. The initial 
argument was that uncertainties of  data quality and provenance, coupled with issues of  
legitimacy of  the rule-making mechanisms and accountability of  the rule-makers, could 
only be surmounted by the highest results in the achievement of  legislative goals – and in 
particular, the achievement of  consumer safety, in accordance with the general perspective 
of  the thesis. To this end, the case studies were structured to question the quality of  the 
pre-marketing approval process and the ability of  the post-marketing surveillance 
mechanisms, as currently designed, to overcome issues of  data uncertainty and to 
effectively react to emerging safety issues (a double requirement for the output of  the 
regulatory system to overcome the ‘democratic deficit’ at the rule-making stage). The focus 
was therefore on safety outcomes interpreted as a sum of  pre-marketing results and 
effectiveness of  reactive measures. The results suggested, again, cautionary reflections. As 
recalled, a measure of  uncertainty seems to permeate pre-marketing scrutiny because the 
provenance and reliability of  data is being progressively (in parallel to the increasing 
transnationalisation of  procedures) impacted by major complicating factors. The analysis 
of  the safety output of  regulatory mechanisms suggests that risk discovery is particularly 
difficult at the pre-marketing stage (again, the problematic features described in chapter III 
compound this difficulty –Vioxx for instance, despite the impossibility of  pinpointing the 
location of  pivotal trials, was admittedly tested transnationally).  But more prominently, 
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what emerged is that post-marketing risk-discovery appears to be characterised by 
elements of  fortuity that are more the product of  imperfect regulatory mechanisms than 
of  unavoidable scientific hazard, while the reactions of  the regulatory system can prove to 
be slow and ineffective. An ulterior complicating factor is the lack of  sufficient resources 
at the agencies’ disposal to perform their inspection duties both pre- and post-marketing.  
 A fundamental question raised in chapter I was: to what extent is procedure affecting 
substance? In light of  the institutional design’s analysis, the answer is threefold. First, it 
seems that procedure affects the quality of  scientific data insofar as multi-local testing 
raises fundamental safety questions yet to be comprehensively addressed by regulatory 
mechanisms (chapter III). Second, the shift to the transnational arena has transformed 
procedurally standardised decision-making mechanisms into a negotiation process, the 
proceedings of  which are not fully accounted for (chapter IV). Third, post-marketing 
mechanisms run the risk of  serious lapses in the delivery of  effective safety control, which 
risk is at least in part a function of  their insufficient funding structures (chapter V).  These 
problematic aspects of  post-marketing surveillance, independent per se from the 
transnational procedures, can be aggravated by the increased pre-marketing uncertainty 
resulting from the analysis provided in the first part of  the thesis. 
A further question suggested in chapter I was to the effect: are we not asking too much 
from regulation under the current circumstances? The four chapters dedicated to the institutional 
design of  pharmaceutical regulation provided a series of  pointers corroborating the 
argument that the regulatory system cannot be self-sufficient in the pursuit of  consumer 
safety. The subsequent part of  the thesis shifted the focus to the ability of  courts to 
constitute the necessary exogenous complement to open up and assist the otherwise closed 
system, as initially described and emerging from the analysis of  regulatory design. 
 
2.  Technical complexity and fundamental choices – The easy case for 
judicial complementarity 
 Analysing the lens of  the judiciary in pharmaceutical safety entailed a complex and 
multi-layered study of  a number of  defining features of  liability rules and court processes. 
To argue for courts as the fit and necessary agent to open the closed system, the opening 
chapter VI began from the observation that the most prominent role of  courts in 
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pharmaceutical cases is to adjudicate tort claims. The analysis therefore focused on the 
development of  liability rules in the US and the EU as applied to pharmaceutical product 
liability cases. The focus was on specific aspects of  those rules, subsequently deepened in 
the following chapters: the ideas of  foreseeability of  risk, availability of  knowledge, and 
regulatory compliance, all closely linked with the regulatory framework previously 
analysed. The resulting overview was relatively fragmented at first sight, with legal and 
interpretative divergence between the US and the EU as well as within the EU. Generally, 
the overview suggested a very case-specific identification of  the issues to be adjudicated 
(with concurrence of  compensatory and deterrent goals in different proportions 
depending on the legal setting in question). That notwithstanding, the brief  analysis of  
product liability rules seemed to open the door to the potential for judges to question the 
origin of  a defective product, and in particular, looking beyond traditional tort 
adjudication, whether the cause of  a harmful defect could be a flaw in the regulation 
allowing for low-quality pre-marketing assessment.  That is the idea  underpinning a ‘hard 
look’ doctrine, suggested throughout the thesis and expanded in the final sections of  the 
chapter. 
The paradigm needed to be tested, and with a sequence of  three brief  chapters, the 
thesis proceeded to address three fundamental questions raised in chapter I, somewhat 
mirroring the analysis undertaken for the institutional design. 
The first question was the following. Can courts play a role in the management of  
pharmaceutical products in terms of  introducing transparency and coherence as regards the quality, 
relevance, and nature of  scientific knowledge? In other words, can courts go beyond pure cost-benefit 
assessments, deferential to regulatory decisions, and enter the realm of  uncertainty with value-based 
judgments? 
Chapter VII addressed the matter. The results of  the study were composite. The 
analysis of  case law provided in two sections suggested that, through judicial intervention, 
scientific evidence that gets lost or withheld in the regulatory process can be uncovered 
and integrated in specific risk assessments, or made generally available for more diverse 
purposes – this was particularly evident in the GlaxoSmithKline Paxil settlement leading to 
temporary full data disclosure. The ability to authoritatively impose full disclosure of  
information enables courts to effectively supplement regulatory agencies’ data pools, 
overcoming structural difficulties encountered by regulators in accessing essential 
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information (which while necessarily limited on pre-marketing assessment, appears to be 
unnecessarily uncertain, and equally so at the post-marketing stage as a result of  imperfect 
surveillance mechanisms, as discussed above). Going beyond liability cases, the chapter 
showed how imposing disclosure can influence the regulatory system at large (with access 
to information guaranteed beyond the facts of  a single case, and even the potential to 
influence forthcoming legislation). 
 Beyond the capacity of  individual court decisions to directly influence accessibility 
of  data, the analysis moved to related issues of  knowledge availability, going back to the 
field of  product litigation. What emerged was interesting. The chapter concluded with an 
observation that while the attitudes of  US and EU courts towards access to and inclusion 
of  relevant scientific knowledge in liability assessments have developed through time 
independently and in adjacent rather than juxtaposing fields, the results are not dissimilar. 
There is a common theme identifiable in the fact that both judiciaries seem to share a 
significant level of  awareness as regards the flaws of  the regulatory framework – an 
awareness that appears to cover the limited data grounding pre-market approvals as much 
as the shortcomings of  post-marketing surveillance. This awareness seems however 
counterbalanced by a generally deferential approach to regulatory findings – with 
compliance still considered at least  prima facie strong evidence of  safety – which typically 
restrains courts from questioning the origin of  emerging safety issues (potentially the 
regulatory architecture itself) and confines their enquiry instead exclusively to specific 
conduct. The positive attitudes shared by American and European judiciaries towards 
inclusion of  relevant knowledge in liability assessments does warrant the conclusion that 
the ‘keys’ to open the closed system are in place. The question reproduced above asked 
whether courts can impact the quality of  scientific knowledge. The analysis suggests that 
they certainly can impact the availability of  knowledge and its inclusion in the assessment 
of  safety – thus indirectly improving the quality of  the assessment itself. The discussion 
over the various judicial debates also highlighted a judicial inclination towards entering the 
realm of  uncertainty with value-based judgments. This inclination emerged in the following 
chapters too.  
The second question raised in chapter I on the potential role of  courts inquired: 
can courts act as a democratic agent? Can they act as a proxy for participatory democracy which appears to 
be lacking at a transnational level through accessible national enforcement mechanisms? 
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 This was a particularly complicated issue to tackle. To provide a meaningful answer 
the structure of  chapter VIII had to be multi-faceted. In particular, the issue of  
accessibility of  courts (a premise to evaluate their ability to act as a ‘proxy’ for 
participatory democracy) was divided into two major aspects. The first, proof  of  causation 
in liability litigation, is an integral part of  accessibility as proving a causal link in a field 
very much characterised by scientific uncertainty is a formidable obstacle for any litigant. 
The analysis suggested an encouraging picture, showing the versatility of  judges and their 
ability to confront highly technical material in making fundamental choices about the 
elements of  causation – which contributes to answering the first question raised above on 
the ability of  judges to engage uncertainty with value-based judgments. The scene 
depicted, again composite and with degrees of  variations across different legal orders, 
allows for the identification of  a common thread. General statistics emerging from 
epidemiological studies are more and more relied upon, with the caveat that non-statistical 
and individual elements can or have to be taken into account depending on the facts at 
hand. While proof  of  specific causation remains the heaviest burden on plaintiffs in 
product liability cases involving medicines, the judicial interpretation appears to be both 
generally reasonable and evolving over time, suggesting progressively incremental know-
how in handling complex evidence. 
 The second and related aspect took up the broader point that aggregate litigation, 
and in particular the American model of  class actions, seems better suited than individual 
cases to guarantee widespread accessibility of  court processes. In particular, the 
aggregation of  individuals sharing a given factual commonality contributes from the pre-trial 
phase to building the evidentiary foundations of  both general and specific causation. 
Absent similar mechanisms in the EU, access to justice maintains its causal difficulties and 
requires more individual initiative. The impression is however that once cases reach the 
EU courts they do have an impact, as the analysis in both chapters VII and VIII 
uncovered.  
The answer to the question on the ability of  courts to act as a proxy for 
participatory democracy is, then, necessarily multi-layered. The first point is that the US 
court system appears to be still better equipped than its EU counterparts in allowing 
diffuse accessibility. A debate is in motion in the EU, and it will be interesting to evaluate 
what kind of  collective redress mechanisms (applicable to our field of  interest) may be 
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devised. A second point relates to an issue identified within the question: can courts be 
expected to act as a proxy for participatory democracy through national enforcement 
mechanisms? Two observations are necessary. On the one hand, access to justice is a 
desirable goal because of  the direct compensatory effect of  court decisions – and here is 
where any obstacles to individual participation in litigation are problematic. On the other 
hand, in terms of  exercising a form of  quality control over regulatory processes (a 
bottom-up ‘relocation’ of  public control, as suggested in chapter I and later in this 
section), arguably even a handful of  cases may be sufficient. The analysis has shown how, 
when cases do reach courts, they are competently discussed with significant repercussions. 
It appears that in this case, the answer to the initial question has to be ambivalent and 
requires further development in the third section of  this chapter. 
The final question raised in chapter I tackles the issue of  safety delivery: what are the 
opportunities for courts to deliver consumer safety (and if  so, to go beyond the specific case and influence the 
policy-making, which entails a broad understanding of  the concept of  ‘regulatory compliance’)? This 
question had already received a positive but partial answer in chapters VII and VIII. In 
tackling both critical topics of  knowledge availability and causation, courts have shown an 
ability to implicitly or explicitly engage with the regulatory framework. Chapter IX 
provided elements pointing at a significant capacity of  courts to manage complex issues 
and, in particular, trans-scientific issues involving a delicate balance between scientific 
evidence and core value choices. The idea of  ‘regulatory compliance’ has been interpreted, 
for example, as a minimum threshold necessarily complemented, when required, by further 
duties of  care. The quality and depth of  the judicial debate on matters relating to the 
nature, reliability (leaning towards the ‘policy side’ of  the mix, without unduly intruding 
into the realm of  pure scientific intricacies), and accessibility of  scientific evidence, and the 
responsibility of  the manufacturer therefor, corroborates the claim that courts are 
adequate venues for the review of  regulatory assessments very much based on trans- or 
regulatory science. On the ability to deliver consumer safety, the selection of  cases 
suggests therefore a positive case-specific answer, while the analysis summarised above 
also showed how courts’ decisions have the potential to impact the regulatory framework. 
That impact seems however still very much episodic, and while judges show a significant 
degree of  awareness of  regulatory flaws, this tends to be translated into case-specific 
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reactive decisions, with regulatory impact beyond the single case happening more through 
fortuitous small-scale domino effects than systematic reviews. 
 What emerged from the overall analysis allows for a preliminary conclusion, the 
contours of  which have been traced throughout the four chapters dedicated to the 
judiciary. This is what we refer to in this section’s title as the ‘easy case’ for judicial 
complementarity. The idea of  an ‘easy case’ is borrowed from John Goldberg and 
Benjamin Zipursky823 in their effective rebuttal of  Mitchel Polinsky and Steven Shavell’s 
“Uneasy Case for Product Liability”.824 The argument of  Goldberg and Zipursky revolves 
around how doing away with product liability is unsatisfying in terms of  tort’s deterrent 
and compensatory functions and victims’ welfare. In particular, the key to the argument 
developed throughout the piece is the incremental nature of  the benefits brought by 
product liability litigation as regards consumer protection, wrongdoing deterrence, equality 
before the law, and the necessary reinforcement of  general “norms of  responsibility”.825 
What can we add in light of  our analysis? As suggested in chapters VII to IX, the 
incremental value is more subtle than the here-and-now, going at times beyond the 
specificity of  the case at hand. For instance, leaving aside the obvious example of  
disclosure orders that directly facilitate the discovery of  unrelated harms (the 
GlaxoSmithKline Paxil settlement), a sequence of  cases may generate positive incremental 
judicial know-how relating to complex technical matters, which has the merit of  
progressively refining judicial understandings of  trans-scientific issues (as we have 
observed regarding admissibility and accessibility of  evidence and proof  of  causation). 
The easy case for judicial complementarity seems also to involve the notion of  
“relocation”826 of  the state’s control to the post-factum monitoring phase, in a field 
characterised by detachment between regulatory bodies from public circuits and the move 
to the transnational sphere. 
 Still, there is room to argue that the full potential for judicial complementarity in 
pharmaceutical regulation has yet to be reached. Courts have yet to fully develop what we 
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have referred to as a ‘pedagogical’ function vis à vis the regulatory system towards the 
improvement of  safety assessments – a role that would also refine the relocation of  the 
state into a more comprehensive, less case-specifically reactive space. The argument, 
suggested in chapter I and referred to throughout the thesis in the analysis of  existing legal 
tools (or ‘keys’) to open up the system, is now to be finalised in the following section. The 
crucial point is the notion of  ‘deference’. What emerged from the analysis of  the judicial 
role in pharmaceutical safety is that the courts’ interventions are mostly interpreted as an 
incremental factor ‘topping up’ regulatory safety assessments otherwise deferred to as 
proof  of  safety. The argument here is that a ‘hard look’ could be better suited to 
investigate the origins of  problems rather than simply reacting to their unfolding – thus 
not only opening up the closed system, but also breaking the circle of  self-perpetuation. This is 
the ‘complex case’ entailing an answer to the question raised in the opening chapter: are we 
asking judges the right questions? 
 
3.  A lesson from the past with an eye to the future – The complex case 
for a pedagogical role of  courts  
 The complex case for judicial complementarity draws upon an old theory 
elaborated by the American judiciary between the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘hard look’ 
doctrine. Sheila Jasanoff  effectively describes the evolution of  judicial oversight of  
agencies’ decision and policy-making activity.827 The ‘hard look’ doctrine emerged as a 
means for judges to monitor agencies at a time when health and safety regulation was still 
in its early stages. A judicial ‘hard look’ involved not only a review of  the scientific 
arguments and evidence grounding an agency’s decisions, but also the “agency’s procedural 
choices” in order to ascertain that “all relevant issues had been thoroughly aired, and that 
experts holding different viewpoints had been given an opportunity to participate”.828 The 
doctrine was a rough one and gave rise to alternating results, running the undoubted risk at 
times of  unsound decisions based on anecdotal grounds, especially when courts ventured 
into substituting themselves for risk assessors.829 The recognised merit of  the theory lies 
however in its ability to open up “a bureaucratic-technical culture that [operated], for the 
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most part, out of  the public eye”.830 Specifically, what the judiciary managed to achieve, 
through a decade and a half  of  ‘hard looks’ at regulatory outcomes, was enhancing the 
regulators’ duty to make their decisions clear and understandable to a non-expert public, 
with rational explanations of  the use of  data and contentious scientific issues addressed 
thoroughly and accessibly – in this sense, courts ‘educated’ the emerging regulators on 
their public role which resulted in a “democratization of  technical decision-making”.831 
The doctrine was subsequently abandoned in the mid-1980s when the political discourse 
shifted towards deregulation and, to reduce the burden of  thorough reviews, courts began 
to embrace a deferential attitude to regulatory assessments involving complex expertise. 
What is the potential lesson here? The complex case for a renewed pedagogical 
role of  courts in enhancing pharmaceutical safety requires consideration of  the ‘hard look’ 
idea in light of  the results of  the thesis summarised above. In particular, the question is 
what a ‘hard look’ in liability litigation could bring in terms of  enhancing effectiveness and 
improving legitimacy of  the regulatory system. The answer requires reflection on the 
issues described in the first part of  the thesis dedicated to institutional design. We 
observed in chapter II a detachment of  emerging pharmaceutical regulators from the rest 
of  the public sphere.  This is the phase during which, in the US, courts developed the 
‘hard look’ – to educate inexperienced regulators on fundamental principles of  
accountability for their decision-making process and its outputs. The following shift, 
represented by the dichotomy between the national and the transnational sphere, in which 
regulators from consolidated frameworks negotiate the contents of  new regulatory 
measures among themselves and with industry representatives, represents another novel 
phase in which regulators can benefit from a ‘re-educational’ judicial role. The magnitude 
of  the phenomenon, namely the steady growth of  transnational regulatory steps (especially 
clinical trials) in approval procedures (entailing growing reliance of  domestic regulatory 
systems on transnational data, with its baggage of  uncertainties), calls for scrutiny of  the 
various problematic aspects analysed throughout the thesis (in particular in chapters III 
and IV), which are yet to be fully grasped by domestic regulators. While general judicial 
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trends seem to vindicate an incremental role for judicial control832 – adding ulterior 
elements to regulatory compliance, the ‘easy case’ – a pedagogical take (a ‘hard look’) could 
uncover to what extent the criticalities facing pharmaceutical regulation are unavoidable or 
if  they are in part a direct product of  standards and standard-setting mechanisms.  In 
other words, a ‘hard look’ could address the origin of  the problem – if  the institutional 
design is indeed where a particular problem arises. 
The democratisation of  technical discourse, achieved in the US through some 
fifteen years of  hard judicial scrutiny, is needed again for a non-dissimilar democratisation 
of  the transnational technical discourse, entrenched in inaccessible negotiating 
mechanisms – to open up the closed system. Abandoning the deferential approach whereby 
regulatory compliance is proof  (strong though not conclusive) of  a product’s safety, and 
thereby engaging the regulators with the criticalities of  the approval mechanisms (with 
their transnational complications), could also be the tool to break the circle of  self-
perpetuation – in this sense, giving a positive answer to the question raised in chapter I and 
above on the ability of  courts to contribute to the legitimacy of  this transnational 
regulatory architecture. The judicial tools elaborated by both American and European 
judiciaries, described throughout chapters VI to IX, seem fit to take up the challenge. 
Suggested in chapter I, and corroborated by the subsequent analysis, the evolution 
of  the state from rule-maker to rule-taker in pharmaceutical regulation has been 
accompanied by a form of  ‘relocation’ of  its authority to ex post judicial controls (with the 
significant exception of  post-crisis legislative reactions, as discussed in chapter V). If  the 
locus auctoritatis of  pharmaceutical regulation is somewhat difficult to grasp in the current 
transnational setting, a ‘hard look’ at regulatory outputs, together with the beneficial 
impacts suggested above, could represent the completion of  this relocation, whereby 
authority over unrefined regulatory practices can be regained through judicial oversight. It 
appears then that the responsiveness of  courts to private claims, one of  the most 
traditional features of  nation states, is already performing, though with notable margins 
for improvement, a form of  public oversight of  an otherwise hardly challengeable 
regulatory system, now gone transnational. In Ulrich Beck’s words, judicial authority 
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constitutes a “counter-power” in this global age,833 yet to fulfil its true potential. 
 
4. A concluding remark 
 The results of  this study are admittedly not conclusive in a number of  
aspects. They rather raise a series of  unanswered questions that could be the object of  
future research endeavours. For instance, when discussing the institutional architecture of  
pharmaceutical safety and its dynamics, a recurring element encountered in the materials 
analysed and the ensuing draft of  this work is the strong trade-oriented drive of  regulatory 
cooperation initiatives. The need for reducing costs and easing regulatory burdens is 
continuously restated – from the early stages of  the 1989 ICDRA conference, to the ICH’s 
foundation and subsequent activity, all the way to the current debates on TTIP agreements. 
Questions arise due to the particular nature of  the transnational regulatory networking 
device in place in this specific field. Is the trade necessity of  unimpeded market access for 
pharmaceutical products overriding health and safety concerns? In other words, are the 
rule-makers unduly susceptible to corporate influences? If  so, how much of  an impact is 
the parallel lack of  participation of  civil society having on the quality of  standards 
adopted? And beyond this, the question could be: is there evidence of  a conscious shift 
towards sub-standard practices to ensure marketability and what would incentivise (or de-
incentivise) such a shift?  
These aspects deserve further digging in the future. Parallel fields of  risk regulation 
suggest that industry can, on the contrary, be strongly invested in the promotion of  high 
safety standards. A specific example is the regulation of  food safety (in particular in the 
EU). While this is not the place to go into the details of  this area of  safety regulation, an 
observation can be made that private certification mechanisms, developed and 
implemented by the food industry itself, complement international and domestic 
legislation to the extent that they form an integral (and at times a dominant) feature of  the 
governance mechanism ensuring health protection. Naturally, the parallels with 
pharmaceutical safety cannot be taken for granted, and neither can the conclusions drawn 
from food regulation be transplanted tout court to the pharmaceutical field – for a number 
of  reasons that touch upon differences in the legislative and institutional framework at 
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both national(s) and international levels, and differences in the shape of  the two markets. 
Yet, the example suggests a measure of  caution in evaluating the direct involvement of  
industry in regulatory schemes. The materials collated in this thesis are insufficient to 
support conclusive arguments one way or the other. That was not the raison d’être of  this 
study. 
The initial curiosity inspiring the genesis and development of  this project derives 
from the simple observation that pharmaceutical injuries, despite the construction of  the 
most extensive regulatory oversight mechanisms conceived for any product specific area, 
keep occurring. In particular, the analysis has shown that major, widespread harms 
materialise on a relatively cyclical basis, occasionally triggering legislative reactions. The 
discussion of  the effects of  regulatory compliance in liability cases further suggests that 
routine harmful events keep occurring and represent a significant social cost in terms of  
individual injuries and impact on healthcare systems. Why is that so? Is this simply 
inherent to the nature of  pharmaceutical products, and therefore unavoidable, or is there 
room for improvement? This, in essence, is what the thesis tried to confront.  
The description of  problematic features in the institutional design, its progressive 
evolution, and subsequent transnational development opens a significant space for a 
debate in legal scholarship. The questions raised above in this section, concerning the 
possible existence of  bias in the rule-makers, should be rephrased. If  the regulatory 
mechanisms as they stand do show a concerning degree of  uncertainty and fallibility, what 
we should really ask (above and beyond a quest for culpability) is: can we do better? There 
is no single or clear-cut solution to the challenging task of  improving the protection of  
health and safety in a field involving unavoidably dangerous products – claiming otherwise 
would expose one to the risk of  over-simplification, which is not only a scientific sin but 
more prominently an unrealistic foundation for remedial action. The intent of  this thesis 
was rather to point to a set of  existing legal tools, one that doesn’t require profound 
reform or imaginative institutional restructuring, but has already demonstrated an ability to 
complement governance in uncertainty-ridden cases. Admittedly, the thesis very much 
limited its focus to the selected complementary instrument: courts. This was an explicit 
choice dictated by the conviction that external monitoring is key to a stronger regulatory 
architecture.  
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We do not contend that ‘doing better’ in pharmaceutical safety depends exclusively 
upon heavier reliance on courts. The problems exposed throughout the thesis, however, do 
deserve attentive discussion in legal scholarship, while the judicial tools analysed confirm 
the basic capacity of  courts to address (at least in part) fundamental criticalities. The key 
argument of  this work – a pedagogical role for courts, an argument ad adiuvandum rather 
than contra – is worth debating. The floor is open. 
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